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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s panels decided approximately 
134 insurance-law or insurance-related disputes between July 1, 2010, and June 
30, 2011.1  To a greater or lesser degree, however, only twenty-six decisions are 
simply highlighted or discussed fully in this Article.2  Of course, the reason is 
not complicated: Slip opinions and unpublished decisions comprised the greater 
majority of the Fifth Circuit’s rulings.3  In addition, among the cases selected 
                                                                                                                 
 1. On August 1, 2011, the author accessed Westlaw and searched the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit’s database (CTA5).  The author submitted the query, “sy (insurer policy insured insurance) & date 
(after June 30, 2010) & date (before July 1, 2011),” which produced 134 insurance-law and insurance-related 
cases. 
 2. Each of the following twenty-six decisions were read thoroughly and considered for a full review and 
analysis: Case 1: Danos Marine, Inc. v. Certain Primary Prot. and Indem. Underwriters, 613 F.3d 479 (5th 
Cir. July 2010)—Eastern District of Louisiana; Case 2: Stewart Enters., Inc. v. RSUI Indem. Co., 614 F.3d 
117 (5th Cir. Aug. 2010) (per curiam)—Eastern District of Louisiana; Case 3: Bayle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 615 
F.3d 350 (5th Cir. Aug. 2010)—Eastern District of Louisiana; Case 4: Consol. Cos., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. 
Co., 616 F.3d 422 (5th Cir. Aug. 2010)—Eastern District of Louisiana; Case 5: Bradley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
620 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. Sept. 2010)—Eastern District of Louisiana; Case 6: Cal–Dive Int’l, Inc. v. Seabright 
Ins. Co., 627 F.3d 110 (5th Cir. Nov. 2010)—Eastern District of Louisiana; Case 7: Seacor Holdings, Inc. v. 
Commonwealth Ins. Co., 635 F.3d 675 (5th Cir. Mar. 2011)—Eastern District of Louisiana; Case 8: Dickie 
Brennan & Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 636 F.3d 683 (5th Cir. Mar. 2011)—Eastern District of Louisiana; Case 
9: French v. Allstate Indem. Co., 637 F.3d 571 (5th Cir. Apr. 2011)—Eastern District of Louisiana; Case 10: 
Bayou Steel Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 506 (5th Cir. May 2011)—Eastern District of 
Louisiana; Case 11: Penthouse Owners Ass’n v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 612 F.3d 383 (5th 
Cir. July 2010)—Southern District of Mississippi; Case 12: Canal Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 625 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 
Nov. 2010)—Northern District of Mississippi; Case 13: Capital City Ins. Co. v. Hurst, 632 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. 
Feb. 2011)—Southern District of Mississippi; Case 14: Barden Miss. Gaming L.L.C. v. Great N. Ins. Co., 638 
F.3d 476 (5th Cir. Apr. 2011)—Northern District of Mississippi; Case 15: Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Navigators 
Ins. Co., 611 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. July 2010)—Southern District of Texas; Case 16: Standard Waste Sys. Ltd. v. 
Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 612 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. July 2010)—Northern District of Texas; Case 17: Great Am. 
Ins. Co. v. AFS/IBEX Fin. Servs., Inc., 612 F.3d 800 (5th Cir. July 2010)—Northern District of Texas; Case 
18: RSR Corp. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851 (5th Cir. July 2010)—Northern District of Texas; Case 19: 
Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Bonilla, 613 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. July 2010)—Northern District of Texas; Case 20: 
Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Bay Rock Operating Co., 614 F.3d 105 (5th Cir. Aug. 2010)—Western District of 
Texas; Case 21: DPC Indus., Inc. v. Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 609 (5th Cir. Aug. 2010)—
Southern District of Texas; Case 22: Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Rentech Steel, L.L.C., 620 F.3d 558 
(5th Cir. Sept. 2010)—Northern District of Texas; Case 23: Keller Founds., Inc. v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. 
Co., 626 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. Nov. 2010)—Western District of Texas; Case 24: VRV Dev. L.P. v. Mid-
Continent Cas. Co., 630 F.3d 451 (5th Cir. Jan. 2011)—Northern District of Texas; Case 25: Md. Cas. Co. v. 
Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co., 639 F.3d 701 (5th Cir. Apr. 2011)—Western District of Texas; Case 26: 
Evanston Ins. Co. v. Legacy of Life, Inc., 645 F.3d 739 (5th Cir. June 2011)—Western District of Texas. 
After weighing the relative significance of the procedural and substantive questions appearing in each 
case, the author, however, decided not to discuss fully the following thirteen cases in this review: Case 1, Case 
6, Case 7, Case 8, Case 10, Case 14, Case 15, Case 16, Case 17, Case 20, Case 24, Case 25, Case 26. 
 3. Compare supra note 1 (explaining that the 5th Circuit decided 134 insurance-law cases and 
insurance-related cases from June 30, 2010, to July 1, 2011), with supra note 2 (explaining that of the 134 
decisions, 26 are available for full analysis).  There were twenty-three slip opinions and the remainder were 
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for review, thirty-nine percent (38.5%) originated in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.4  And, every Louisiana case 
involved a first-party insurance dispute.5  To be sure, that percentage is 
significant.  The explanation, however, mirrors largely the one proffered in the 
2009–2010 Fifth Circuit review: Three to six years after causing massive 
property losses along the Gulf Coast, Hurricanes Katrina and Gustav continue 
to generate large numbers of first-party insurance lawsuits in the Eastern 
District of Louisiana as well as in the Southern District of Mississippi.6 
On the other hand, forty-six percent (46.2%) of the discussed decisions 
were initiated in the United States District Courts for the Northern, Southern, 
and Western Districts of Texas.  And, of these latter cases, most were filed in 
the Northern and Western Districts.  Unlike the controversies in the Louisiana 
cases, however, all of the disputes in the Texas cases involved third-party 
insurance claims.7  The remaining fifteen percent (15.3%) of insurance 
controversies began in the United States District Courts for the Northern and 
Southern Districts of Mississippi.  And those cases involved both first-party and 
third-party insurance disputes.8 
Among the first-party and third-party insurance decisions discussed or 
highlighted in this Article, there are no novel or major procedural disputes.  
Instead, insurance consumers and insurers asked the Fifth Circuit to address 
and resolve only substantive questions of fact and law.9  Generally, those 
questions are (1) whether residential and commercial property insurers have a 
                                                                                                                 
labeled “not for publication” or contained procedural or substantive decisions that were not unique or 
groundbreaking.  See supra note 1. 
 4. See supra note 2. 
 5. See supra note 2; see also Willy E. Rice, Destroyed Community Property, Damaged Persons, and 
Insurers’ Duty to Indemnify Innocent Spouses and Other Co-Insured Fiduciaries: An Attempt to Harmonize 
Conflicting Federal and State Courts’ Declaratory Judgments, 2 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 63, 
74 (2009) (“[P]rudent insurance consumers commonly purchase two types of insurance contracts.  Some 
insurance agreements are called ‘first-party insurance.’  First-party insurance covers innocent insureds’ person 
and property.  The other is labeled ‘third-party insurance.’  The latter covers innocent insureds who might be 
vicariously liable for deviant co-insureds’ negligent or intentional conduct.  Unquestionably, there are major 
and legally significant differences between the two categories of insurance.  Part III briefly discusses those 
insurance contracts, since innocent co-insured spouses and other co-insured fiduciaries commence legal 
actions against insurers under both first and third-party insurance contracts.”). 
 6. See Willy E. Rice, The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit: A Review of Selected 2009-2010 
Insurance Decisions, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 971, 973 n.6 (2011); Lavonne Kuykendall, Hurricane Gustav: 
Estimates on Losses Are Reduced, WALL ST. J., Sept.  2, 2008, at C7; see also infra notes 22-146, 288-366 
and accompanying text (discussing Hurricanes Katrina- and Gustav-related cases). 
 7. See Evanston Ins., 645 F.3d 739; Md. Cas., 639 F.3d 701; VRV Dev., 630 F.3d 451; Keller Founds., 
626 F.3d 871; Rentech Steel, 620 F.3d 558; DPC Indus., 615 F.3d 609; Bay Rock Operating Co., 614 F.3d 
105; Bonilla, 613 F.3d 512; RSR Corp., 612 F.3d 851; Great Am. Ins., 612 F.3d 800; Standard Waste Sys., 
612 F.3d 394; Amerisure Ins., 611 F.3d 299. 
 8. See Barden Miss. Gaming L.L.C. v. Great N. Ins. Co., 638 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. Apr. 2011)—Northern 
District of Mississippi; Capital City Ins. Co. v. Hurst, 632 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. Feb. 2011)—Southern District of 
Mississippi; Canal Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 625 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. Nov. 2010)—Northern District of Mississippi; 
Penthouse Owners Ass’n v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 612 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. July 2010)—
Southern District of Mississippi. 
 9. See infra Parts II-III. 
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contractual duty to pay first-party tangible and intangible property-loss claims;10 
(2) whether various liability insurers have a contractual duty to defend insureds 
against third parties’ personal-injury and property-damage lawsuits;11 and      
(3) whether indemnity insurers have a contractual duty to reimburse or 
indemnify insureds after the latter used out-of-pocket funds against third 
parties’ environmental pollution lawsuits where insureds settle, defend 
themselves, or both.12 
More precisely, among other specific questions, litigants asked the Fifth 
Circuit panels to determine (1) whether property insurers have a contractual 
duty to pay “additional insurance proceeds” after settling property owners’ first-
party claims;13 (2) whether the doctrine of anti-concurrent causation bars 
insureds’ reimbursement requests under first-party property-insurance 
contracts;14 (3) whether “additional insurance payments” are impermissible 
“double recovery” under property insurance contracts;15 (4) whether property 
insurers have a contractual obligation to indemnify business owners after the 
latter incur business interruption losses;16 and (5) whether environmental 
liability and commercial-general-liability insurers must pay insurance proceeds 
to decontaminate polluted areas and pay  third-party victims’ pollution-related 
personal-injury and property-damage claims.17 
Furthermore, these introductory remarks would be incomplete without 
mentioning the following: Several panels made “slight” and “full” Erie guesses 
to decide a few controversies.18  And, another panel certified two substantive 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See infra Part I.A-B. 
 11. See infra Part II.A-B. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra notes 22-143 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 148-92 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 195-284 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 285-366 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 583-748 and accompanying text. 
 18. See Bradley v. Allstate Ins. Co. (Bradley II), 620 F.3d 509, 517 n.2 (5th Cir. Sept. 2010) (“When 
sitting in diversity, this Court applies the substantive law of the state.”) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64, 89 (1938)); Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Rentech Steel, L.L.C., 620 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 
Sept. 2010) (“Where, as here, the proper resolution of the case turns on the interpretation of Texas law, we 
‘are bound to apply [Texas] law as interpreted by the state’s highest court.’  Because the Texas Supreme 
Court has never ruled on whether the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act ‘obligates’ a nonsubscribing 
employer to compensate an employee for injuries sustained due to employer negligence, we must make an 
‘Erie guess’ as to how the Texas Supreme Court would rule upon the issue based on (1) decisions of the 
[Texas] Supreme Court in analogous cases, (2) the rationales and analyses underlying [Texas] Supreme Court 
decisions on related issues, (3) dicta by the [Texas] Supreme Court, (4) lower state court decisions, (5) the 
general rule on the question, (6) the rulings of courts of other states to which [Texas] courts look when 
formulating substantive law and (7) other available sources, such as treatises and legal commentaries. . . .  In 
making our Erie guess, we look first to those Texas Supreme Court cases that, while not deciding the issue, 
provide guidance as to how the Texas Supreme Court would decide the question before us.  Our preeminent 
Erie-guess authorities, language and decisions from the Texas Supreme Court, suggest that the court would 
find that a negligence claim against a nonsubscriber is a common-law claim, and that section 406.033 imposes 
no ‘obligation’ upon Rentech Steel to pay the Teels’ judgment.” (citations omitted) (citing  Barfield v. 
Madison Cnty., Miss., 212 F.3d 269, 271-72 (5th Cir. 2000)); Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 611 
F.3d 299, 307, 310 n.4 (5th Cir. July 2010) (“Since Mid-Continent, the Texas Supreme Court has not 
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questions of law to the Texas Supreme Court instead of making Erie guesses.19 
Finally, based on the author’s prior reviews, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
does not intentionally assign a theme to the aggregate of the panels’ yearly 
insurance-law decisions.20  A careful reading of the 2010–2011 cases, however, 
leads the author to this conclusion: Whether intended or unintended, the greater 
majority of this year’s insurance-law rulings and declarations falls under the 
                                                                                                                 
specified the precise boundaries of its holding as it applies to contractual subrogation when the insured is fully 
indemnified.  Nor do we attempt to do so here. Instead, our decision here is an Erie guess, and in making an 
Erie guess, we must determine how the Texas Supreme Court would resolve the issue under the specific 
circumstances presented. . . .  In making an Erie guess, this court may consult the decisions of other 
jurisdictions so long as the highest court of the forum state has not addressed the issue.”); Emp’rs Mut. Cas. 
Co. v. Bonilla, 613 F.3d 512, 519 (5th Cir. July 2010) (“We acknowledge finding no published Texas caselaw 
. . . .  We conclude, though, that the Texas Supreme Court if presented with this precise issue would take as a 
natural next step from Lindsey that this accident occurred from ‘the inherent nature’ of this mobile catering 
truck.  The vehicle intended is not some mystical, generic vehicle, but the one specifically insured by the 
parties to the policy.  The special nature of this vehicle was not hidden or otherwise unknown—it literally was 
in black and white in the policy. . . .  The policies . . . in this case defined the business as ‘mobile catering’ 
and expressly covered mobile catering trucks which were equipped with a kitchen to prepare food.  Though 
there was no express inclusion or exclusion of uses relating to the business purpose, such purpose would be 
the intent of the parties in contracting a ‘commercial automobile liability policy’ for automobiles engaged in 
the mobile catering business.  We go no further than to hold, in what is a slight Erie guess but relying on 
substantial direction from the Texas courts, that a business vehicle policy covers the intended and identified 
uses of that business vehicle.”); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 206 (5th Cir. 2007) (“To 
determine Louisiana law, we look to the final decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court.  In the absence of a 
final decision by the Louisiana Supreme Court, we must make an Erie guess and determine, in our best 
judgment, how that court would resolve the issue if presented with the same case.  In making an Erie guess, 
we must employ Louisiana’s civilian methodology, whereby we first examine primary sources of law: the 
constitution, codes, and statutes.”); see also Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 985, 
988 (5th Cir. 1992)  (“[I]t is the duty of the federal court to determine as best it can, what the highest court of 
the state would decide.”).  
 19. See Evanston Ins. Co. v. Legacy of Life, Inc., 645 F.3d 739, 751 (5th Cir. June 2011) (“In summary, 
if the Texas Supreme Court determines that Evanston did have a duty to defend based on either the ‘personal 
injury’ or ‘property damage’ provisions of the insurance policy, then we will: 1) reinstate Legacy’s 
counterclaims for breach of contract and violation of the Texas Insurance Code for Prompt Payment of 
Claims; 2) render judgment that Evanston breached its contract with Legacy; 3) render judgment that 
Evanston violated the Texas Insurance Code for Prompt Payment of Claims; 4) render judgment that Evanston 
must pay Legacy $56,598.69 as damages for Legacy’s defense of the Underlying Lawsuit; 5) render judgment 
that Evanston must pay eighteen percent interest (to date of judgment) on the $56,598.69 pursuant to the 
Texas Insurance Code for Prompt Payment of Claims; and 6) remand to the district court for determination of 
reasonable attorneys’ fees to be paid to Legacy in respect to litigating the present lawsuit and appeal.  
Conversely, if the Texas Supreme Court determines that Evanston did not have a duty to defend, none of the 
foregoing relief will be awarded Legacy.”).  Therefore, the Fifth Circuit panel certified the following two 
determinative questions of law to the Supreme Court of Texas: 
1. Does the insurance policy provision for coverage of “personal injury,” defined therein as 
“bodily injury, sickness, or disease including death resulting therefrom sustained by any person,” 
include coverage for mental anguish, unrelated to physical damage to or disease of the plaintiff’s 
body? 
2. Does the insurance policy provision for coverage of “property damage,” defined therein as 
“physical injury to or destruction of tangible property, including consequential loss of use thereof, 
or loss of use of tangible property which has not been physically injured or destroyed,” include 
coverage for the underlying plaintiff’s loss of use of her deceased mother’s tissues, organs, bones, 
and body parts? 
Id. 
 20. See infra Part II and accompanying text. 
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general heading, “previously litigated or purportedly settled substantive-law 
controversies.”21 
II.  FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE DISPUTES INVOLVING STATE SUBSTANTIVE 
LAWS AND STATUTES 
A.  First-Party Claims―Tangible Residential and Commercial Property 
Losses 
Substantive Question: Whether under Louisiana and Mississippi law, an 
all-risk residential property insurer has a duty to pay additional proceeds 
after the insurer and property owners settled Hurricane Katrina-related 
property-damage claims. 
1.  A Review of Pertinent Facts in “Concurrent Causation,” “Additional 
Payment,” and “Double Recovery” Cases 
Comprising a diversity of circuit court and designated district court judges, 
four Fifth Circuit panels decided a stubbornly recurring substantive question: 
Whether property insurers have a contractual duty to pay additional proceeds 
under first-party insurance contracts after homeowners receive a reimbursement 
for covered Hurricane Katrina-related tangible property losses.22  This general 
question appears in the following cases: Stewart Enterprises, Inc. v. RSUI 
Indemnity Co.; Bayle v. Allstate Insurance Co.; Bradley v. Allstate Insurance 
Co.; French v. Allstate Indemnity Co.; and Penthouse Owners Ass’n v. Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyds, London.23  A variety of common and unique sub-
issues, however, appear among these decisions.  Therefore, the relevant facts in 
each case are outlined below before presenting a discussion of the four panels’ 
respective findings and holdings. 
First, in Stewart, the insured was Stewart Enterprises, Inc., an enterprise 
that owned cemeteries, funeral homes, and other commercial properties in New 
Orleans, Louisiana.24  As Hurricane Katrina lambasted the Gulf Coast in 2005, 
a strong wind and a flood severely damaged Stewart’s properties.25  And like 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See infra Part II and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 23. See French v. Allstate Indem. Co., 637 F.3d 571 (5th Cir. Apr. 2011) (Panel comprised of Circuit 
Judges Jennifer Walker Elrod, Edward Prado, and Carl Stewart); Bradley II, 620 F.3d 509 (Panel comprised 
of Circuit Judges Patrick Higginbotham and Carl Stewart, as well as the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Louisiana’s Judge Kurt Engelhardt, sitting by designation); Stewart Enters., Inc. v. RSUI Indem. 
Co., 614 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. Aug. 2010) (per curiam) (Panel comprised of Circuit Judges Fortunato Benavides, 
W. Eugene Davis, and Patrick Higginbotham); Bayle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. Aug. 2010) 
(Panel comprised of Circuit Judges W. Eugene Davis, Leslie H. Southwick, and Jacques L. Wiener); 
Penthouse Owners Ass’n v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 612 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. July 2010) (Panel 
comprised of Circuit Judges E. Grady Jolly, Priscilla Owen, and Jerry Edwin Smith). 
 24. Stewart, 614 F.3d at 118. 
 25. Id. 
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many bewildered property owners during that period, Stewart could not easily 
determine whether wind, flooding, or a combination of the two caused the 
losses.26 
Prior to Katrina, Stewart insured its properties and businesses under a 
primary-insurance policy and two excess-insurance contracts.27  Lexington 
Insurance Company (Lexington) sold the all-risk primary policy, which insured 
Stewart’s property against flood and other covered perils up to $10 million, 
respectively.28  Stewart purchased an all-risk excess-coverage policy from 
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London (Lloyd’s).29  Under the first excess 
insurance contract, Lloyd’s insured Stewart’s commercial properties against 
flood and other covered perils up to $15 million, respectively.30  Stewart also 
bought a second excess-insurance contract from RSUI Indemnity Company 
(RSUI).31  Under RSUI’s policy, the maximum coverage was $225 million, 
which would serve as the excess after Lexington and Lloyd’s paid their 
collective $25 million for covered property losses.32 
In the wake of Katrina, Stewart concluded that wind and flooding 
damaged its properties; therefore, the company asked the primary and two 
excess insurers to pay for the allegedly covered losses.33  Both Lexington and 
Lloyd’s paid the full amount under their respective primary and first excess-
insurance policies.34  RSUI refused to pay, concluding that its second excess 
policy did not cover any flood-related property losses.35  In addition, RSUI 
argued: Even assuming that flooding was a covered peril, an anti-concurrent 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Id. at 118-19 (“This [inability to establish whether a covered peril or an excluded peril was the 
efficient/dominant or concurrent cause of a loss] has proven to be a significant roadblock for many of the 
victims attempting to recover compensation from their insurance carriers, of which Stewart is only the 
latest.”).  Or stated slightly differently, under an insurance law definition of coverage, insurance consumers 
like Stewart often have difficulty determining whether a property loss is covered under an all-risk or a 
specified-risk property-insurance contract.  See, e.g., Warrilow v. Norrell, 791 S.W.2d 515, 527 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied) (explaining that coverage analysis of a property insurance claim examines 
the relationship between “covered perils” and “excluded perils”).  “Property insurance, unlike liability 
insurance, is unconcerned with establishing negligence or otherwise assessing tort liability.”  Id. (quoting 
Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 710 (Cal. 1989)). “Coverage in a property policy is 
commonly provided by reference to causation, such as ‘loss caused by . . .’ certain enumerated forces. . . . It is 
precisely these physical forces that bring about the loss.”  Id. (first omission in original) (quoting Garvey, 770 
P.2d at 710).  “In Texas, if one force is covered and one force is excluded, the insured must show that the 
property damage was caused solely by the insured force, or he must separate the damage caused by the 
insured peril from that caused by the excluded peril.”  Warrilow, 791 S.W.2d at 527 (citing Travelers Indem. 
Co. v. McKillip, 469 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1971)). 
 27. Stewart, 614 F.3d at 118. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 119. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
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causation clause (ACC)36 in RSUI’s excess-insurance contract excluded any 
claim if a flood caused, completely or partially, any property damage.37 
Stewart filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, asking the district judge to declare 
that RSUI had a duty to pay the claim.38  Ultimately, both parties petitioned the 
court for summary relief.39  Both motions were denied.40  Instead, the district 
court found that RSUI’s excess policy covered flood damage up to $25 million, 
subject to a proviso: RSUI’s payment could be reduced by the amount that 
either Lexington or Lloyd’s paid to cover Stewart’s losses.41  But, the district 
court also made two additional findings: (1) The ACC clause barred any 
recovery if wind and flooding jointly caused the property damage; and (2) The 
policy permitted a maximum recovery of $25 million if wind or flooding 
exclusively caused the property losses.42  Dissatisfied with the findings, Stewart 
and RSUI appealed.43 
Bayle v. Allstate Insurance Co. also presents a recurring question that is 
very similar to the general question appearing in the prior case.  First, consider 
the relevant facts.  William and Darlene Bayle are siblings, and they own 
property in Chalmette, Louisiana.44  Hurricane Katrina severely damaged the 
Bayles’ property.45  “[N]o one was present in the house when eight to ten feet 
of water (mixed with escaped oil from a nearby Murphy Oil storage tank) 
flooded the Bayles’ one-story house.”46  Additionally, little evidence in the 
record suggested that wind caused a significant amount of damage.47 
When Katrina arrived, the Bayles’ property was insured under an Allstate 
homeowners’ policy against “wind damage.”48  Allstate also insured the 
property against floods under a separate National Flood Insurance Policy 
(NFIP).49  As the administrator of the federal flood policy, Allstate paid the full 
                                                                                                                 
 36. See Penthouse Owners Ass’n v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 612 F.3d 383, 385 (5th 
Cir. July 2010). 
 37. See Stewart, 614 F.3d at 119. 
 38. Id. at 125 (“At issue is the interpretation of two ACC clauses contained within . . . the Lexington 
policy . . . [which were embraced under] the RSUI policy’s following form provision.” (emphasis added)). 
 39. Id. at 119. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Bayle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 350, 352 (5th Cir. Aug. 2010). 
 45. Id. at 353. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. (“Ms. Bayle testified that, when she returned to view the wreckage, she saw just one cracked 
window pane in one of the bedrooms and that she was not able to look in the attic for roof damage.  In his 
deposition testimony, Mr. Bayle noted that, when he viewed the damage in November 2005, he saw one or 
perhaps two small window panes that were broken, but conceded that these could have been damaged by 
vandals.”). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.  In a nutshell, Congress enacted the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 because the average 
homeowner cannot afford to purchase private insurance at near prohibitively high prices.  See National Flood 
Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 587 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4129 
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policy limits of $105,000—$75,000 for structural damage and $30,000 for 
damaged contents.50  Under the terms and conditions of the homeowners’ 
policy, Allstate gave the Bayles $17,560.73 for wind damage—$3,628.87 for 
the roof’s structural damage, $8,804.22 for personal-property losses, and 
$5,127.64 for additional living expenses.51  Briefly put, when the Bayles 
received those 2005 payments, they did not identify any additional, 
uncompensated structural damage.52  Furthermore, they did not identify any 
wind-damaged items with repair costs exceeding Allstate’s payments.53 
In the end, the Bayles decided not to repair the severely damaged house.54 
Consequently, they “sold” the “unrepaired” house and the lot to Murphy Oil for 
$64,000.55  The oil company purchased the property to settle the Bayles’ 
petroleum-pollution claim.56  Murphy completely demolished the house.57  
Although the record does not indicate that the Bayles objected to Allstate’s 
2005 adjustments and payments, the Bayles and twenty-eight homeowners sued 
Allstate in August 2007.58  The suit originated in a state court but was removed 
to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.59 
Three years after Katrina, the district court severed the cases, and the 
Bayles filed an individual action against Allstate.60  The Bayle opinion does not 
clearly state whether the Bayles filed a breach-of-contract or a declaratory-
judgment action.61  The homeowners’ claims, however, were unmistakable.  
The Bayles alleged that (1) Allstate did not pay sufficient consideration to cover 
the wind-caused structural damage to their property; and (2) Allstate improperly 
used the “actual cash value” (ACV) of the damaged property rather than a 
“building structure reimbursement” standard to determine the correct payment 
                                                                                                                 
(2006)).  The Act established the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), an agency of the Department of Homeland Security that administers the 
program.  See id.  NFIP has two components: (1) a flood insurance program and (2) a unified national plan for 
flood management.  See id. § 4001(b)-(c).  In 1977, the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) gave the primary responsibility for operating NFIP to FEMA.  See id. § 4071.  To attain 
the stated goals, FEMA enacted regulations and created the Standard Flood Insurance Policy (SFIP).  See 44 
C.F.R. §§ 61.4(b), 61.13(d).  The agency also encourages private insurers, so-called “Write Your Own” 
(WYO) insurers like Allstate, to market and sell flood insurance.  See §§ 4071(a)(1), 4081(a).  In addition, 
WYO insurers may sell SFIP contracts in their own names.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-08-504, NATIONAL CATASTROPHE INSURANCE: ANALYSIS OF A PROPOSED COMBINED FEDERAL FLOOD 
AND WIND INSURANCE PROGRAM 11-13 (2008), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d08504.pdf. 
 50. Bayle, 615 F.3d at 353. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 353-54. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 354. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. at 352. 
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for the wind-caused structural damage.62  Allstate filed a motion for summary 
judgment, asking the district court to dismiss the action.63  Among other 
conclusions, the district court found that the Bayles did not identify any 
uncompensated, wind-caused property losses.64  After the court granted the 
insurer’s motion, the Bayles appealed.65 
During the 2009–2010 session, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided, 
and the author reviewed, Bradley v. Allstate Insurance Co. (Bradley I).66  In 
that case, the central question was whether property insurers had a contractual 
duty to pay additional proceeds after Hurricane Katrina destroyed “covered” 
tangible property and the homeowners were compensated for the “covered 
loss.”67  This term, the Fifth Circuit reconsidered the question in Bradley I, 
vacated its prior rulings, withdrew Bradley I, and replaced it with Bradley II.68 
Reconsider the facts in Bradley I.  Felton and Lucille Bradley were 
residents of New Orleans, Louisiana.69  Allstate insured the Bradleys’ house 
under a homeowners’ insurance contract, which excluded flood-related losses.70 
In the event of losses, Allstate had a contractual duty to pay $105,600 or less 
for structural damage, $73,920 or less for damaged contents, and $10,560 or 
less for other structural damages.71  To insure the property that Allstate’s policy 
excluded, the Bradleys purchased flood insurance from Fidelity National 
Insurance Company (Fidelity).72  Both insurance contracts were current when 
Hurricane Katrina arrived in New Orleans.73  Katrina totally destroyed the 
Bradleys’ house, leaving only a “few badly damaged concrete blocks . . . on the 
property.”74 
After filing a timely notice of loss, Allstate’s engineers concluded that a 
“combination of hurricane winds and flooding” totally destroyed the structure.75 
After reviewing a second engineer’s report, Allstate’s adjusters, however, 
determined that “[c]atastrophic [w]ind [d]amage” made the dwelling 
unlivable.”76  After negotiations, Allstate and the insureds settled the claim, and 
the property insurer “paid $41,339.06 for structural damage and $10,632 for 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 354. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. at 352-53. 
 66. Bradley v. Allstate Ins. Co. (Bradley I), 606 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. May 2010), vacated and superseded 
on denial of reh’g, 620 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2010) (Panel comprised of Circuit Judges Patrick Higginbotham 
and Carl Stewart, as well as the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana’s Judge Kurt 
Engelhardt, sitting by designation); see Rice, supra note 6, at 971. 
 67. Bradley I, 606 F.3d at 221. 
 68. Bradley II, 620 F.3d 509, 514 (5th Cir. Sept. 2010). 
 69. Bradley I, 606 F.3d at 221. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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[unsalvageable] contents.”77  Significantly, those payments were substantially 
lower than the respective policy limits for a destroyed structure and its 
contents.78  In contrast, the Bradleys received the policy limits under the flood-
insurance contract—$63,800 for structural damage and $6,200 for destroyed 
contents.79  Thus, the insurers paid collectively a total payment of $105,139.06 
for the structural damages.80 
The Bradleys, however, wanted to build another house.81  Allstate 
appraised the pre-Katrina market value of the Bradleys’ destroyed home at 
$85,000.82  The Bradleys determined that “the pre-storm value of the home was 
between $85,000 and . . . $97,000.”83  Moreover, their expert estimated that the 
Bradleys would need $265,427 to rebuild their house.84  Allstate refused to 
satisfy the Bradleys’ request for additional payments, and the homeowners sued 
the insurer in a Louisiana state court.85  Their complaint raised several claims 
and causes of action sounding in contract and in tort.86  In particular, the 
Bradleys cited Louisiana’s Value Policy Law (VPL) and asserted that their 
house was a “total loss.”87  They also claimed that Allstate had a duty to pay the 
policy limits without deductions or offsets.88  Additionally, the homeowners 
argued that Allstate had a contractual duty to pay additional proceeds to cover 
their personal-property losses and additional living expenses.89 
Citing diversity jurisdiction, Allstate removed the case to the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.90  Ultimately, the district 
court awarded some damages for the Bradleys’ “additional living expenses,” 
but the award was less than the requested amount.91  Regarding the 
homeowners’ other claims, the district court granted Allstate’s motions for 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.  Specifically, Allstate paid 60.85% ($64,260.94) and 85.6% ($63,288) less than the insurance 
contract promised to pay for structural damages and destroyed contents, respectively.  See id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.  (“To date, the Bradleys have not rebuilt their Tennessee Street house [in New Orleans], although 
Mr. Bradley stated [in a] deposition that he intends to rebuild.  In order to benefit from government assistance 
through the Road Home program, the Bradleys attested that they will rebuild and return to the property.  The 
Bradleys did purchase another home in New Orleans East for $134,500, but they have not designated that 
home as a replacement property.”). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. at 221-22 & n.1 (“The Bradleys claimed that Allstate breached the insurance contract, acted 
negligently, and acted in bad faith. . . . [Thus, they sought] compensation for mental anguish and emotional 
distress . . . [as well as] damages for Allstate’s alleged bad faith pursuant to LA. REV. STATS. §§ 2:1220 and 
22:658 [recodified as § 22:1892 (2009)].”). 
 87. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22:1318, 22:695(A) (2009); Bradley I, 606 F.3d at 221. 
 88. Bradley I, 606 F.3d at 221. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 220, 222. 
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summary judgment.92  In particular, the Eastern District of Louisiana concluded 
that the Bradleys could only receive the actual cash value of their destroyed 
house.93  Of course, that sum was less than the total payment ($105,139.06) that 
the Bradleys received for structural damages under their homeowners’ and 
flood policies.94 
Also, the district court dismissed the “total loss” claim.95  The lower court 
wrote: “[A]lthough the Bradleys ‘allege that the property was damaged by wind 
and flood and that the home is a total loss, there is no allegation that the total 
loss was caused by wind or any other peril covered under the homeowners’ 
policy.’”96  Accordingly, there are no disputed issues of material fact, and 
Allstate is entitled to judgment as a matter of law that Louisiana’s VPL does 
not apply.97  The Bradleys appealed.98  Again, given that the Fifth Circuit 
vacated its prior rulings in Bradley I, withdrew the case, and replaced Bradley I 
with Bradley II,99 a discussion of the appellate court’s newest rulings in the 
latter case appears below. 
The relevant facts in French v. Allstate Indemnity Co. are simple and 
familiar.100  In 2003, Kathryn French and Malcolm Sutter (French) built a 
lakefront house in Slidell, Louisiana.101  French insured the property under an 
Allstate homeowners’ insurance contract.102  The policy outlined several 
payment schedules: $338,000 or less for damage to dwelling, $33,800 or less 
for damage to other structures, and $253,500 or less for destroyed contents.103  
Furthermore, under an additional living expense (ALE) clause, the insurer 
promised to pay additional money for twelve months or less if certain 
conditions were satisfied.104 French also purchased a twenty percent 
endorsement—a “Building Structure Reimbursement Extended Limits 
Endorsement”—that added more coverage for the dwelling.105  Finally, to 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Id. at 222. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (emphasis added). 
 97. Bradley v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 07-3748, 2008 WL 2952974, at *4 (E. D. La. July 25, 2008); see 
also Bradley I, 606 F.3d at 222 (“The [federal district] court also dismissed the Bradleys’ claims for loss of 
personal property for failure to introduce evidence of ownership or the value of the items claimed.  The mental 
and emotional distress claims were rejected for failure to advance any evidence of mental anguish or 
emotional distress.  With regard to the Bradleys’ bad faith claims, the court found that Allstate had fully paid 
the Bradleys’ claims under the policy and therefore there was no ‘valid, underlying, substantive claim.’”).  
 98. See Bradley II, 620 F.3d 509, 514 (5th Cir. Sept. 2010). 
 99. See id. 
 100. See French v. Allstate Indem. Co., 637 F.3d 571, 574-75 (5th Cir. Apr. 2011) (Panel comprised of 
Circuit Judges Jennifer Walker Elrod, Edward Prado, and Carl Stewart). 
 101. Id. at 574. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 575. 
 104. Id. at 583. 
 105. Id. at 575. 
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insure the property against floods, the insured bought an Allstate-administered 
NFIP.106 
After Katrina, French’s lakefront property was seriously damaged.107  
French filed a property-loss claim, asking Allstate to pay for wind and flood 
damages under the homeowners’ and flood insurance policies, respectively.108  
Between September 2005 and August 2008, Allstate paid $215,292.88 and 
$91,926.37, respectively, to cover the wind-caused damage to French’s 
dwelling and contents.109  The insurer also paid $2,100 to cover French’s 
additional living expenses.110  Moreover, under the terms of a settlement 
agreement, French received $171,708 for the flood-caused damage to the 
dwelling.111  The insurers’ compensation under the homeowners’ policy was 
about half (49.5%) of the insurance contract’s total limits of coverage.112 
Unhappy with the payments, French apparently filed a breach-of-contract 
action against Allstate in a Louisiana state court.113  Among other remedies, the 
plaintiff sought additional payments for the wind-damaged properties.114  
Ultimately, the dispute was removed to the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana, where the district judge conducted a three-day 
bench trial in February 2009.115  Ultimately, the judge concluded: (1) Allstate 
had a duty to pay $338,000 to cover the wind-damaged dwelling because 
French’s repair costs would exceed that amount;116 (2) The property insurer had 
a duty to pay an additional $123,000 to cover the wind-damaged dwelling;117 
and (3) Allstate had a duty to pay $10,000 to repair French’s “other 
structures.”118  On the other hand, the district judge concluded that French     
(1) could not recover additional living expenses and (2) could not collect 
money under the Extended Limits Endorsement.119 
Allstate filed a motion to modify the judgment.120  The insurer argued that 
the additional $123,000 wind-damage award was unwarranted because French 
                                                                                                                 
 106. Id. at 574. 
 107. Id. at 575. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 576. 
 113. See id.  The French opinion does not state clearly whether French filed a breach-of-contract or a 
declaratory-judgment action.  See id. at 575. 
 114. Id. (“Before trial, [French] settled [the] flood claims and the flood insurer was dismissed from [the 
lawsuit], leaving only the wind-damage claims to be tried.”). 
 115. See id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. at 575-76 (“[In addition], the district court found that Allstate was [liable for] penalties under 
Louisiana Revised Statute § 22:658 because Allstate . . . failed to timely pay an undisputed portion of 
[French’s] claim.  Concluding that the older, 2003 version of § 22:658 applied, the district court calculated 
penalties as 25 percent of the total amount it found was due, or 25% of $348,000.”). 
 120. Id. at 576. 
746 TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:733 
 
failed to prove that element by a preponderance of the evidence.121  Even more 
interestingly, Allstate asserted that French’s total insurance compensation, at 
least $510,000.88, violated Louisiana’s “double recovery” rule because the 
award exceeded the value of French’s house.122  The district court denied 
Allstate’s motion, concluding that French presented sufficient evidence to 
support the additional payments award. 123  Allstate appealed.124 
Penthouse Owners Ass’n v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London is the 
final opinion in this initial series of first-party cases.125  In Penthouse, the 
pertinent facts are extremely sparse.  The insured is Penthouse Owner’s 
Association (Penthouse).126  The corporation owns a complex of condominiums 
in Pass Christian, Mississippi.127  Before Hurricane Katrina, the property was 
insured under an undisclosed insurer’s flood-insurance contract.128  In addition, 
certain underwriters at Lloyd’s of London (Underwriters) insured the 
commercial/residential property under an all-risk insurance contract.129  The 
policy limit was $3,568,000.130  Katrina completely destroyed Penthouse’s 
property, leaving only the slab.131  “Penthouse recovered the policy limit 
($3,610,000) from its flood insurer, and made a claim under the Underwriters’ 
policy.”132  The Underwriters denied the claim, asserting that the all-risk 
policy’s flood-exclusion and ACC clauses barred the claim.133  According to the 
Underwriters’ engineers, flooding destroyed the condos.134 
Nearly two years after Katrina, Penthouse sued the Underwriters in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.135  The 
complaint raised several theories of recovery—breach of contract, negligence, 
and bad-faith breach of contract.136  More generally, the complaint alleged that 
Katrina-related winds destroyed the condos several hours before the storm 
surge (flooding).137  Therefore, according to Penthouse, the sole dominant or 
                                                                                                                 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. at 580. 
 123. Id. at 576. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Penthouse Owners Ass’n v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 612 F.3d 383, 385 (5th 
Cir. July 2010). 
 126. Id. at 384-85. 
 127. Id. at 385. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See id. 
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efficient proximate cause138 of the property loss was wind rather than 
flooding.139 
The Underwriters filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that wind 
was not the sole cause of the property loss.140  Alternatively, the insurers argued 
that flooding was an excluded peril in the all-risk policy’s windstorm deductible 
clause.141  Therefore, the Underwriters insisted that Penthouse could not receive 
any compensation because the windstorm deductible clause was essentially “a 
reverse anti-concurrent causation clause”142 and both wind and flooding caused 
the insured’s loss.143  The district court denied the Underwriters’ summary 
judgment motion and concluded that the windstorm deductible clause extended 
“coverage” for Katrina-related damages regardless of whether wind or a flood 
caused the losses.144  Thus, Penthouse received a judgment as a matter of law, 
based on the district court’s interpretation of the windstorm deductible 
clause.145  The Underwriters appealed.146 
2.  Fifth Circuit Panels’ “Concurrent Causation,” “Anti-Concurrent  
Causation,” and “Reverse Anti-Concurrent Causation” Opinions 
As stressed earlier, the definition of “coverage” under an all-risk or a 
specified-risk property insurance contract is rather unique.147  Under both 
Louisiana’s and Mississippi’s laws, an insured’s destroyed property is covered, 
and the insurer is liable if a peril listed in the insurance contract “caused” the 
loss.148  But, the Supreme Courts of Louisiana and Mississippi have been 
extremely clear: A “covered peril” must be the dominant and efficient 
proximate cause of an insured’s property loss.149  Thus, if a “peril insured 
                                                                                                                 
 138. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 139. Penthouse, 612 F.3d at 385. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 143. Penthouse, 612 F.3d at 385. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. at 386. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See supra text accompanying note 29. 
 148. See Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 of Plaquemines Parish v. Delta Gas, Inc., 141 So. 2d 925, 927 (La. Ct. 
App. 1962) (“Here we are not concerned with a liability policy; there is no coverage for bodily injury and [no 
one] was insured against negligence.  This insurance is against loss or damage to the property by explosion, or 
the other perils covered, during the time the policy was in force and effect regardless of the presence or 
absence of negligence. . . . Under the policy, Agricultural was required to pay for damage done by an 
explosion during the term of the policy. . . . The damage did not occur during that time; it occurred . . . at 
which time the policy was no longer in existence.  There can be no liability [of the insurer].”); Commercial 
Union Ins. Co. v. Byrne, 248 So. 2d 777, 780 (Miss. 1971) (embracing the principle that under an extended 
coverage policy or an all peril policy, “the insurer cannot be held liable for any part of the damage caused by 
the excluded hazard”). 
 149. See, e.g., Lorio v. Aetna Ins. Co., 232 So. 2d 490, 493 (La. 1970) (stressing that “a review of . . .  
authorities on the subject reveals that courts of last resort [including the Supreme Court of Louisiana] have 
consistently interpreted the term ‘direct loss,’ as used in a windstorm insurance policy, to be a loss 
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against” does not meet those criteria, an insured may not recover property-
insurance proceeds. Furthermore, in both jurisdictions, the concurrent 
causation doctrine reinforces the efficient proximate cause doctrine and allows 
an insured to collect insurance payments if a covered peril and an “excluded 
peril” collectively or simultaneously produce a loss.150 
On the other hand, an insurer may defend itself against a duty-to-pay or a 
duty-to-indemnify claim by (1) showing that an ACC clause appears in the 
contract and (2) arguing that the insured’s failure to segregate covered-peril 
and excluded-peril damages precludes the insured from recovering any 
insurance compensation.151  In Stewart and Penthouse, the commercial and 
residential insurers raised the first defense against the disgruntled Louisiana and 
Mississippi property owners, respectively.152  And, in Bayle, Allstate raised the 
second defense.153 
Again, in Stewart, the Eastern District of Louisiana ruled against the 
insured, concluding that the ACC clause barred any recovery if wind and 
flooding jointly caused the property damage within RSUI’s excess-insurance 
policy’s $25 million limit.154  On appeal, Stewart argued that “the district 
court’s reading of the ACC clause created an absurd result”—permitting 
recovery if wind exclusively or flooding exclusively caused the property 
damage, but barring recovery when a combination of the two perils caused the 
damage.155 
First, Stewart is a Fifth Circuit per curiam opinion; therefore, the author is 
unknown.156  But, at the outset, the panel observed that a “following form” 
                                                                                                                 
proximately caused by the peril insured against, [and concluding that the term has] essentially the same 
meaning as ‘proximate cause’ applied in negligence cases” (emphasis added)); Providence Wash. Ins. Co. v. 
Weaver, 133 So. 2d 635, 637 (Miss. 1961) (“The phrase ‘direct loss’ means a loss occurring directly from . . . 
immediate or proximate cause, as distinguished from remote.  If [a covered risk] in the policy is the dominant 
and efficient cause of the loss, the right of the insured to recover will not be defeated . . . .” (citations 
omitted)). 
 150. See, e.g., Roach-Strayhan-Holland Post No. 20, Am. Legion Club, Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 112 So. 2d 
680, 682-83 (La. 1959) (“[S]ince in a great number of factual situations it has been shown that wind is often 
not the sole contributing cause of the loss or damage, [courts have embraced] the view that [to recover under a 
property insurance contract,] it is sufficient . . . that the wind was the proximate or efficient cause of the loss 
or damage, notwithstanding other factors contributing thereto.  This is in line with the jurisprudence of our 
own State.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); Weaver, 133 So. 2d at 637  (“In short the proximate cause 
to which the loss is to be attributed may be the dominant or efficient cause, although other and incidental 
causes may be nearer in time to the result and operate more immediately in producing the loss.”) (embracing 
the principle that “if [a covered risk] in the policy is the dominant and efficient cause of the loss the right of 
the insured to recover will not be defeated because there were contributing causes”). 
 151. See Stewart Enters. v. RSUI Indem. Co., 614 F.3d 117, 118-19 (5th Cir. Aug. 2010) (per curiam); 
Bayle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 350, 354-56 (5th Cir. Aug. 2010). 
 152. See Stewart, 614 F.3d at 118-19; Penthouse Owners Ass’n v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, 
London, 612 F.3d 383, 385 (5th Cir. July 2010). 
 153. See Bayle, 615 F.3d at 354-56. 
 154. See Stewart Enters. v. RSUI Indem. Co., No. 07-4514, 2009 WL 1668502, at *6 (E.D. La. June 15, 
2009).  
 155. Stewart, 614 F.3d at 125. 
 156. Id. at 118. 
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clause appeared in the excess insurer’s policy.157  Put simply, it stated that 
RSUI’s policy “is subject to the same warranties, terms[,] and conditions . . . as 
the Lexington primary policy.”158  And Lexington’s insurance contract 
contained two ACC clauses.159  In relevant part, the perils-excluded provisions 
read: 
10.  PERILS EXCLUDED 
This policy does not insure against loss or damage caused directly or 
indirectly by any of the excluded perils.  Such loss or damage is excluded 
regardless of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any 
sequence to the loss: 
. . . 
P. loss or damage caused by or resulting from:  
. . . 
(2) Flood, unless specified in [a prior section] and then only for such 
specified amount; 
(3) any and all loss from any other cause when occurring concurrently or 
sequentially with Earthquake, Volcanic Eruption or Flood, except 
Fire.160 
 
The district court’s “most straightforward reading” of P.(3) produced this  
controversial conclusion: RSUI was liable if flooding or wind solely caused the 
property damage, but the excess insurer had no duty to indemnify if flooding 
and wind jointly caused the loss.161 
At the beginning of its short analysis, the Stewart panel acknowledged that 
insurers insert ACC clauses into property-insurance contracts to avoid disputes 
like the one between Stewart and RSUI.162  But the appellate court stressed that 
RSUI used its ACC clause to bar recovery after two covered perils—wind and 
flooding—damaged property.163  Simply put, the panel concluded that the 
excess insurer’s defense was “untenable,” “awkward,” and generating 
confusion about the precise purpose of the ACC.164  Therefore, applying the 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Id. at 121. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 125. 
 160. Id. at 120 n.7. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. at 126. 
 163. See id.  “[F]or damage up to the $25 million sublimit, flood is an included peril.”  Id. at 127. 
 164. See id. (“RSUI’s reading turns the rationale for including an ACC clause on its head, creating 
difficult causation determinations where none otherwise exist.  RSUI’s interpretation would force the insured 
to demonstrate that damage was caused exclusively by one of the two included perils.  This reading is 
untenable and can only be the result of an awkward use of terms that assumes a full exclusion of flood 
damage.  We will not read the policy to force Stewart to prove a windless flood.  We read the ACC clause to 
only apply to damage in excess of the $25 million aggregate limit.”). 
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doctrine of ambiguity under Louisiana’s law, the Stewart panel declared that 
RSUI had a duty to indemnify.165 
To repeat, in Penthouse, the Underwriters insured the Penthouse Owners 
Association’s condominiums under an all-risk policy.166  Under the policy’s 
exclusion clause, the insurers had no duty to indemnify if the following perils 
caused a loss: “flood, surface water, waves, tides, tidal waves, overflow of any 
body of water, or their spray, all whether driven by wind or not.”167  An ACC 
also appeared in the contract.168  It read: A water-caused “loss or damage is 
excluded regardless of any other cause of loss or event that contributes 
concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.”169  Finally, a “Windstorm or Hail 
Deductible” provision appeared in the insurance contract’s endorsement.170  
The deductible was five percent, and the clause stated, in relevant part: 
The Windstorm or Hail Deductible . . . applies to loss or damage to 
Covered Property caused directly or indirectly by windstorm or hail, 
regardless of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any 
sequence to the loss or damage.  If loss or damage from a covered weather 
condition other than windstorm or hail occurs, and that loss or damage would 
not have occurred but for the windstorm or hail, such loss or damage shall be 
considered to be caused by windstorm or hail and therefore part of the 
windstorm or hail occurrence. 
. . . 
The Windstorm or Hail Deductible applies whenever there is an occurrence 
of windstorm or hail.171 
 
In Penthouse, the Southern District of Mississippi concluded that the 
“Windstorm Deductible endorsement effectively canceled the policy’s 
exclusion for [water-related] losses.”172  More specifically, the district court 
declared that the deductible endorsement was essentially a reverse anti-
concurrent cause clause.173  Therefore, the deductible provision did not limit 
                                                                                                                 
 165. Id. (“Read objectively, the policy at best does not answer the present claims with sufficient clarity to 
escape the principle that such uncertainty is to be resolved in favor of the insured.  Reading in favor of the 
insured, we find the RSUI policy covers flood to the extent the aggregate limits under the Lexington and 
Lloyd’s policies have not been fully paid.”);  see also Succession of Fannaly v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 805 So. 2d 
1134, 1138 (La. 2002) (repeating that “the ambiguous contractual provision is construed against the insurer 
who furnished the contract’s text and in favor of the insured”). 
 166. Penthouse Owners Ass’n v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 612 F.3d 383, 385 (5th Cir. 
July 2010). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id.  
 170. Id.; see also Camden Fire Ins. Ass’n v. New Buena Vista Hotel Co., 24 So. 2d 848, 850-51 (Miss. 
1946) (“[An insurance contract’s endorsement] controls the policy insofar as it enlarges, modifies or restricts 
the terms [of the policy],” and if there is any conflict between the rider and the policy, “the rider controls in 
construing the contract expressly where the provisions of the rider are the more specific.”). 
 171. Penthouse, 612 F.3d at 385. 
 172. Id. at 386. 
 173. Id. at 387. 
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coverage.174  Instead, the Southern District of Mississippi stated that the 
purportedly reverse ACC clause expanded Penthouse’s coverage to include any 
concurrent or sequential windstorm or hail damage, even if the policy itself did 
not cover flood-related property damage.175  Quite simply, the district court 
concluded that the policy and its endorsement produced conflicting language 
about whether water-related losses were covered or excluded.176 
Circuit Judge Jolly wrote the opinion for the Penthouse panel.177  He 
began his analysis by stressing three important points: (1) “The purpose of a 
deductible is to shift some of the insurer’s [covered] risk . . . to the insured,” by 
stating formally the percentage of a covered loss, which the insurer will not 
pay;178 (2) A deductible clause can be applied logically only “after a covered 
loss has been established”;179 and (3) A deductible clause does not increase the 
insurer’s risk by expanding the scope of coverage.180 
In Corban v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, the Mississippi Supreme 
Court embraced the principle that insurers may defend themselves by citing 
unambiguous language in a policy’s ACC clause.181  In addition, under 
Mississippi’s law, an ACC clause does not require an insurer to indemnify an 
insured if covered and excluded perils concurrently cause property loss.182  On 
the other hand, in Mississippi, an ACC provision does not completely 
extinguish an insurer’s duty to indemnify if an excluded and a covered peril 
individually and sequentially cause a property loss.183 
Conversely, in Penthouse, the central question was whether a property 
insurance contract’s deductible provision can be reasonably construed as being 
a reverse ACC clause.184  As Circuit Judge Jolly correctly observed, the 
Supreme Court of Mississippi had never addressed this narrow question;185 
                                                                                                                 
 174. Id. 
 175. See id. 
 176. Id. at 386-87 (“The district court held that conflict in the Policy . . . is created by the language in the 
Windstorm Deductible . . . . The deductible ‘applies to loss or damage . . . caused directly or indirectly by 
windstorm or hail, regardless of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to 
the loss or damage.’   The emphasized phrase exactly tracks the language of the ACC clause in the 
‘Exclusions’ portion of the policy, which extends the water exclusion to damage caused directly or indirectly 
by water, ‘regardless of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the 
loss.’”). 
 177. See id. at 384. 
 178. Id. at 387; see also LEE R. ROSS & TOMAS F. SEGALLOR, 12 COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 178:1, at 
178:6 (3d ed. 2005) (“A provision commonly found in automobile collision policies is the so-called 
‘deductible clause,’ whereby a stated sum is deductible from the amount for which the insurer would 
otherwise be liable”); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 589 (3d ed. 1993) (defining a 
“deductible” as “a clause in an insurance policy relieving the insurer of responsibility for an initial specified 
small loss of the kind insured against”). 
 179. Penthouse, 612 F.3d at 387. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See Corban v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 20 So. 3d 601, 615-16 (Miss. 2009). 
 182. Id. 
 183. See id. 
 184. See Penthouse, 612 F.3d at 386-87. 
 185. See id. at 388 (“Although the Mississippi Supreme Court has not interpreted a deductible 
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although, the Penthouse litigants concluded otherwise.186  Thus, was the 
windstorm-deductible endorsement a “reverse anti-concurrent cause” provision, 
which effectively canceled the policy’s exclusion for water-related losses?187  
Again, the district court said, “Yes.”188  Judge Jolly said, “No.”189 Explaining 
his declaration, the learned circuit judge wrote: 
[T]he plain language of the Windstorm Deductible only describes when the 
deductible applies, and does not purport to describe, or even mention, the 
scope of the policy’s coverage.  The purpose of the broad language, which the 
district court read as a “reverse anti-concurrent cause” clause, . . . [prevents 
an insured from escaping] the applicability of the higher deductible for 
windstorm and hail damage . . . . [T]he clause operates only when deciding 
whether to apply the deductible to a loss, after determining that [a covered-
perils provision obligates the insurer to compensate the insured for a 
loss]. . . . The deductible endorsement does not create or extend coverage.190 
Therefore, citing and applying the laws of the Fifth Circuit panels, Circuit 
Judge Jolly declared that the district court’s “reverse anti-concurrent causation” 
ruling was erroneous.191  Additionally, the circuit judge vacated the district 
                                                                                                                 
endorsement clause like the one at issue here, this court has done so, applying Mississippi law to hold that a 
hurricane deductible endorsement did not affect the policy’s scope of coverage.” (footnote omitted) (citing 
Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507 F.3d 346, 355 (5th Cir. 2007))). 
 186. See id. at 388 n.4 (“Each party contends that the Mississippi Supreme Court has answered the 
question here to its advantage, but we think neither is correct.  The Underwriters argue that the Mississippi 
court addressed the issue in Corban when it held that a ‘wind and hail’ deductible did not provide coverage 
for all hurricane-related losses, including water damage.  However, Corban does not provide a definitive 
answer because the issue in that case was narrower than the one here.  The argument the court addressed in 
Corban was that the mere existence of a ‘wind and hail’ deductible indicated that hurricanes were covered 
events, such that all hurricane-related losses were covered.  Further, the deductible in Corban was not found 
in an endorsement and did not contain any of the same language as the one here.”  (citation omitted) (citing in 
part Corban, 20 So. 3d at 614 n.21)). 
 187. See id. at 387-88. 
 188. See id. at 387. 
 189. See id. at 387-88. 
 190. Id. (footnote omitted). 
Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the phrase “This endorsement changes the policy,” 
found as a header to the Windstorm Deductible endorsement, does not refer to the scope of 
coverage under the policy.  To be sure, this endorsement does . . . “change the policy”: it changes 
the standard deductible (which is $5000 for other types of losses) to 5 % of the total loss when the 
loss is caused by windstorm or hail.  
Id. at 387 n.2. 
 191. See id. at 388-89 (“We first addressed a deductible like the one here—but under Louisiana law—in 
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 220 (5th Cir. 2007).  In that case, we concluded that 
several deductible endorsements similar to the one in this case did not render the policies’ ACC clauses 
ambiguous.  Those deductibles included the same broad language stating that they applied ‘regardless of any 
other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.’  We noted that ‘[n]othing in the 
language of the endorsements purports to extend coverage for floods or to restrict flood exclusions,’ and held 
that the deductibles’ plain language ‘indicates that they do nothing more than alter the deductible for damage 
caused by a hurricane.’  We adopted the reasoning of Katrina in Tuepker, in which we held that, under 
Mississippi law, a hurricane deductible did not affect the scope of a policy’s coverage.  After discussing 
Katrina and citing Paulucci v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (M.D. Fla. 2002), both of 
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court’s certified order, which granted Penthouse’s motion for a judgment as a 
matter of law.192 
3.  Fifth Circuit Panels’ “Additional Payment” and “Double Recovery” 
Opinions 
On several occasions, Louisiana’s appellate courts have decided property-
insurance disputes involving the following substantive questions: (1) whether 
an insured may recover damages for segregable covered-peril losses under both 
a homeowners’ policy and a flood-insurance contract; (2) whether an insured 
may receive “additional payment” for a covered loss under, say, a homeowners’ 
policy or a flood policy; and (3) whether an insured’s additional compensation 
is an impermissible double recovery.193  At first blush, one might easily 
conclude that these three questions are unrelated.  But, upon a closer analysis, 
one would discover that “segregation of losses,” additional compensation, and 
double recovery are prongs of a general theory of recovery under a property-
insurance contract.194 
To illustrate, under Louisiana’s general “segregation” or “segregable 
damages” doctrine,195 an insured may recover for her segregable wind and flood 
damages.196  In addition, the insured may recover any previously uncompen-
sated damages for losses.197  But there are two provisos: (1) the insured’s 
combined compensation under her homeowners’ and flood insurance contracts 
may not exceed the value of her property;198 and (2) the insured may not 
recover twice for the same wind-related or flood-related loss under the 
respective insurance contracts.199  Without doubt, the second proviso is 
designed to prevent double recovery, which is not sanctioned in Louisiana.200 
                                                                                                                 
which involved deductible endorsements that were nearly identical to Penthouse’s, we concluded that ‘[l]ike 
the hurricane deductible at issue in In re Katrina, this clause clearly only applies to the deductible, and does 
not affect the scope of coverage under the policy.’” (alterations in original) (citation omitted)). 
 192. Id. at 389. 
 193. See Bradley II, 620 F.3d 509, 514 (5th Cir. Sept. 2010). 
 194. See id. at 524-26. 
 195. See id. at 523 n.14 (“As we explained in Dickerson: ‘Under Louisiana law, the insured must prove 
that [his] claim . . . is covered . . . [under] his policy.  Once [that occurs], the insurer has the burden of 
demonstrating that the [loss] is excluded from coverage.  Thus, once [the insured] proved his home was 
damaged by wind, the burden shifted to [the insurer] to prove that flooding caused the damage at issue, 
thereby excluding coverage under the homeowners policy.  As no one disputes that at least some of the 
damage to the [the insured’s] home was covered by the homeowners policy, [the insurer] had to prove how 
much of that damage was caused by flooding and was thus excluded from coverage under its policy.” (third 
and fourth sentences’ alterations in original) (quoting Dickerson v. Lexington Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 290, 294 (5th 
Cir. 2009))). 
 196. See, e.g., Johnson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 07-1226, 2008 WL 2178059, at *2 (E.D. La. 
May 19, 2008) (citing Weiss v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 06-3774, 2007 WL 891869, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 21, 
2007)). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See, e.g., Cole v. Celotex, 599 So. 2d 1058, 1080 (La. 1992) (concluding that an insured in 
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But, Louisiana’s law is extremely clear regarding an insured’s right to 
receive additional or multiple payments under several insurance contracts: 
Homeowners’ and flood insurance policies protect an insured’s property against 
two different covered perils.201  Thus, in the event of losses from both perils, 
both insurers have a duty to pay.202  And neither insurer may use a double-
recovery defense to evade their respective contractual obligation.203 
In light of those settled principles, reconsider the homeowners’ claims in 
Bayle.  Allstate used the ACV of the Bayles’ house to determine the amount of 
compensated insurance proceeds for the wind-caused structural damage.204  The 
insureds, however, insisted that a “replacement cost value” (RCV) formula was 
the proper equation to calculate the financial loss.205  Thus, the Bayles asked 
Allstate to pay additional funds to cover the structural damage.206  Allstate 
requested and the Eastern District of Louisiana granted a motion for summary 
judgment.207  The court held: (1) Under Louisiana’s law, the insured has the 
burden of segregating covered and noncovered losses; (2) The Bayles did not 
identify any additional uncompensated, wind-caused property losses; (3) An 
ACV rather than an RCV was the proper measure for calculating the damages; 
and (4) Allstate had no contractual obligation to pay any additional 
compensation for previously compensated wind-caused losses.208 
Circuit Judge Wiener crafted the Bayle opinion, addressing thoughtfully 
general and ancillary appellate questions.209  Again, the broad “recurring” 
                                                                                                                 
Louisiana may recover insurance proceeds “under all available coverages provided that there is no double 
recovery”) (quoting 15A COUCH ON INSURANCE § 56:34 (2d ed. 1983)); Albert v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 940 
So. 2d 620, 622 (La. 2006) (reaffirming the principle that Louisiana law does not allow property owners to 
receive double compensation for perils-caused losses under property insurance contracts). 
 201. See, e.g., Ferguson v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 06-3936, 2007 WL 1378507, at *4 (E.D. La. May 9, 
2007); see also Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moffett, 378 F.2d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir. 1967) (reaffirming the 
fundamental principle that a property insurance contract promises to indemnify an owner against a covered-
peril loss and to put an insured in the same position that she occupied before a loss). 
 202. See, e.g., Ferguson, 2007 WL 1378507, at *4. 
 203. Id. (“[And even if an insured purchases two policies—one homeowners and one flood—and 
recovers under both], that [is]  not . . . double coverage. . . . The flood policy is not excess insurance.  Instead, 
it covers a loss [which is] not covered [under] the homeowner policy.”); see also Celotex, 599 So. 2d at 1080 
(“[W]hile an insured may not recover in excess of his actual loss, an insured may recover under each policy 
providing coverage until the total loss sustained is indemnified.”). 
 204. Bayle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 615 F.3d  350, 352 (5th Cir. Aug. 2010) 
 205. See id. at 354.  
 206. See id. at 352 n.2 (“In the district court, the Bayles also challenged the amount that they recovered 
for damage to contents and ‘additional living expenses’ (‘ALE’) . . . but they appear to have waived entirely 
their contents and ALE claims on appeal.”). 
 207. Id. at 354 (“In opposing Allstate’s motion for summary judgment, the Bayles’ only submission was a 
report prepared by Steven Hitchcock, a claims adjuster who estimated the total cost of repairing and replacing 
the house.  He based his conclusions on interviews with the Bayles and computer software [that he] used to 
estimate insurance, restoration, and remodeling costs.  After offering a line-item listing of the materials and 
labor needed to restore the entire property, irrespective of whether the cause of the damage was wind or flood, 
or a combination of both, Hitchcock concluded that the total replacement cost value (‘RCV’) of the Bayles’ 
house was $182,863.13.  He ventured no ACV.”). 
 208. See id. at 354-55. 
 209. See id. at 352. 
2012] INSURANCE 755 
 
question was whether an insured or an insurer must segregate covered-risk 
damage from excluded-risk damage when both covered and excluded perils—
wind and flooding, respectively—are the concurrent causes of a loss.210  The 
district court awarded summary relief to Allstate because the insurer advanced a 
convincing argument: The Bayles failed to prove that wind—rather than 
flooding—was the sole and efficient cause of the uncompensated or under-
compensated property losses.211  The homeowners, however, asserted that 
Allstate had the burden to segregate the losses and damages.212 
At the outset, Judge Wiener noted that both Allstate and the Bayles were 
apparently confused about the significant difference between a litigant’s burden 
of persuasion and a litigant’s burden of production under Louisiana’s law.213  
In Jones v. Estate of Santiago, the Supreme Court of Louisiana concluded that 
an insured has the initial burden to prove that his insurance contract covers a 
loss.214 Once that occurs, the burden shifts to the insurer, who must prove that 
the policy’s exclusion clause bars insurance compensation for the insured’s loss 
or injury.215 
The Jones court found that the insurer satisfied its burden by presenting 
sufficient prima facie evidence to justify its summary judgment award.216 
Therefore, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that the burden shifted to 
the insured to present sufficient evidence, which demonstrated that a material 
issue of fact remained regarding whether the exclusion clause barred the 
claim.217  In 2009, the Fifth Circuit decided Dickerson v. Lexington Insurance 
Co., a case in which the district court granted the insured’s motion for summary 
judgment after a bench trial.218  On appeal, Lexington challenged the 
                                                                                                                 
 210. See id.; see also id. at 355-56 (“Neither party contends that any applicable provision of the Allstate 
policy is ambiguous, and the Bayles do not seek—as have insureds in other cases—additional benefits under a 
named peril policy or under a policy that contains an anti-concurrent cause provision.  And, unlike many 
hurricane-damaged properties, the Bayles’ house was not reduced to its foundations or to but a slab.”). 
 211. Id. at 356. 
 212. Id. at 355 n.15 (“The Bayles also assert in the alternative that federal law requires the insurer to 
‘segregate’ or ‘allocate’ damage.  The Bayles point to federal law governing private insurers who administer 
federal flood insurance policies, and contend that particular provisions require such private insurers to adjust 
both flood and wind claims simultaneously.  The Bayles fail to take into account that no federal ‘single 
adjuster’ program was ever created.  As the Bayles cite no authority to support the proposition that this federal 
program was intended to displace state law governing the burdens of proof and production in breach of 
insurance contract claims, we do not address this contention.” (citation omitted)). 
 213. Id. at 358. 
 214. Jones v. Estate of Santiago, 870 So. 2d 1002, 1010 (La. 2004). 
 215. Id.; see also LA. STAT. ANN. REV. § 22:658(2)(B) (2007) (redesignated § 22:1893(2)(B) by Acts 
2008, No. 415, § 1 (effective Jan. 1, 2009)) (“If damage to immovable property is covered, in whole or in 
part, under the terms of the policy of insurance, the burden is on the insurer to establish an exclusion under the 
terms of the policy.”). 
 216. Jones, 870 So. 2d at 1011-12. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Dickerson v. Lexington Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Bayle, 615 F.3d at 357 
(“Like the Bayles, the insured in Dickerson filed suit against the provider of his homeowners insurance, 
Lexington, alleging that it had breached the insurance contract by failing to pay the full amount owed under 
the policy.  Also like the Bayles, the insured in Dickerson sought damages and statutory penalties for bad faith 
under Louisiana law.  And, like the Bayles’ policy with Allstate, Dickerson’s policy with Lexington excluded 
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sufficiency of the insured’s summary judgment evidence.219  In the end, the 
Fifth Circuit resolved the Dickerson dispute by applying the burden-shifting 
principles outlined in Jones. 220 
On appeal during the Fifth Circuit’s 2010–2011 term, the Bayles cited the 
analyses and rulings in Jones and Dickerson and argued that at the outset, both 
Allstate and the Bayles agreed that Katrina-related winds—the covered peril—
caused some property loss; therefore, the burden shifted to Allstate to prove that 
flooding—the excluded risk—also caused the uncompensated property loss.221  
On appeal, Allstate argued, however, that the Dickerson panel did not formally 
adopt Louisiana’s burdens-of-proof rules, which are outlined in Jones.222  
Allstate insisted that the panel’s statement in Dickerson was dicta.223  In Bayle, 
Judge Wiener stated succinctly: “[O]ur articulation of the allocation of the 
burden of proof in Dickerson was not dictum, although Allstate was correct that 
it did not alter the rule . . . in Jones.”224  But the circuit judge also rejected the 
Bayles’ assertion and concluded: “Dickerson [does not] stand for the 
proposition . . . that [an] insurer alone must bear the burden of producing 
evidence to segregate covered losses from excluded losses, at least not at the 
summary judgment stage.”225 
More specifically, Judge Wiener stressed that Louisiana’s law imposes the 
burden of persuasion on an insured to establish that a covered peril was the 
efficient proximate cause of an uncompensated or an under-compensated 
loss.226  And if the insurer wants to avoid liability by relying on a policy’s 
                                                                                                                 
coverage of damage from flood.  Unlike the district court in [Bayle], however, the district court in Dickerson 
adjudicated the claim after a bench trial, ruling in favor of Dickerson.” (footnote omitted)). 
 219. Dickerson, 556 F.3d at 290. 
 220. Id. at 294-95. 
 221. See Bayle, 615 F.3d at 357. 
 222. Id. at 356.  
 223. Id. at 356-57. 
 224. Id. at 358 (“[I]n Dickerson we were not ruling on an appeal from a grant of summary judgment—
where, ‘[i]f the burden at trial rests on the non-movant, the movant must merely demonstrate an absence of 
evidentiary support in the record for the non-movant’s case’. . . [still, the sufficiency of the evidence must be 
reviewed necessarily to properly allocate and determine litigant’s] burden of proof, . . . because ‘[t]he judge 
must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden.’” (second and 
fourth alterations in original)). 
 225. Id.  
 226. See id. at 358-59 (“Simply put, this [rule means] that the insured must prove coverage under the 
policy.”); see also Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 123-24 (La. 2000) (“When determining whether 
. . . a policy affords coverage for an incident, it is the burden of the insured to prove the incident falls within 
the policy’s terms.  On the other hand, the insurer bears the burden of proving the applicability of an 
exclusionary clause within a policy.” (citation omitted)); Whitham v. La. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 34 So. 
3d 1104, 1107 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2010) (“In an action under an insurance contract, the insured bears the 
burden of proving the existence of policy and coverage.  The insurer, however, bears the burden of showing 
policy limits or exclusions.”); Comeaux v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 986 So. 2d 153, 154 (La. Ct. App. 
5th Cir. 2008) (“[A]lthough the insurer has the burden to show an exclusion applies, we find that State Farm 
here is not relying on an exclusion to avoid paying the claim [because] State Farm acknowledges that ALE 
was due pursuant to the homeowners policy and paid accordingly.”); Lee v. Taylor, 808 So. 2d 407, 410 (La. 
Ct. App. 1st  Cir. 2000) (“The insured bears the burden of proof to establish every fact essential to a cause of 
action under the policy coverage.”); Stewart v. La. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 420 So. 2d 1217, 1219 (La. Ct. 
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exclusion clause, the insurer has the burden of persuasion to establish that an 
uncompensated or under-compensated loss is excluded.227  Even more 
importantly, Judge Wiener emphasized that under Louisiana’s law, the parties’ 
respective burdens of persuasion do not shift between the parties.228  
Conversely, during a summary judgment proceeding, the burden of production 
shifts.229  If an insurer files a summary judgment motion, the insurer must 
produce sufficient prima facie evidence to prove that an excluded peril was the 
cause of an uncompensated or under-compensated loss.230  And if the insurer 
achieves that end, “the burden shifts to the [insured] to present evidence 
demonstrating that a material factual issue [still] remains.”231 
Again, on appeal, the Bayles asked the Fifth Circuit to declare that the 
disparity—between their estimated gross damages and the amount received for 
wind-caused losses—required Allstate to pay additional insurance proceeds.232 
The Bayles also asked the panel to declare that Allstate had to segregate wind- 
and flood-caused losses before receiving summary relief.233  But, writing for the 
panel, Judge Wiener rejected the Bayles’ pleas.234  Instead, he concluded that 
the Eastern District of Louisiana summary judgment was proper.235  The panel 
found that Allstate produced evidence identifying excluded-flood-caused and 
covered-wind-caused losses.236  The burden of production, however, shifted to 
the Bayles, and the homeowners had to offer sufficient rebuttal evidence, which 
created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether any uncompensated, 
wind-cause loss remained.237  Conversely, the panel found that the Bayles did 
not satisfy their burden of production.238 
The Bayles also challenged “the sufficiency of the payment they received 
for structural damage, claiming that their damages should have been calculated 
under the policy’s ‘building structure reimbursement’ provision.”239  The 
district court rejected the Bayles’ argument and granted Allstate’s request for 
                                                                                                                 
App. 3d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he insurer has the burden of proving facts which limit its coverage.”). 
 227. See Bayle, 615 F.3d at 359. 
 228. See id. 
 229. See id. 
 230. See id. 
 231. Id. at 359 n.33; id. at 359 (“[These rules apply,] [b]ecause at trial the defendant-insurer has the 
ultimate burden of persuasion that the exclusion is applicable.”) (quoting Jones v. Estate of Santiago, 870 So. 
2d 1002, 1010 (La. 2004)); see also ROSS & SEGALLOR, supra note 178, § 175:9 (“It is the insured’s burden 
to produce evidence that would afford a reasonable basis for estimating the amount of damage or the 
proportionate part of damage caused by the covered peril and that by the excluded peril.”). 
 232. See Bayle, 615 F.3d at 360. 
 233. See id. 
 234. See id. 
 235. See id. at 361. 
 236. See id. 
 237. See id. 
 238. See id. (“[T]he Bayles fail to recognize that when Allstate adduced evidence sufficient to establish a 
prima facie case that flood, not wind, caused any uncompensated or under-compensated damage complained 
of by the Bayles, the burden of production shifted to the Bayles to offer rebuttal evidence sufficient to create a 
genuine issue of material fact as to which, if any, uncompensated items of damage were caused by wind.”). 
 239. Id. 
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summary relief, finding that the ACV of the Bayles’ house was the proper 
compensation for the loss.240  Thus, concluding that the homeowners failed to 
prove the existence of a genuine issue of material fact involving the “building 
structure reimbursement clause,” Judge Wiener held that the district court did 
not err. 241 
Finally, the Bayles and Allstate also disagreed about the sufficiency of the 
ACV reimbursement and about whether prior payments fully indemnified the 
Bayles for their wind-caused losses.242  Although the Bayles produced sufficient 
evidence of the house’s RCV, they did not produce sufficient evidence of the 
house’s ACV.243  On the other hand, Allstate presented evidence of two 
ACVs.244  In the end, the panel held that this issue was immaterial in light of its 
overarching ruling about Allstate’s and the Bayles’ shifting evidentiary burdens 
of production and persuasion.245  Still, the panel upheld the district court’s 
ruling that Allstate had no duty to pay any additional proceeds to cover the 
Bayles’ wind-caused losses.246 
Several weeks after deciding Bayle, the Fifth Circuit decided Bradley II.247 
Again, the homeowners in Bradley II argued that Allstate had a contractual 
duty to pay additional proceeds to cover their personal-property losses and 
                                                                                                                 
 240. See id. 
 241. Id. at 362 (“It is undisputed that the Bayles neither repaired their damaged property nor replaced it 
on the same lot.  And, although they did purchase a condominium, it was at a different location.  Moreover, 
for the Bayles to recover under the ‘building structure reimbursement’ clause, the condominium must have 
been purchased within 180 days of Allstate’s last actual cash value payment to the Bayles.  [No one] contests 
that the condominium was not purchased within 180 days of Allstate’s last actual cash value payment to the 
Bayles.  ‘Louisiana law . . . places the burden on the [insured] to establish every fact essential to recovery and 
to establish that the claim falls within the policy coverage,’ and the Bayles failed to adduce any evidence that 
their condominium was purchased within the requisite 180-day period.” (omission and second alteration in 
original)). 
 242. See id. 
 243. See id. at 362-63 (“[The Bayles argued that] [t]he mere existence of . . . two competing figures . . . 
signals [the existence of] a genuine issue of material fact which precludes summary judgment.  Allstate 
[argues] that . . . the Bayles recovered $132,628.87 in structural damages to their property, which exceeds 
both figures that Allstate produced in connection with its motion for summary judgment.”).  Again the Bayles 
recovered compensation for flood- and wind-caused losses as well as from the sale of their property to Murphy 
Oil.  See id. 
 244. See id. at 362 (“In an early report submitted to the NFIP, a copy of which was included in Allstate’s 
summary judgment evidence, the ACV of the home was listed as $74,284.80 . . . [, and] in its summary 
judgment briefs, Allstate advanced another ACV sum, which was calculated by its expert . . . to be 
$108,220.”). 
 245. See id. at 363. 
 246. See id. (“As we explained earlier, Allstate [presented] sufficient evidence [to] support . . . its motion 
for summary judgment [by establishing] that all wind-caused structural damage to the Bayles’ house was fully 
compensated.  Not only did the Bayles fail to counter with any rebuttal evidence to establish the existence of 
as-yet uncompensated damage caused by wind, the Bayles also failed to proffer any evidence that the 
quantum of damages they had already received from Allstate for wind-caused damage was insufficient.  The 
Bayles have cited no authority, and we have found none, to support the proposition that the shifting 
evidentiary burden of production in these insurance suits somehow absolves the insureds from the traditional 
rule ‘[u]nder Louisiana law, [that] the plaintiff must prove damages with reasonable certainty . . . .’” (fourth 
and fifth alteration in original)). 
 247. See Bradley II, 620 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. Sept. 2010). 
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additional living expenses in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.248  Allstate argued 
that the Bradleys had no contractual right to recover any additional payment 
under their homeowners’ policy because they recovered the ACV of the 
property.249  Allstate insisted and the Eastern District Court of Louisiana agreed 
that additional compensation would be a double recovery and a windfall for the 
Bradleys. 250  On appeal, the Fifth Circuit disagreed.251 
Writing for the panel, Circuit Judge Stewart outlined the panel’s initial 
findings and rulings.252  First, the panel found that the district court calculated 
the ACV incorrectly by using the pre-storm market value of the house.253  
Furthermore, the district judge held that there were no disputed issues of 
material fact regarding the ACV of the Bradleys’ home.254  The Fifth Circuit 
panel, however, concluded that the latter holding was reversible error.255  Citing 
Louisiana’s law, Judge Stewart stressed that “ACV is computed [by 
determining] the cost of replacing the building as it existed at the time of the 
accident, [while] taking into account the replacement costs within a reasonable 
time after the accident . . . [and deducting any] depreciation.”256 
Thus, the panel remanded the case to allow the district court to calculate 
properly the ACV of the Bradleys’ house.257  The following instruction and 
ruling also appeared in Judge Stewart’s opinion:  
Upon remand, the fact-finder must arrive at the proper figure for ACV to 
establish the amount of actual loss.  As long as the Bradleys’ combined 
                                                                                                                 
 248. Bradley I, 606 F.3d 215, 221 (5th Cir. May 2010). 
 249. Bradley II, 620 F.3d at 521. 
 250. See id. (“The [district] court held that because the Bradleys had already collected $105,139.06 from 
flood and homeowners coverage combined, any additional recovery would amount to a double recovery.  
Relying upon Cole v. Celotex, the district court . . . held that the Bradleys were not entitled to further recovery 
as a matter of law.”). 
 251. See id. at 528. 
 252. See id. at 519-28. 
 253. Id. at 520-21. 
 254. See id.  
 255. See id. at 521.  
 256. Id. at 520; see also Hackman v. EMC Ins. Co., 984 So. 2d 139, 143 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2008) 
(reiterating that a homeowners’ policy does not define ACV and that Louisiana law defines ACV as 
“reproduction cost less depreciation”); Bingham v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 503 So. 2d 1043, 1045 (La. Ct. App. 2d 
Cir. 1987) (stressing that the test for “determining actual cash value is [based on the] principle that an 
adequately insured person should incur neither economic gain nor loss when his property is destroyed”). 
 257. See Bradley II, 620 F.3d at 521 n.9 (“[T]he correct measure of ACV under Louisiana law is 
replacement cost minus depreciation.  Further, Allstate’s position that actual loss for purposes of double 
recovery should be based on the pre-storm market value of the home would effectively invalidate the total loss 
provision of the policy.  The policy limits and premium for the policy reflect Allstate’s estimate of the home’s 
pre-storm value.  Yet according to Allstate’s interpretation, if the home were completely destroyed by wind, 
then Allstate would still not be required to pay the policy limits ($105,600) because the payment would exceed 
the pre-storm value ($97,000).  This reads the total loss provision out of the contract and amounts to a 
windfall for Allstate.  Such a construction does not reflect the intent of the parties, as expressed by the words 
of the policy.” (citation omitted)); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2049 (1985) (“A provision susceptible of different 
meanings must be interpreted with a meaning that renders it effective and not with one that renders it 
ineffective.”). 
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recovery under their homeowners and flood policies is less than their actual 
loss, then the double recovery rule does not preclude the Bradleys from 
receiving additional compensation under their homeowners policy.258 
French is another “double recovery” controversy that the Fifth Circuit 
decided this survey period.259  To repeat, the Eastern District of Louisiana 
ordered Allstate to pay an additional $123,000 for French’s Katrina-related, 
wind-damaged lakefront property.260  Before the Fifth Circuit, Allstate 
maintained that the record contained insufficient evidence to support the 
finding that Allstate had a contractual duty to pay additional money to cover 
French’s loss.261  Allstate also argued that the combined prior and additional 
payments ($510,000.88) exceeded the value of French’s house.262  Therefore, 
according to the insurer, the additional payments violated Louisiana’s “double 
recovery” rule.263 
Circuit Judge Stewart wrote the French opinion.264  And, at the outset, he 
reviewed the controversial ACV provision in the homeowners’ policy that 
French purchased from Allstate.265  That provision, titled “How We Pay For A 
Loss,” reads in pertinent part: 
 
Actual Cash Value.  If you do not repair or replace the damaged . . . 
property, payment will be on an actual cash value basis.  This means there 
may be a deduction for depreciation.  Payment will not exceed the limit of 
liability shown on the Policy Declarations for the coverage that applies to the 
damaged . . . property, regardless of the number of items involved in the 
loss.266 
 
As Judge Stewart stressed, various Fifth Circuit panels have interpreted 
the meaning of the ACV clause in Allstate’s homeowners’ insurance 
contracts.267  And applying Louisiana’s law, the panels have issued consistent 
rules: (1) Insured homeowners may not receive payments for structural damage 
that exceed the ACV of their damaged or destroyed property unless the insureds 
                                                                                                                 
 258. Bradley II, 620 F.3d at 525. 
 259. See French v. Allstate Indem. Co., 637 F.3d 571, 576 (5th Cir. Apr. 2011). 
 260. See id. 
 261. Id. at 578. 
 262. Id. at 580 (“As the district court noted in its oral ruling, by the start of [the] trial Allstate had paid 
[French] $215,292.88 for wind damage to the dwelling, and the flood insurer had paid $171,708 for flood 
damage to the dwelling.  The [Frenches] had thus recovered a total of $387,000.88 in insurance proceeds for 
Katrina-related damage to their home.  With the district court’s award of $123,000, the [Frenches] total 
recovery for [the damaged property] climbed to $510,000.88.  Allstate argues that $510,000.88 exceeds the 
[Frenches] actual loss . . . and therefore the award [was] a double recovery.”). 
 263. See id. at 578-79. 
 264. Id. at 574. 
 265. See id. at 579. 
 266. Id. 
 267. See id. (citing Nunez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 604 F.3d 840, 846 (5th Cir. 2010)); Bradley II, 620 F.3d 
509, 520 (5th Cir. Sept. 2010); Bayle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 350, 362 (5th Cir. Aug. 2010). 
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repair or replace their damaged property;268 and (2) The ACV is computed “as 
the cost of replacing the building as it existed at the time of the accident, taking 
into account the replacement costs within a reasonable time after the accident, 
minus depreciation.”269  On the other hand, a homeowner may receive payments 
to cover additional expenses if an insured homeowner repairs or replaces the 
covered property within 180 days.270 
Addressing Allstate’s double-recovery defense, the panel’s findings and 
conclusion were stated clearly: (1) The district court had authority to calculate 
French’s actual financial damages—the ACV of the insured’s damaged 
property;271 (2) Sufficient evidence appeared in the record to support the district 
court’s award;272 and (3) The district court’s award was not an impermissible 
double recovery under Louisiana’s law.273  Therefore, finding no clearly 
reversible error, the French panel affirmed the Eastern District of Louisiana’s 
additional-payment award.274 
There is more.  French paid an additional premium and purchased an 
“Extended Limits Endorsement,” which was attached to the Allstate policy.275  
The endorsement modifies certain parts of the insurance contract, and in a 
paragraph titled “How We Pay for A Loss,” the endorsement reads in relevant 
part: 
 
Building Structure Reimbursement. Under Coverage A—Dwelling 
Protection and Coverage B—Other Structures Protection, we will make 
additional payment to reimburse you for cost in excess of actual cash value if 
                                                                                                                 
 268. See Nunez, 604 F.3d at 846; Bradley II, 620 F.3d at 525; Bayle, 615 F.3d at 362. 
 269. Bradley II, 620 F.3d at 520. 
 270. See French, 637 F.3d at 579. 
 271. See id. at 581 (citing Bradley II, 620 F.3d at 522 (“The fact-finder must determine, or the parties 
may stipulate, the ACV of the property.”)). 
 272. Id.   
We reiterate that the district court was best positioned to make credibility determinations of the 
witnesses to ascertain the Plaintiffs’ actual loss.  Moreover, there was sufficient evidence at trial—
as Allstate itself points out—that the ACV of the Plaintiffs’ dwelling, and the Plaintiffs’ 
corresponding actual loss, exceeded $510,000.88.    
Id.   
The parties submitted as a joint exhibit at trial the flood damage worksheet of Allstate’s adjuster    
. . . , in which he assessed the ACV of the Plaintiffs’ dwelling at $571,975.81.  Similarly, the 
parties submitted a 2003 appraisal of the Plaintiffs’ home as another joint exhibit, and that 
appraisal lists the home’s replacement value at $533,925.  [There was testimony] at trial that this 
figure likely underestimated the replacement value of the dwelling. 
Id. at 581 n.9. 
 273. Id. at 579-81 (“Allstate raised this very argument in the district court both before trial, in its 
proposed findings of fact, and after trial, in its Rule 52(b) motion.  Both times the argument was rejected: the 
district court declined to adopt Allstate’s position at the close of trial; and, in denying Allstate’s Rule 52(b) 
motion, the district court implicitly reaffirmed that the Plaintiffs’ pre-trial recovery fell short of indemnifying 
them for their loss—sufficiently so that the additional award for wind damage did not constitute a double 
recovery.  We cannot say that this finding was clearly erroneous.”). 
 274. See id. at 581. 
 275. See id. 
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you repair, rebuild or replace damaged, destroyed or stolen covered 
property within 180 days of the actual cash value payment. 
. . . . 
Building Structure Reimbursement will not exceed the smallest of the 
following amounts: 
a) the replacement cost . . . ; 
b) the amount actually and necessarily spent to repair or replace the  
      damaged building structure(s) . . . ; or 
c) the limit of liability applicable to the building structure(s) as shown 
      on the Policy Declarations  
. . . . 
Building Structure Reimbursement payment will be limited to the difference 
between any actual cash value payment made for the covered loss to building 
structures and the smallest of 1), 2) or 3) above.276 
 
As stated earlier, the district judge concluded that French could not collect 
money under the endorsement.277  Thus, on appeal, French challenged the 
district court’s ruling, asserting that the ruling was erroneous.278  In part, the 
district court’s finding was based on the following language in the 
endorsement: 
 
This endorsement applies only if:  
1) You insure your dwelling, attached structures and detached building 
structures to 100% replacement cost as determined by:  
a) an Allstate Home Replacement Cost Estimator completed and based  
on the accuracy of information you furnished; or   
  b) our inspection of your residence premises.279 
 
Judge Stewart’s analysis of this issue was short but sufficient.280  Like the 
district court, he found and stressed the following indisputable fact: The 
homeowners did not repair or replace their damaged property.281  In addition, 
Judge Stewart cited and embraced the Bayle panel’s analysis and conclusion 
                                                                                                                 
 276. Id.  In addition, “[t]he [e]ndorsement, where applicable, substitutes the following language into 
section (3): ‘3) 120% of the limit of liability applicable to the building structure(s) as shown on the Policy 
Declarations . . . .’  All other policy terms and conditions remain the same.”  Id. at 582 (omission in original). 
 277. Id. at 575. 
 278. Id. at 581. 
The district court rejected [the Frenches’] argument that the Extended Limits Endorsement 
applied to [the homeowners’] wind-damage claim.  To prevail . . . , the district court concluded, 
[the Frenches], at the threshold, had to show that they had repaired or replaced their damaged 
property, and it was undisputed at trial that the [homeowners] had not made any permanent repairs 
to their dwelling.  The district court [also] concluded that the Extended Limits Endorsement did 
not apply [because the homeowners] had not insured their property to a hundred percent of its 
replacement cost, as required under the Endorsement. 
Id. at 582. 
 279. Id. at 582 n.10. 
 280. See id. at 578-82. 
 281. Id. at 579. 
2012] INSURANCE 763 
 
surrounding the same question.282  In the end, the circuit judge concluded that 
Allstate had no duty to pay any building structure reimbursement.283  Judge 
Stewart also concluded that Allstate had no duty to pay any proceeds to cover 
French’s additional living expenses.284 
B.  First-Party Claims—Intangible Commercial Property Losses 
Substantive Question: Whether under Louisiana’s law, commercial 
property insurers have a contractual duty to pay property owners for the 
latter’s Hurricanes Katrina- and Gustav-related business-interruption 
losses. 
 
A week after Hurricane Katrina destroyed a substantial amount of 
commercial property along the Gulf Coast, a prescient article appeared in the 
Wall Street Journal about the types of insurance disputes that would arise.285  In 
relevant part, the article read: 
Insurance disputes over payments for flooding and other storm damage 
could extend far beyond homeowners, as businesses of all sizes begin to 
confront insurers over lost profits from Hurricane Katrina. 
Billions of dollars . . . for so-called business-interruption insurance—
which reimburses owners for some expenses and lost profits—will hinge on 
                                                                                                                 
 282. See id. at 582.  
The Bayles sought damages under the “building structure reimbursement” provision of their policy 
with Allstate, but it was “undisputed that the Bayles neither repaired their damaged property nor 
replaced it on the same lot.”  The district court thus “rejected the proposition that any of the 
Bayles’ structural damage should be calculated under the ‘building structure reimbursement’ 
provision, maintaining that the Bayles were limited to the ACV of the property.”  We affirmed in 
that case, holding that “[t]he district court did not err in concluding that the Bayles are not entitled 
to any payments for structural damage in excess of the ACV of their house.” 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bayles v. Allstate Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 352, 361-62 (5th Cir. Aug. 2010)). 
 283. Id. (“We agree with the district court’s legal conclusion and therefore do not address its alternative 
factual determination.  As is plainly evident from the text of the Extended Limits Endorsement, it modifies 
only the Building Structure Reimbursement provision, and therefore an insured may benefit from the 
Endorsement only if she is entitled to Building Structure Reimbursement.”). 
 284. See id. at 583 (“The district court concluded that because the [homeowners] had not introduced 
evidence of any additional living expenses actually incurred, they were not entitled to payments under the 
ALE provision.  Were the [homeowners] to later commence repairs that required them to vacate their home, 
and thereby incur ALE, the district court stated, they could then claim payment under the provision.  On 
appeal, the [homeowners] do not dispute that they have not established the predicate requirement of actually 
incurring ALE.  Indeed, it is undisputed that the [homeowners] have continuously resided at their house since 
2003 and have not commenced any permanent repairs to their home.   Instead, the [homeowners] again argue 
that their failure to repair should be excused under Article 1772 of the Louisiana Civil Code.  And again, we 
decline to address this argument raised for the first time on appeal.  We do note our agreement with the 
district court that under the homeowners’ policy, it appears that the [homeowners] may later claim ALE 
payment once they have actually incurred those expenses.”). 
 285. Theo Francis, In Katrina’s Wake: Businesses Face Insurance Disputes—Billions of Dollars to 
Hinge On a Host of Murky Issues; Parsing Policy Language, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2005, at A13. 
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many of the same issues facing homeowners, including whether damage was 
caused by flooding or by wind and rain.  
. . . .  
[The estimated cost to cover losses is] $100 billion, [and] private-sector 
insurers [are] expected to [pay] between $17 billion and . . . $50 billion. 
. . . Disputes are particularly likely [to arise] over the complexities of 
business-interruption insurance. . . . In addition to reimbursing business 
owners for some continuing business expenses and profit lost from direct 
storm damage, such policies also provide some coverage when business is 
lost as a result of orders of civil authority. 
When business-interruption payments are triggered by direct damage to 
a property, they can continue for months, sometimes until business returns to 
normal.  [Insurance compensation, for say] . . . the mandatory evacuation of 
New Orleans . . . [is] typically less generous, ending after two weeks or a 
month . . . . Some civil-authority [insurance payments start only] if the order 
stemmed from a peril covered under the [insurance contract’s property-loss 
clause] . . . . 
Claims decisions are expected to hinge on the specific policy language, 
with some disputes stretching out years.286 
 
A search of reported insurance-law decisions reveals that the article’s forecast 
was accurate: Insurers and insured commercial enterprises have litigated 
numerous business-interruption disputes in Louisiana’s state courts.287 
On the other hand, only a few of the Katrina-related business-interruption 
controversies have reached the Fifth Circuit.  In early 2010, the court of appeals 
decided two disputes, Versai Management Corp. v. Clarendon America 
Insurance Co. and Catlin Syndicate Ltd. v. Imperial Palace of Mississippi, 
Inc.288  And, in late 2010, the Fifth Circuit decided and published another 
Katrina-related case, Consolidated Companies, Inc. v. Lexington Insurance 
Co.289  The court of appeals decided Dickie Brennan & Co. v. Lexington 
Insurance Co. in early 2011.290  But, Dickie is a Hurricane Gustav-related 
business-interruption conflict.291  Here, a review of Consolidated and Dickie is 
presented.  And, as the reader will discover, Dickie and Consolidated address 
variations of a recurring question that the Fifth Circuit decided in Versai, 
Catlin, and Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Insurance Co.: What 
triggers an insurer’s duty to pay proceeds when a hurricane and civil 
                                                                                                                 
 286. Id. (emphasis added).  Twenty-one cases were generated by searching Westlaw’s LAIN-CS database 
on September 2, 2011, using the query “business interruption.”  To be sure, that number is significant because 
the aggregate of all disputes involved millions of dollars. 
 287. See id. 
 288. Versai Mgmt. Corp. v. Clarendon Am. Ins. Co., 597 F.3d 729, 733 (5th Cir. 2010); Catlin Syndicate 
Ltd. v. Imperial Palace of Miss., Inc., 600 F.3d 511, 512 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 289. Consol. Cos., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 616 F.3d 422, 424 (5th Cir. Aug. 2010). 
 290. Dickie Brennan & Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 636 F.3d 683, 684 (5th Cir. Mar. 2011). 
 291. See id. at 687. 
2012] INSURANCE 765 
 
authorities’ accompanying mandatory evacuation orders interrupt an insured’s 
business?292 
1.  A Review of Pertinent Facts in “Business-Interruption” Cases 
First, consider the most pertinent facts surrounding the dispute in 
Consolidated.  Consolidated Companies, Inc. (Conco) owned a warehouse 
located in Harahan, Louisiana.293  On August 28, 2005, Conco received a 
commercial property insurance contract from Lexington Insurance Company 
(Lexington). 294  The policy limit was $25 million, and it insured Conco against 
business interruption and other covered perils.295  On August 29, 2005, 
Hurricane Katrina—an undisputed covered peril—damaged Conco’s property 
and equipment.296  “Conco resumed partial operations within ten days.”297  
Fifteen months later, Conco’s operations were completely restored.298  During 
the interruption of normal business activities, however, Conco earned 
$205,840,489 in revenues and incurred $205,561,483 in debt.299  Conco’s small 
profit was $279,006.300 
Conco submitted a notice-of-loss claim to the insurer.301  After 
investigating and adjusting the claim, Lexington determined that Conco’s total 
loss was $3,247,070.302  Conco accepted a check for $3,000,000, but the 
insured refused Lexington’s check for the $247,070.303  Later, Conco asserted 
that Lexington had a contractual duty to pay $24,970,551 for covered losses.304 
Of the latter amount, the total business-interruption claim was $19,379,642—
purportedly $7,071,120 for lost profits and $12,308,522 for “charges and 
expenses.”305  Ultimately, Lexington refused to pay.306  Conco filed a breach-of-
contract action against Lexington in the district court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana.307  Conco received a jury award, which was substantially greater 
                                                                                                                 
 292. See Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 312, 313 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 293. Consol. Cos., Inc., 616 F.3d at 424. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id.  
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. (“Conco filed this action alleging Lexington breached the insurance contract.  Conco also alleged 
that Lexington violated Louisiana’s insurance bad-faith statutes by failing to pay the full amount of Conco’s 
damages within the statutes’ prescribed time periods.”); see also LA. REV. STAT. §§ 22:1973, :1892 (2009) 
(recodifying LA. REV. STAT. §§ 22:1220, :658 (2008), respectively). 
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than Lexington’s offer.308  After the district judge entered the judgment, 
Lexington appealed.309 
Lexington was also the defendant in Dickie.310  Hurricane Gustav and 
subsequent governmental orders, however, allegedly caused the insured’s 
business-interruption losses.311  “As Hurricane Gustav approached Louisiana on 
August 30, 2008, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin issued a mandatory 
evacuation order.”312  In pertinent part, the order stated that the “Governor and 
Mayor Nagin were declaring a state of emergency ‘because of anticipated high 
lake and marsh tides due to the tidal surge, combined with the possibility of 
intense thunderstorms, hurricane force winds, and widespread severe 
flooding.’”313 
When Gustav arrived in the Gulf of Mexico, Dickie Brennan & Company 
(Brennan) and several of its affiliates owned and operated restaurants in New 
Orleans.314  Gustav-related winds and flooding did not seriously damage 
Brennan’s properties.315  But, Brennan asked Lexington to pay insurance 
proceeds to cover business-interruption losses, arguing that it could not conduct 
business during a mandatory evacuation.316  Lexington refused to pay for the 
Brennan’s interrupted-business losses.317  Brennan sued Lexington in the 
district court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.318  The district court awarded 
the insurer’s request for summary relief.319 Brennan appealed.320 
2.  Fifth Circuit Panels’ “Business-Interruption” Opinions 
Did Lexington have a contractual obligation under Conco’s and Brennan’s 
commercial insurance contracts to indemnify those companies?321  The 
Consolidated jury ruled in favor of Conco, finding that Lexington had a duty to 
                                                                                                                 
 308. See Consol. Cos., Inc., 616 F.3d at 425. 
 309. Id. 
 310. See Dickie Brennan & Co., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 636 F.3d 683, 684 (5th Cir. Mar. 2011). 
 311. Id. at 684-85. 
 312. Id. at 684 (ordering “the evacuation of the West Bank commencing at 8:01 a.m. on August 31, 2008 
and of the East Bank commencing at noon on August 31, 2008”); id. at 684 n.2 (announcing “On September 
2, 2008, Mayor Nagin issued an Amended Evacuation Order announcing that the evacuation would end on 
September 4, 2008.  Plaintiffs do not argue that the Amended Order triggered coverage.”). 
 313. Id. at 684 (“When the evacuation order was issued, Hurricane Gustav was approaching New Orleans 
from the Gulf of Mexico.”). 
 314. See, e.g., id. at 684 n.1 (“Cousins Restaurant, Inc. (doing business as Palace Café); Seven Sixteen 
Iberville, L.L.C. (doing business as Dickie Brennan’s Steakhouse); and Brasserie, L.L.C. (doing business as 
Bourbon House)”). 
 315. Id. at 684. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. at 683. 
 319. Id. at 684. 
 320. Id. at 683. 
 321. See id. at 683-85; Consol. Cos., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 616 F.3d 422, 424 (5th Cir. Aug. 2010). 
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reimburse Conco for its business-interruption expenses and losses.322  The 
district court did not accept the entire verdict.323  Therefore, the district judge 
reduced the business-interruption award, other damages, and penalties.324  In 
the final judgment, Conco received $19,379,642 for interrupted-business 
damages.325  Lexington appealed.326 
Circuit Judge Southwick wrote the Consolidated opinion.327  And right 
away, he framed the business-interruption controversy this way: “The meaning 
of ‘charges and expenses’ is a central dispute in this appeal.”328  More 
specifically, Lexington asserted that the district court erred by failing to give 
proper jury charges.329  Conversely, Conco maintained that the district court 
correctly interpreted the policy, and therefore the jury correctly awarded 
$12,308,522 for business-interruption “charges and expenses.”330 
The commercial insurance contract that Conco purchased from Lexington 
contained a business-interruption clause.331  It read: 
EXPERIENCE OF BUSINESS: In determining the amount of net profit (or 
loss), charges and expenses covered hereunder for the purpose of 
ascertaining the amount of loss sustained, due consideration shall be given to 
the experience of the insured’s business before the date of damage or 
destruction and to the probable experience thereafter had no loss occurred.332 
                                                                                                                 
 322. Consol. Cos., Inc., 616 F.3d at 425 (“The jury awarded Conco $19,586,239 for business-interruption 
loss, a figure later slightly reduced by the district court.”); id. at 425 n.2 (“The jury also awarded damages for 
losses to inventory, physical damage to Conco’s warehouse, and extra expenses, but only the business-
interruption damages are at issue on this appeal.”).  The jury “also found that Lexington violated the Louisiana 
bad-faith statutes by withholding payment arbitrarily, capriciously, or without probable cause.  This resulted in 
statutory damages of $2.5 million under Section 22:1220 and a statutory penalty of $5,365,797.50 under 
Section 22:658.”  Id. at 425.  This particular “penalty represents twenty-five percent of the total amount the 
jury found that Lexington failed to pay arbitrarily, capriciously, or without probable cause.”  Id. at 425 n.3.  
Initially, the “penalty was $6,167,446.75, but it was reduced to reflect the district court’s post-trial 
modifications to the total damages.”  Id.  Furthermore, “[t]he jury also assessed $2.5 million in penalties (in 
addition to $2.5 million in damages) under Section 22:1220.  The district court set aside this $2.5 million 
penalty, and Conco does not challenge the ruling.”  Id. at 425;  see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:658 (2009) 
(recodifying § 22:1220). 
 323. Consol. Cos., Inc., 616 F.3d at 425. 
 324. Id. (“[The court reduced] the jury verdict by $3 million to account for an alleged failure by jurors to 
deduct the amount Lexington had advanced to Conco.  Second, the business-interruption award was reduced 
by $206,597 based on the conclusion that the jury improperly included inventory mark-ups and discounts in 
computing the loss.  Third, the district court proportionately reduced the penalties to reflect the reductions.”).  
In the end, Conco received $21,463,190 in compensatory damages, $5,365,797.50 in statutory penalties, and 
$2,500,000 in statutory damages.  Id. 
 325. Id. ($19,586,239 for business-interruption loss minus $206,597). 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. at 424. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. at 425. 
 330. Id. at 424-25. 
 331. Id. at 431. 
 332. Id. at 421 (emphasis added). 
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In addition, a conditions clause appeared in Lexington’s insurance contract.333  
The conditions provision stated: 
(1)  RESUMPTION OF OPERATIONS: It is a condition of this insurance 
that if the insured could reduce the loss resulting from the interruption of 
business, 
(a) by a complete or partial resumption of operations, or 
(b) by making use of other available stock, merchandise or location 
such reduction will be taken into account in arriving at the amount of loss 
hereunder, but only to the extent that the business interruption loss covered 
under this policy is thereby reduced.334 
 
The Fifth Circuit panel reviewed the business-interruption and conditions 
provisions in light of Louisiana’s rules of contract construction and 
interpretation.335  And writing for the panel, Judge Southwick concluded:       
(1) The insurance contract required Lexington to pay proceeds, which returned 
a completely shutdown Conco to the same financial position that the company 
occupied before Katrina; (2) Conco could recover lost profits that it could have 
made but for Katrina; and (3) Conco could recover “usual expenses” that the 
company incurred during the interruption through not operating.336  The panel, 
however, found, and Judge Southwick stressed: Conco’s business did not close 
                                                                                                                 
 333. Id. at 427. 
 334. Id. 
 335. See id. at 426;  LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2045 (2008) (providing that a contract should be interpreted 
to determine the “common intent of the parties”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:881 (2009) (stating that an 
insurance policy must be “construed according to the entirety of its terms and conditions as set forth in the 
policy”).  Section 22:881 cites Louisiana’s law and the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in In re Katrina Canal 
Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 2007), and is significant because the appellate court outlined how 
district courts should apply Louisiana rules and interpret an insurance contract that contains potentially 
ambiguous language: 
The words of a contract must be given their generally prevailing meaning.  When the words of a 
contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may 
be made in search of the parties’ intent.  If the policy wording at issue is clear and unambiguously 
expresses the parties’ intent, the insurance contract must be enforced as written. 
  Where, however, an insurance policy includes ambiguous provisions, the ambiguity . . . 
must be resolved by construing the policy as a whole; one policy provision is not to be construed 
separately at the expense of disregarding other policy provisions. . . .  Words susceptible of 
different meanings must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the object of 
the contract.  A provision susceptible of different meanings must be interpreted with a meaning 
that renders it effective and not with one that renders it ineffective. 
  Ambiguity may also be resolved through the use of the reasonable-expectations doctrine—
i.e., by ascertaining how a reasonable insurance policy purchaser would construe the clause at the 
time the insurance contract was entered.  The court should construe the policy to fulfill the 
reasonable expectations of the parties in light of the customs and usages of the industry.  A 
doubtful provision must be interpreted in light of the nature of the contract, equity, usages, the 
conduct of the parties before and after the formation of the contract, and of other contracts of a 
like nature between the same parties.  
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 207 (5th Cir. 2007) (alteration and first omission in 
original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 336. Consol. Cos., Inc., 616 F.3d at 427. 
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completely.337  Ten days after Katrina, Conco’s operations began and continued 
for fifteen months.338  And, Conco made a net profit of $279,006.339 
Again, based on evidence extrapolated from past experiences, Conco 
argued that Lexington had a duty to pay $12,308,522 to cover business-
interruption charges and expenses.340  Interpreting the insurance contract and 
applying the doctrine of ambiguity, the Eastern District of Louisiana concluded 
that funds to cover charges and expenses were not excluded under the policy.341 
The district court declared: “The policy does not address ‘charges and 
expenses’ in the event of a resumption of operations and does not clearly state 
the effect that a resumption of operations has on the calculation of charges and 
expenses.”342 
Put simply, the Consolidated panel refused to embrace the district court’s 
interpretations and analysis.343  Ultimately, the panel concluded: (1) No 
ambiguity appeared in the policy about whether Lexington had a duty to pay for 
business-interruption charges and expenses;344 (2) Conco earned a net profit of 
                                                                                                                 
 337. Id. at 428. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. at 425.  Also using past earnings, Conco’s expected profit before Katrina was $7,350,126.  Id. at 
428.  That difference between actual and expected profit—$279,006 and $7,350,126—was after subtracting 
the actual, post-Katrina profit from the expected profit; the yield was $7,071,120.  Id.  The Fifth Circuit 
concluded that the difference was recoverable.  See id. 
 341. See id. at 429 (“The district court was referring to the absence of any mention of ‘charges and 
expenses’ in the resumption-of-operation section of the policy.  We note, though, that the section similarly 
fails to mention profits. Instead, it refers to whether ‘the insured can reduce the loss’ by some level of 
resumption.  The district court then relied on the maxim that ‘ambiguity in an insurance policy is construed 
against the insurer,’ and determined that no reduction in charges and expenses was permitted.”). 
 342. Id. (quoting Consol. Cos., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 06-4700, 2009 WL 211751, at *9 (E.D. 
La. Jan. 23, 2009)). 
 343. See id. 
 344. See id.   Because Judge Southwick’s explanation of the panel’s conclusion is fairly instructive, a 
large section appears below: 
  We disagree with the district court’s analysis. . . .  [T]he first question . . . is whether the 
relevant language is ambiguous on its face.  Some of the relevant wording is in the resumption-of-
operations clause.  As a condition of coverage, operations had to be resumed “if the insured could 
reduce the loss resulting from the interruption of business” by such a resumption.  The policy 
states that “such reduction will be taken into account in arriving at the amount of loss hereunder, 
but only to the extent that the business interruption loss covered under this policy is thereby 
reduced.” 
  This clause does not elaborate on what the “loss resulting from the interruption of business” 
means.  Meaning is found in the general section immediately before the “Resumption of 
Operations” subparagraph.  There, “actual loss” from an interruption of business is said to consist 
of the net profit that the interruption prevented the insured from earning plus “all charges and 
expenses (excluding ordinary payroll), but only to the extent that they must necessarily continue 
during the interruption of business, and only to the extent to which they would have been incurred 
had no loss occurred.”  Three paragraphs later, the policy addresses the effect of the insured’s 
resuming operations: “if the insured could reduce the loss resulting from this interruption of 
business . . . by a complete or partial resumption of operations . . . such reduction will be taken 
into account in arriving at the amount of loss.” This is the same “loss” that is defined as being 
expected net profit plus charges and expenses. There is no ambiguity.  
Id. at 429 (last two omissions in original) (citations omitted).   
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$279,006, which was sufficient; and (3) The Eastern District of Louisiana’s 
erroneous jury instructions would have allowed Conco to receive a windfall.345 
Therefore, the Consolidated panel vacated the district court’s business-
interruption charges and expenses award, vacated the award of statutory 
damages and penalties against Lexington, and affirmed the district court’s 
judgment in all other respects.346 
In Dickie, the Eastern District of Louisiana ruled in favor of Lexington 
after reviewing the language in Brennan’s commercial insurance contract.347  
The business-interruption clause read: 
We will pay for the actual loss of Business Income you sustain and necessary 
Extra Expense caused by action of civil authority that prohibits access to the 
described premises due to direct physical loss of or damage to property, 
other than at the described premises, caused by or resulting from any 
Covered Cause of Loss.  This coverage will apply for a period of up to two 
consecutive weeks from the date of that action.348 
Consider carefully the italicized phrases in the business-interruption provision. 
Before the district court, Brennan argued: “[D]amage to property” occurred at a 
place “other than at the described premises” when Mayor Nagin issued the 
evacuation order.349  The insured stressed that Hurricane Gustav caused 
property damage in the Caribbean before it reached New Orleans.350  Therefore, 
according to Brennan, the conditions were satisfied and Lexington had a duty to 
pay business-interruption proceeds.351  The Eastern District of Louisiana 
rejected Brennan’s argument and granted Lexington’s motion for summary 
relief.352  Briefly, the district court found no nexus between the evacuation 
order and the property damage that satisfied the conditions in the insurance 
contract.353 
                                                                                                                 
 345. See id. at 429-30 (“The district court’s calculation method required jurors to give Conco a windfall.  
If the charges and expenses had already been paid by the revenue of the business, requiring the policy also to 
pay them is not placing Conco in the same position it would have been had no damage been suffered . . . . 
Only if revenue did not offset the charges and expenses would the insurance policy be called upon for 
payment.  We acknowledge that the district court informed jurors that this ‘policy is designed to place the 
insured in the position that it would have been in if there had been no interruption,’ but the court did not allow 
jurors to make the reduction for charges and expenses necessary to do that.  Conco was placed in a better 
position than if there had been no interruption.  Because Conco was able to pay all of its charges and expenses 
with revenue during the restoration period, we vacate the award of $12,308,522 in charges and expenses.  No 
part of that amount can be recovered in this case.”). 
 346. See id. at 424, 428. 
 347. See Dickie Brennan & Co., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 636 F.3d 683, 684 (5th Cir. Mar. 2011). 
 348. Id. at 685 (emphasis added). 
 349. Id. at 684-85 (emphasis added). 
 350. See id. at 684 (“The Brennans allege that Hurricane Gustav had already damaged property in the 
Caribbean nations of Cuba, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti when Nagin issued the evacuation 
order.”). 
 351. See id. at 685. 
 352. See id. at 684. 
 353. See id. 
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Circuit Judge Davis fashioned the opinion for the Dickie panel.354  And at 
the outset, Judge Davis applied Louisiana’s law to decide the case.355  Then, he 
cited the on-point or highly relevant conclusion in Kean, Miller, Hawthorne, 
D’Armond, McCowan & Jarman, LLP v. National Fire Insurance Co. of 
Hartford.356  In Kean, a district court considered a nearly identical civil-
authority provision as the one in Lexington’s insurance policy.357  Before 
receiving business-interruption compensation under a civil-authority provision, 
the Kean court declared that an insured must establish a loss of business 
income.358  In particular, an insured must prove four elements: 
(1) [civil authorities’ action caused the interruption]; (2) the action of civil 
authority [prohibited the insured’s] access to the described premises . . . ;    
(3) the action of civil authority prohibiting access to the described premises 
must be caused by direct physical loss of or damage to property other than at 
the described premises; and (4) the loss or damage to property other than the 
described premises must be caused by or result from a covered cause of loss 
as set forth in the policy.359 
Briefly put, Lexington’s and Brennan’s disagreement centered on whether 
Mayor Nagin’s mandatory evacuation order satisfied the third element.360  
Brennan argued that the third element was established if (1) civil authorities 
responded to a peril that causes property damage elsewhere and (2) the same 
peril threatened to cause damage in a local vicinity where the insured’s property 
was located.361  Citing the prior damage in the Caribbean and Hurricane 
Gustav’s then-projected path toward New Orleans, Brennan insisted that it had 
satisfied this element.362  Lexington, on the other hand, argued that (1) “the 
policy require[d] a causal link between the prior damage and the civil authority 
action” and (2) “the damage must be near . . . the insured premises to satisfy 
that link.”363 
Disposing this controversy quickly and efficiently, Judge Davis 
emphasized that (1) Mayor Nagin’s evacuation order did not mention any 
earlier property damage in the Caribbean; (2) the order only listed “possible 
future storm surge, high winds, and flooding based on Gustav’s predicted 
path”; and (3) no property damage had occurred in Louisiana when the civil 
                                                                                                                 
 354. See id. 
 355. See id. at 685. 
 356. Id. (discussing Kean, Miller, Hawthorne, D’Armond, McCowan & Jarman, LLP v. Nat’l Fire Ins. 
Co. of Hartford, No. 06-770-C, 2007 WL 2489711, at *1 (M.D. La. Aug. 29, 2007)). 
 357. See Kean, 2007 WL 2489711, at *1. 
 358. See id. at *3. 
 359. Id. 
 360. See Dickie, 636 F.3d at 685. 
 361. See id. 
 362. See id. 
 363. Id. 
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authorities issued the evacuation.364  Therefore, Brennan failed to persuade the 
Dickie panel that a nexus existed between any prior property damage and the 
evacuation order.365 And because Brennan did not meet its burden of proof, the 
panel affirmed the judgment of the district court.366 
III.  THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS: SOCIAL GUESTS, PROPERTY OWNERS, AND 
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS’ PERSONAL-INJURY CLAIMS AND 
COMMERCIAL AUTOMOBILE INSURERS’ DUTY TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY 
INSUREDS 
Substantive Question: Whether under Mississippi’s and Texas’s laws, 
automobile liability insurers have a duty to defend and indemnify insureds 
against social guests, property owners, and independent contractors’ 
personal-injury claims and lawsuits. 
  
During the 2010–2011 term, Fifth Circuit panels devoted a considerable 
amount of judicial resources to decide three quarrels among consumers and 
their automobile insurers.367  The cases are: Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. 
Bonilla, Canal Insurance Co. v. Coleman, and Capital City Insurance Co. v. 
Hurst.368  To be sure, the substantive questions in these declaratory judgment 
                                                                                                                 
 364. Id. at 685-86. 
 365. See id. at 686 (“We are persuaded . . . that the district court correctly accepted Lexington’s argument 
that [Brennan] failed to establish a link between the property damage in the Caribbean and the issuance of 
Nagin’s evacuation order so as to trigger coverage under the Lexington policy.”) (citing S. Tex. Med. Clinics, 
PA v. CNA Fin. Corp., No. H-06-4041, 2008 WL 450012, at *10 (S.D. Tex. 2008)).  In South Texas, 
authorities predicted that Hurricane Rita would arrive in Wharton County, Texas.  See South Texas, 2008 WL 
450012, at *2.  They issued a mandatory evacuation order, which the insured obeyed.  Id.  Rita reached 
Florida and damaged property before the mandatory evacuation order was issued in Texas.  Id.  Although the 
insured’s property in Wharton County was not damaged, the evacuation caused business-interruption losses.  
Id.  The insurance policy contained a civil authority provision identical to the provision in the Lexington 
policy.  Id.  Judge Rosenthal concluded that the insured did not establish the necessary nexus between the 
damage and issuance of the order.  Id.  Instead, the judge found that the civil official issued the evacuation 
order because Hurricane Rita was threatening the Texas coast and not because Hurricane Rita had already 
caused property damage in Florida.  See id. at *10. 
 366. See Dickie, 636 F.3d at 686-87 (“The general rule is that ‘[c]ivil authority coverage is intended to 
apply to situations where access to an insured’s property is prevented or prohibited by an order of civil 
authority issued as a direct result of physical damage to other premises in the proximity of the insured’s 
property.’  Although it does not expressly address the proximity issue, the Lexington policy requires proof of a 
causal link between prior damage and civil authority action.  The record in this case demonstrates no such 
link, which leads us to conclude that the district court correctly found no coverage for the Brennans’ loss of 
revenue because of the business interruption.” (footnote omitted)). 
 367. See, e.g., Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Bonilla, 613 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. July 2010) (discussing whether 
injuries from a fire in a truck constituted use of the vehicle for insurance purposes). 
 368. Id. (Panel comprised of Circuit Judges W. Eugene Davis, Leslie Southwick, and Jacques L. Wiener); 
Canal Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 625 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. Nov. 2010) (Panel comprised of Circuit Judges Fortunato 
Benavides, Harold DeMoss, and Jennifer Elrod); Capital City Ins. Co. v. Hurst, 632 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. Feb. 
2011) (Panel comprised of Circuit Judges Harold DeMoss, Carolyn King, and Edward Prado). 
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cases are recurring and extremely familiar.369  Furthermore, the three panels did 
not surprise the reader by employing a new or more creative methodology to 
address the litigants’ disputes.370  In fact, it is arguable that two panels simply 
used an “old” template or a routine methodology to decide these automobile-
insurance controversies.  And, that is arguably the source of the problems in 
two opinions.  Although the opinions in Coleman and Hurst are lengthy and 
somewhat predictable, the analysis in each is less than stellar.  In each opinion, 
the panel either discussed major issues superficially or failed to discuss major 
issues, period.371  Below, the panels’ findings and analyses as well as some of 
their questionable conclusions and declarations are outlined and discussed more 
fully. 
A.  A Review of Pertinent Facts in Automobile-Related Duty-to-Defend and 
Duty-to-Indemnify Cases 
The legal row in Bonilla evolved from a terrible accident.372  Jolly Chef 
Express, Inc. (Jolly Chef) is a Texas corporation.373  Dallas, Texas is its 
principle place of business.374  Jolly Chef’s business may be categorized under 
the heading “mobile catering” or “[r]etail [t]rade [d]rinking and [e]ating 
[p]laces.”375  Regularly, Juan Miguel Bonilla (Bonilla) leased a mobile-catering 
truck from Jolly Chef.376  Bonilla also “leased a space on Jolly Chef’s 
commissary and parking lot[,]” and he typically hired a driver and a cook for 
each leased truck.377  And, at the end of each day, the driver and cook returned 
the leased truck to the commissary, cleaned the truck, and prepared it for the 
next day’s operation.378 
In the course of events, Bonilla leased Truck 219.379  He employed 
Fabricio Fernandez and Isabel Molina—driver and cook, respectively—to 
operate and sell items from the truck.380  After completing their route on one 
fateful day in 2002, Molina and Fernandez returned Truck 219 to Jolly Chef’s 
                                                                                                                 
 369. Compare Bonilla, 613 F.3d at 513-14 (asking whether injuries sustained resulted from use of the 
vehicle and the insurance company was liable), with Coleman, 625 F.3d at 246 (discussing whether an 
accident was covered by an insurance policy). 
 370. See infra text accompanying notes 464-85. 
 371. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 515-25 (noting the validity of the defense raised in Coleman 
left for future panel consideration). 
 372. Bonilla, 613 F.3d at 514. 
 373. Jolly Chef Express, Inc., CORPORATION WIKI, http://www.corporationwiki.com/Texas/Irving/jolly-
chef-express-inc/32682399.aspx (“Updated 10/27/2011 - This profile of Jolly Chef Express, Inc. was created 
using data from Texas Secretary of State.”) (last visited Mar. 6, 2012). 
 374. Id. 
 375. See Bonilla, 613 F.3d at 517;  Jolly Chef Express, Inc., ISHCC, http://www.ishcc.org/TX/Grand-
Prairie/jolly-chef-express-inc (last visited Mar. 6, 2012). 
 376. Bonilla, 613 F.3d at 514. 
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. 
 379. Id. 
 380. See id. 
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lot.381  They parked it and began to clean the vehicle.382  Fernandez poured a 
flammable substance on the floor of the truck to loosen the grease.383  Then, he 
left the truck to complete another task.384  Molina was in the truck and began to 
wash dishes.385  Suddenly, a pilot light on the stove ignited the substance on the 
floor, causing an explosion.386  Flames engulfed Molina, and she was severely 
injured.387  Molina sued Bonilla and Jolly Chef in a Texas state court.388 
When the accident occurred involving Truck 219, Bonilla’s small 
enterprise was not insured.389  Truck 219, however, was listed as insured 
property on Jolly Chef’s three insurance policies.390  Put simply, Employers 
Mutual Casualty Company (Employers Mutual) insured Jolly Chef’s trucks 
under a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance contract and under a 
commercial umbrella policy.391  Additionally, Emcasco Insurance Company 
(Emcasco) insured Jolly Chef under a commercial automobile liability policy.392 
Jolly Chef’s entire fleet of trucks was covered under the Emcasco auto 
insurance policy.393 
After Molina filed her personal-injury suit, both Emcasco and Employers 
Mutual (EEM) reserved their respective rights and began to defend Jolly Chef 
and its lessee (Bonilla).394  Later, Molina secured a $1,832,933.58 judgment 
against Bonilla.395  She did not prevail, however, against Jolly Chef.396  Even 
though EEM defended Jolly Chef and Bonilla, both insurers refused to pay the 
judgment.397  Instead, EEM filed a declaratory judgment action in the district 
court for the Northern District of Texas.398  Bonilla and Molina—the third party 
who burned in Truck 219—were defendants.399  In due course, all parties filed 
motions for summary judgment.400  The district court granted EEM’s motion.401 
 Bonilla and Molina appealed.402 
                                                                                                                 
 381. Id. 
 382. See id. 
 383. See id. 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. 
 386. See id. 
 387. See id. 
 388. Id. 
 389. See id. 
 390. Id. 
 391. See id. at 514-15. 
 392. Id. at 515. 
 393. Id. 
 394. See id. 
 395. Id. 
 396. Id. 
 397. Id. 
 398. Id. 
 399. See id. at 514-15. 
 400. Id. at 515. 
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 402. Id. 
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The Coleman litigants are Bernetta and Glen Coleman, P.S. Transport, 
Inc. (P&S), and Canal Insurance Company (Canal).403  P&S “was a for-hire 
[interstate] motor carrier engaged in transporting property.”404  More 
specifically, “P&S specializes in flatbed traffic, primarily in lanes between the 
Southeast, the Northeast, Texas, California and the Midwest.”405  Even more 
relevant, P&S has a fleet consisting of “275 company owned tractors[,] . . . 75 
owner operators, and 425 platform trailers.”406  Timothy Briggs, Jr. was one of 
those owner–operator truckers.407  In fact, Briggs was P&S’s trucker–
employee.408  But, Briggs also was a lessor, since he leased his tractor-truck to 
P&S.409 
Without a doubt, P&S spent money to construct a large commercial 
facility—with driver accommodations—to park company-owned and leased 
tractors, trailers, and trucks.410  Yet, P&S did not require Briggs to park the 
leased vehicle at P&S’s commercial facilities.411  Instead, each evening, P&S 
allowed Briggs to drive the leased tractor-truck to his residential community, 
where Briggs parked the large tractor-truck.412  In July 2004, a collision 
occurred between the tractor-truck and a Toyota Camry as Briggs was backing 
the tractor-truck into the driveway at his house.413  “At the time of the accident, 
Briggs was returning home from work.  He was driving the truck ‘bobtail[,]’     
. . . meaning that the truck had no trailer attached.”414  Glen and Bernetta 
Coleman—driver and passenger, respectively—occupied the Camry.415  The 
Colemans filed a tort-based cause of action against Briggs and P&S in a 
Mississippi state court.416 
Before the accident, Canal insured P&S’s fleet of trucks and trailers under 
a basic automobile liability insurance contract.417  The Canal-issued auto policy, 
however, did not list Briggs’s leased tractor-truck as P&S’s “covered motor 
                                                                                                                 
 403. See Canal Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 625 F.3d 244, 246 (5th Cir. Nov. 2010). 
 404. See Brief for the Defendant, Canal Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 625 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. Nov. 2010) (No. 10-
60196), 2010 WL 4621659 at *1. 
 405. About Us, P&S TRANSP., INC., http://www.pstransportinc.com/aboutus/index.php (last visited Mar. 
6, 2012). 
 406. Id. 
 407. See Coleman, 625 F.3d at 245. 
 408. Id. 
 409. See Brief for the Defendant, supra note 404, at *1;  see also Coleman, 625 F.3d at 246-47 (“P.S. 
Transport did not own the truck Briggs was driving at the time of the accident.  Rather, the truck was under a 
‘lease-and-employment’ agreement, meaning that Briggs owned the truck but leased it to P.S. Transport as 
part of his employment contract.”). 
 410. About Us, supra note 405 (“P&S is based in Alabama in company-owned facilities located in the 
Ensley area of Birmingham.  The facility consists of the general offices, terminal yard with fuel storage and 
warehouse facilities, including driver accommodations.”). 
 411. See Brief for the Defendant, supra note 404, at *1-2. 
 412. Id. at *7. 
 413. Id. at *6, 7. 
 414. Coleman, 625 F.3d at 246. 
 415. Id. 
 416. Id. 
 417. Id. 
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vehicle.”418  On the other hand, a federally mandated MCS-90 Endorsement419 
was attached to the automobile policy because P&S was a “for-hire motor 
carrier,” which operates “motor vehicles” and transports “property in interstate 
or foreign commerce.”420  Therefore, after learning about the Colemans’ 
underlying personal-injury suit, Canal commenced a declaratory judgment 
action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Mississippi.421  Citing P&S’s automobile policy and the MCS-90 Endorsement, 
Canal asked the district court to declare that the liability insurer had no duty to 
indemnify if the Colemans prevailed against P&S and Briggs.422  Both Canal 
and Bernetta Coleman moved for summary judgment.423  The district court 
granted Canal’s motion and denied Coleman’s.424  Coleman appealed.425 
Finally, Hurst also presents terribly familiar and uncomplicated facts. 
Lecedrick and Latasha Hurst were married and lived in Gloster, Mississippi.426 
Pinewood Logging, Inc. (Pinewood) is a logging company.427  Liberty, 
Mississippi is its principle place of business.428  When this legal dispute 
evolved, Darral Bell was Pinewood’s employee.429  In late October 2004, 
Lecedrick struck Bell, and each threatened the other at an acquaintance’s 
house.430  After the incident, Bell left the house, driving a Pinewood-owned 
Ford F–350 truck.431  Driving his Yamaha four-wheeled vehicle, Lecedrick 
                                                                                                                 
 418. See Brief for the Defendant, supra note 404, at *2. 
 419. 49 C.F.R. § 387.7(d) (2010) states: “The proof [of the required financial responsibility] shall consist 
of—(1) ‘Endorsement(s) for Motor Carrier Policies of Insurance for Public Liability Under Sections 29 and 30 
of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980’ (Form MCS-90) issued by an insurer(s) . . . .” (emphasis added).  Finally, 
49 C.F.R. § 387.15 (2010) provides the text required for the “Form MCS-90” required by § 387.7(d). 
 420. 49 C.F.R. § 387.3(a) (2010) (captioned “Applicability”) states: “(a) This subpart applies to for-hire 
motor carriers operating motor vehicles transporting property in interstate or foreign commerce.”  49 C.F.R.   
§ 387.5 (2010) (captioned “Definitions”) defines “Motor carrier” as follows: “Motor carrier means a for-hire 
motor carrier or a private motor carrier.”  49 C.F.R. § 387.7(a) (2010) (captioned “Financial responsibility 
required”) states: “No motor carrier shall operate a motor vehicle until the motor carrier has obtained and has 
in effect the minimum levels of financial responsibility as set forth in § 387.9 of this subpart.” 
 421. Coleman, 625 F.3d at 246. 
 422. Id. at 246 n.2 (“Initially, the suit also involved a second Canal-issued insurance policy, . . . which 
Canal issued to Timothy Briggs (‘Briggs Policy’).  Canal first sought a judgment that it was not required 
under either the P.S. Policy or the Briggs Policy to pay a judgment arising from the accident. Canal eventually 
amended its complaint to exclude the Briggs Policy from this action.  Coleman makes a number of arguments 
about the interrelationship of the two policies.  She ‘fears that, under the facts of this case, any adjudication 
that Canal is obligated to pay damages under the Briggs policy’ might have a preclusive effect on her 
argument that Canal is obligated to pay under the P.S. Policy.  The Court does not consider Coleman’s 
arguments regarding the Briggs Policy because it is no longer part of this lawsuit.”). 
 423. Id. at 247. 
 424. Id. 
 425. Id. 
 426. Capital City Ins. Co. v. Hurst, 632 F.3d 898, 900-01 (5th Cir. Feb. 2011). 
 427. Id. at 900.  
 428. Pinewood Logging, Inc., POWERPROFILES.COM, http://www.powerprofiles.com/profile/0000515391 
2860/PINEWOOD+LOGGING,+INC-LIBERTY-MS (last visited Mar. 6, 2012). 
 429. Hurst, 632 F.3d at 900. 
 430. Id. at 900-01. 
 431. Id. at 901. 
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followed Bell.432  Apparently, Lecedrick drove alongside Bell, trying to pass 
Bell.433  But, the Pinewood-owned Ford collided with the Yamaha.434  The 
impact propelled Lecedrick Hurst from his Yamaha, and he died.435 
A Mississippi jury convicted Darral Bell of “manslaughter, without malice 
aforethought, in the heat of passion.”436  On the other hand, the jury returned a 
not-guilty verdict following the judge’s murder instructions.437  Latasha Hurst 
and others brought a wrongful-death action against Bell and Pinewood because 
when the collision occurred, Bell was driving a Pinewood-owned vehicle.438  
When the accident occurred, Capital City Insurance Company (Capital City) 
insured Pinewood under a commercial automobile insurance contract.439  
Therefore, in the wake of the accident and Bell’s criminal conviction, Capital 
City filed a declaratory judgment action in the Southern District Court of 
Mississippi.440  Although Capital City defended Pinewood against the 
wrongful-death action, the automobile insurer asserted that the insurance 
contract’s “expected or intended” injury exclusion clause precluded coverage 
for wrongful-death claims and injuries.441  Capital City’s motion for summary 
judgment was granted.442  The wrongful-death plaintiffs appealed.443 
B.  Fifth Circuit Panels’ Automobile-Related Duty-to-Defend and Duty-to-
Indemnify Opinions 
Again, in Bonilla, EEM decided not to pay the judgment that Molina 
secured against Bonilla, Jolly Chef’s lessee.444  In its summary judgment ruling, 
the Northern District of Texas supported EEM’s decision.445  In a nutshell, the 
district court found the following: (1) Bonilla and Molina were not “insureds” 
under Employers Mutual’s CGL insurance contract; (2) Emcasco’s commercial 
automobile liability policy did not cover the accident in Truck 219 because the 
fire did not arise out of the “use” or “maintenance” of a covered vehicle; and 
(3) Employers Mutual’s commercial umbrella policy did not cover the accident 
                                                                                                                 
 432. Id. 
 433. Id. 
 434. Id. 
 435. Id. 
 436. Id. at 900 (emphasis added). 
 437. Id. at 902. 
 438. Id. at 900.  The plaintiffs in the underlying wrongful-death action were Latasha Hurst, individually 
and as administratrix of the estate of Lecedrick Hurst, and Diondrick Hurst and Lecedrick Hurst, minors by 
and through their parent and natural guardian, Latasha Hurst.  Id. at 898. 
 439. Id. at 898. 
 440. Id. 
 441. Id. 
 442. Id. at 900. 
 443. Id. 
 444. See Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Bonilla, 613 F.3d 512, 514 (5th Cir. July 2010). 
 445. Id. at 514. 
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because the definition of “use” in the umbrella policy was identical to the 
definition in Emcasco’s automobile insurance contract.446 
Molina challenged the district court’s ruling before the Fifth Circuit.447  
Circuit Judge Southwick wrote the opinion for the panel, and he began the 
analysis by highlighting relevant provisions in the three liability insurance 
contracts.448  First, the umbrella policy covered injuries, which “[arise] out of 
the ownership, maintenance, operation, use or entrustment to others” of an 
automobile.449  But a proviso appeared in the policy: an automobile also had to 
be covered under a primary insurance contract.450  Additionally, “[t]he coverage 
[under the umbrella policy could] not be broader than the coverage [under a] 
‘primary’ insurance policy.”451 
Second, under the automobile liability policy, Emcasco promised to “pay 
all sums an insured legally must pay as damages because of bodily injury or 
property damage.”452  But a condition precedent also appeared in Emcasco’s 
primary policy: An “accident” had to cause the injury or property damage, and 
the accident had to evolve “from the ownership, maintenance or use of a 
covered auto.”453  Finally, the CGL insurance contract covered “bodily injury” 
and “property damage” arising from “occurrences” or “accidents” within the 
“coverage territory.”454  The CGL auto policies dovetailed, “excluding coverage 
for bodily injury and property damage ‘arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance, use or entrustment to others of any . . . auto . . . owned or 
operated by or rented or loaned to any insured.’”455 
Because Molina and Bonilla were not “insured” under the CGL insurance 
contract, the Northern District of Texas found that the CGL policy did not 
apply.456  Furthermore, on appeal, Molina did not challenge that finding.457  
Still, Judge Southwick and the panel concluded that the CGL was relevant.458  
Put simply, EEM argued that Molina’s accident was excluded under the auto 
                                                                                                                 
 446. Id. at 515 (“No issues [were] raised on appeal about the CGL policy.”).  
 447. See id. 
 448. Id. 
 449. Id. 
 450. Id. 
 451. Id. (“The Umbrella Policy also provided coverage in the absence of coverage under a primary policy 
[if one used a] vehicle with the permission of a named insured.  The reach of this additional coverage [was 
not] contested . . . .”). 
 452. Id. 
 453. Id. 
 454. Id. 
 455. Id. at 515-16. 
 456. Id. at 516. 
 457. Id. 
 458. Id. (“That decision is not challenged on appeal.  Though coverage by the CGL Policy is not an issue, 
the policy itself is relevant.  Had an insured under both the CGL and the Auto Policy been [Jolly Chef, for 
example], the dispute would have had a much different form.  If the Auto Policy did not cover the occurrence 
because the injury did not arise from the use of a covered auto, then the CGL Policy exclusion of injuries 
arising from the use would not have applied and the claim would have been covered—absent another 
exclusion.  The two policies together created a range of coverage for Jolly Chef.”). 
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policy because the accident was covered under the CGL policy.459  To decide 
whether the language in multiple liability insurance contracts should determine 
the outcome in Bonilla, Judge Southwick reviewed Texas law.460  In fact, the 
learned judge relied heavily on the Texas Supreme Court’s analysis and 
conclusion in Mid-Century Insurance Co. of Texas v. Lindsey.461 
Quite simply, Lindsey established a three-pronged test to determine 
whether an injury arose from the “use” of an automobile policy.462  The 
elements are: (1) “the accident must have arisen out of the inherent nature of 
the automobile”; (2) “the accident must have arisen within the natural 
territorial limits of an automobile, [during] the actual use . . .”; and (3) the 
automobile must produce the injury, rather than simply causing the condition 
that produces the injury.463  But, the Lindsey court cited a definition of an 
“inherent use” in a treatise, which is arguably awkward: “[A “use”] means the 
use of a vehicle as such[;] and [“use”] does not include a use which is foreign 
to a vehicle’s inherent purpose but to which a vehicle might conceivably be 
put.”464 
Focusing on the first element, Judge Southwick restated the litigants’ 
positions: EEM argued that a “use” refers to a vehicle’s “simple,” although 
“broadly defined, transportation capabilities.”465  And Bonilla and Molina 
insisted that the auto policy covered “accidents arising from [the] use of a 
mobile catering truck qua mobile catering truck.”466  Stated slightly differently, 
the litigants clashed over whether a covered automobile must be “used” for 
generic or special purposes.467  The panel concluded, however, that the 
insurers’ argument demanded “an unnatural reading of the policy language.”468 
But, the Bonilla panel could not find a Texas case to support that conclusion.469 
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit panel made a “slight Erie guess” of how the Texas 
Supreme Court might interpret “use” under a commercial automobile insurance 
                                                                                                                 
 459. Id.  To help make that argument, EEM cited Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 
stating: “When language of coverage in a business auto policy is virtually identical to language of exclusion in 
a CGL policy, ‘[s]ome accidents would be covered by the auto policy, others by the CGL.  A single accident 
could not be covered by both.’”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Citgo Petroleum 
Corp., 166 F.3d 761, 769 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
 460. See id. at 517-18. 
 461. See id. (citing Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Lindsey, 997 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Tex. 1999)). 
 462. Bonilla, 613 F.3d at 518 (discussing the test established by Lindsey). 
 463. Lindsey, 997 S.W.2d at 157 (emphasis added) (quoting 8A COUCH ON INSURANCE § 119:37 (3d ed. 
2009)). 
 464. Id. at 156 n.12 (emphasis added) (quoting 6B JOHN A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE    
§ 4316, at 356 (Buckley ed. 1979)). 
 465. Bonilla, 613 F.3d at 518. 
 466. Id. 
 467. See id. 
 468. Id. at 517 (“No definition of ‘use’ appears in the Auto Policy.  The district court held that coverage 
under the Auto Policy was not affected by the special use that Jolly Chef’s mobile catering trucks served.  
Instead, the district court required the use of the vehicle to be [activity that involves] transportation.”). 
 469. Id. at 519. 
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contract.470  Ultimately, the panel concluded “that a business vehicle policy 
covers the intended and identified uses of that business vehicle.”471  Therefore, 
Molina satisfied the first element of the Lindsey test.472 
Did Molina prove the other two factors?  The panel found that “Truck 219 
was parked on Jolly Chef’s lot at the time of the accident, and the injury 
occurred while Molina was inside of the truck.”473  Consequently, the panel 
decided that the accident “occurred within the natural territorial limits of the 
automobile,” thereby satisfying Lindsey’s second element.474  And, to repeat, 
the third element is “[proof that] the vehicle produced the injury.”475  EEM 
argued that Molina did not prove that the truck, per se, produced Molina’s 
injuries.476  Instead, EEM insisted that a pilot light ignited a flammable 
substance and produced Molina’s injury.477  But, the Bonilla panel refused to 
embrace EEM’s argument.478  In the end, the panel concluded: (1) The test in 
Lindsey had been satisfied;479 (2) The automobile and umbrella insurance 
                                                                                                                 
 470. Id. at 518-19 (“The ‘inherent purpose’ of a mobile catering truck certainly could be seen as including 
the use and maintenance of its kitchen facilities, though the inherent purpose of a usual vehicle would not 
include cooking. . . .  There is nothing in the caselaw to suggest that Texas would interpret ‘use’ under a 
business auto policy, in which the stated purpose of the vehicles being insured was for mobile catering, in a 
way that did not include the hazards that arise from maintaining the mobile catering equipment.  Cleaning a 
mobile kitchen was not simply a speculative event that might conceivably occur, nor was the cleaning foreign 
to the vehicle’s inherent purpose.  We acknowledge finding no published Texas caselaw so holding.  We 
conclude, though, that the Texas Supreme Court if presented with this precise issue would take as a natural 
next step from Lindsey that this accident occurred from ‘the inherent nature’ of this mobile catering truck.  
The vehicle intended is not some mystical, generic vehicle, but the one specifically insured by the parties to 
the policy. The special nature of this vehicle was not hidden or otherwise unknown—it literally was in black 
and white in the policy.”). 
 471. Id. at 519.  The panel also noted that “insurance policies [must] be interpreted as written, with 
assumptions favoring coverage when conditions for those assumptions exist, and reliance upon the intent of 
the actual parties to the policies when necessary.”  Id. at 517 (citing and applying Texas law). 
 472. Id. at 519-20 (“The ‘injury-producing act’ was cleaning the floor of the truck so that food could 
safely be prepared.  The cleaning was a natural, expected, and necessary use of mobile catering Truck 219 and 
was covered by the Auto Policy.”). 
 473. Id. at 520. 
 474. Id. (citing Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Lindsey, 997 S.W.2d 153, 157 (Tex. 1999)). 
 475. Id. (“The Lindsey court found this factor troublesome because it is difficult to decide what role a 
vehicle plays in producing an injury.”) (citing Lindsey, 997 S.W.2d at 157-58). 
 476. Id.  
 477. Id. (“EMC supports this argument with language from Lindsey that ‘a firearm discharge . . . does not 
arise out of the use of the vehicle merely because the gun rack is permanently attached.  Rather, the purpose 
and circumstances of the injury-producing act are determinative.’”) (citing Lindsey, 997 S.W.2d at 163). 
 478. Id. 
 479. Id. (“We are not persuaded by this reasoning.  Most of the strength of EMC’s argument is lost once 
we define ‘inherent nature’ in the way that we have.  This policy provided coverage for the uses of this mobile 
catering truck as just such a truck.  The known and expected uses of this vehicle included activities relating to 
cooking.  The cleaning and pouring of the substance on the floor and the resulting fire from the stove’s pilot 
light produced the injury. . . . Each of the Lindsey factors is satisfied.  There was coverage under the Auto 
Policy for injuries arising from use and maintenance of the vehicle.”).  The panel also noted that “[t]here is a 
distinction between situations where the vehicle is only incidentally involved—it is the ‘mere situs’ of an 
accident that could have occurred anywhere—and those ‘where the injury-producing act involved the use of a 
vehicle as a vehicle.’” Id. (quoting Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sturrock, 65 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. 
App.—Beaumont 2002)). 
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contracts covered Molina’s injury;480 and (3) EEM’s employee-injury-exclusion 
defense on appeal was precluded.481  In the end, the Bonilla panel concluded 
that the district court’s summary judgment was erroneous, reversed the ruling, 
and remanded the case for further proceedings.482 
Undeniably, the Bonilla analysis is reasonably thorough; the panel 
thoughtfully addressed the main question as well as important corollary 
issues.483 And, as stated above, the panel tried to find and carefully apply 
Texas’s law.484  But even more importantly, the Bonilla panel correctly 
recognized implicitly that a declaratory judgment trial is an action in equity.485  
And, when a district court—sitting in equity—issues a questionable summary 
judgment, an appellate court has the authority to (1) address the summary 
judgment issue, (2) conduct an independent and in-depth review of the facts 
and relevant law, and (3) make a just and commonsensical declaration based on 
those facts and laws.486 
                                                                                                                 
 480. Id. (“The Commercial Umbrella Policy can apply in two instances.  First, if there is coverage under 
the Auto Policy, there is coverage under the Umbrella Policy.  Second, if there is no coverage under the Auto 
Policy, then there may be excess coverage of the retained limit under the Umbrella Policy provided the 
occurrence is ‘otherwise covered by’ the Umbrella Policy.  There are substantial arguments made regarding 
this policy that understandably focus on the harder question of coverage if the Auto Policy does not apply.  
Because we have concluded that the Auto Policy provides coverage, the Umbrella Policy does as well. . . . 
Bonilla was using Truck 219 with Jolly Chef’s permission.”). 
 481. Id. at 520-21 (“In the district court and now on appeal, EMC claimed that even if we find there was 
‘use’ of Truck 219 as required under the Auto Policy, coverage is still excluded under the Employee Injury 
Exclusion.  The referenced exclusion prevents coverage for bodily injury to ‘[a]n employee of the insured 
arising out of and in the course of employment by the insured.’  The ‘insured’ was Bonilla, and the potential 
‘employee’ was Molina.  There is certainly Texas law to apply on the issue.  ‘The test to determine whether a 
worker is an employee or an independent contractor is whether the employer has the right to control the 
progress, details, and methods of operations of the employee’s work.  The employer must control not merely 
the end sought to be accomplished, but also the means and details of its accomplishment as well.’  [EEM] 
claims that if there is no coverage under the Auto Policy because of the Employee Injury Exclusion, there is 
likewise no coverage under the Umbrella Policy.  Though [EEM] raised this issue in the district court, the 
court did not rule on it because of its decision on issues regarding ‘use’ of the vehicle. . . .We confine our 
analysis to the issues that were evaluated by the district court.  This Employee Injury Exclusion can be 
considered by the district court should the issue again be pressed.”) (quoting Thompson v. Travelers Indem. 
Co., 789 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. 1990)).  
 482. Id. at 514. 
 483. See id. at 515-21. 
 484. See supra notes 461-82 and accompanying text. 
 485. See Bonilla, 613 F.3d at 515; Septum, Inc. v. Keller, 614 F.2d 456, 463 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 486. See, e.g., Bonilla, 613 F.3d at 515 (“We review each of the rulings on cross-motions for summary 
judgment de novo.  We independently examine the evidence and inferences from the perspective favoring the 
non-moving party, in order to determine if there are any disputes of material fact.” (emphasis added)) (citing 
Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 2001); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2)); see 
also Willy E. Rice, Questionable Summary Judgments, Appearances of Judicial Bias, and Insurance Defense 
in Texas Declaratory-Judgment Trials: A Proposal and Arguments for Revising Texas Rules of  Civil 
Procedure 166a(a), 166a(b), and 166a(i), 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 535, 638-39 (2005) (stressing that a judge—
sitting in equity without a jury—should exercise her authority and conduct a full-blown declaratory-judgment 
trial, rather than simply denying or granting summary judgment motions without giving intelligible, 
meticulous, or studious explanations of her ruling).  Again, a declaratory-judgment trial is an action in equity, 
and more often than not, judges make declarations.  See Rice, supra, at 648-49.  And in most instances, the 
amount of judicial resources required to conduct a full-blown declaratory-judgment trial are commensurate 
with or less than those required to deny or grant a motion for summary judgment—again, which often 
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In light of such authority, Judge Southwick and the circuit judges issued a 
well-reasoned declaration in Bonilla, even though a questionable district court’s 
summary judgment was the impetus for the appeal.487  In contrast, the 
respective analyses in Canal and Hurst are less than exceptional, even though 
(1) those actions also involved a litigant’s request for equitable relief—a 
declaration of rights and obligations under automobile liability insurance 
contracts;488 (2) each case challenged a district court’s summary judgment on 
appeal; and (3) the Coleman and Hurst panels also conducted de novo 
reviews.489 
To help illustrate why the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Coleman is 
problematic, reconsider briefly the Northern District of Mississippi district 
court’s ruling.490  After Canal filed its declaratory judgment action, P&S did not 
respond.491  Consequently, the district court entered a default judgment against 
P&S.492  Both Canal and Coleman moved for summary judgment on various 
issues, including the issue on appeal: Whether the MCS-90 endorsement 
covered the Colemans’ injuries after Briggs’s tractor-truck collided with 
Coleman’s Toyota Camry.493  Again, the district court granted Canal’s motion, 
but it denied Coleman’s.494  Coleman appealed.495 
Circuit Judge Benavides fashioned the opinion for the Coleman panel.496  
The seasoned judge began his analysis by examining the language in the Canal-
issued automobile insurance contract.497  It read in relevant part: 
 
SECTION A—BASIC AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE 
I. COVERAGE A—BODILY INJURY LIABILITY 
 COVERAGE B—PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY: 
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured 
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or 
property damage to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence 
                                                                                                                 
contains no explanation of the ruling as well as no declaration of the litigants’ rights or obligations.  See id.  
To be sure, such summary judgment practice in declaratory-judgment trials is expensive, highly inefficient, 
and redundant because a judge sitting in equity has the authority to resolve both questions of law as well as 
questions of fact.  See id. 
 487. See Bonilla, 613 F.3d at 514. 
 488. See Canal Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 625 F.3d 244, 245 (5th Cir. Nov. 2010) (“Canal Insurance Company 
seeks a declaratory judgment . . . .”); Capital City Ins. Co. v. Hurst, 632 F.3d 898, 902 (5th Cir. Feb. 2011) 
(“Capital City filed a declaratory judgment action in district court.”). 
 489. See Coleman, 625 F.3d at 247 (“We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. . . .” (quoting 
In re Egleston, 448 F.3d 803, 809 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hurst, 632 F.3d at 902. 
 490. See Coleman, 625 F.3d at 246-47. 
 491. Id. at 247. 
 492. Id. 
 493. Id. 
 494. Id. 
 495. Id.  
 496. Id. at 245. 
 497. See id. at 246-48. 
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and arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use . . . of an owned 
automobile . . . .498 
Again, P&S did not own the truck that Briggs was driving when the accident 
occurred.499  Instead, P&S leased Briggs’s truck under a “lease-and-
employment” agreement.500  Therefore, Judge Benavides concluded that 
“Briggs’s truck was not an ‘owned automobile’ within the meaning of the 
policy,” and, as a consequence, the automobile policy did not cover the 
Colemans’ bodily injuries or property damage.501 
But, as stated earlier, a federally mandated endorsement—the MCS-90—
was attached to the Canal-issued automobile insurance contract.502  The Motor 
Carrier Act creates a “financial responsibility” mandate.503  Section 30 of the 
Motor Carrier Act reads: 
The Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe regulations to require 
minimum levels of financial responsibility sufficient to satisfy liability 
amounts established by the Secretary covering public liability, property 
damage, and environmental restoration for the transportation of property by 
motor carrier or motor private carrier (as such terms are defined in section 
13102 of this title) in the United States between a place in a State and— 
(A) a place in another State; 
(B) another place in the same State through a place outside of that State; 
  or 
(C) a place outside the United States.504 
 
Therefore, Judge Benavides framed the summary judgment controversy in 
Coleman this way: “[T]he issue before us today is simply whether Briggs’s 
truck was ‘subject to the financial responsibility requirements of Sections 29 
and 30 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.’”505  Of course, an answer was 
precluded until the panel reviewed the attached MCS-90.506  That boilerplate 
endorsement provides: 
                                                                                                                 
 498. Id. at 246 (emphasis added) (omissions in original). 
 499. Id. 
 500. Id. 
 501. Id. at 247. 
 502. Id. 
 503. Id. at 245. 
Section 30 of the Motor Carrier Act is codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 31139(b).  See Motor 
Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, § 30, 94 Stat 793 (1980).  Section 29—which is 
referenced in the MCS-90—is not relevant in this case, as it simply amended part of the previous 
statute by “striking out ‘approved by the Commission’ and inserting in lieu thereof ‘approved by 
the Commission, in an amount not less than such amount as the Secretary of Transportation 
prescribes pursuant to, or as is required by, the provisions of section 30 the Motor Carrier Act of 
1980.’”  Id. § 29. 
Id. at 248 n.5. 
 504. Id. at 248-49 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 31139(b) (2006)). 
 505. Id. at 248. 
 506. See id. 
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In consideration of the premium stated in the policy to which this 
endorsement is attached, the insurer (the company) agrees to pay, within the 
limits of liability described herein, any final judgment recovered against the 
insured for public liability resulting from negligence in the operation, 
maintenance or use of motor vehicles subject to the financial responsibility 
requirements of Sections 29 and 30 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 
regardless of whether or not each motor vehicle is specifically described in 
the policy and whether or not such negligence occurs on any route or in any 
territory authorized to be served by the insured or elsewhere.  Such insurance 
as is afforded, for public liability, does not apply to injury to or death of the 
insured’s employees while engaged in the course of their employment, or 
property transported by the insured, designated as cargo.  It is understood and 
agreed that no condition, provision, stipulation, or limitation contained in the 
policy, this endorsement, or any other endorsement thereon, or violation 
thereof, shall relieve the company from liability or from the payment of any 
final judgment, within the limits of liability herein described, irrespective of 
the financial condition, insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured.  However, all 
terms, conditions, and limitations in the policy to which the endorsement is 
attached shall remain in full force and effect as binding between the insured 
and the company.  The insured agrees to reimburse the company for any 
payment made by the company on account of any accident, claim, or suit 
involving a breach of the terms of the policy, and for any payment that the 
company would not have been obligated to make under the provisions of the 
policy except for the agreement contained in this endorsement.507 
After applying the plain meaning to the words and phrases in the MCS-90 and 
§ 30, the Coleman panel concluded that “the endorsement covers vehicles only 
when they are presently engaged in the transportation of property in interstate 
commerce.”508  How did Circuit Judges Benavides, DeMoss, and Elrod reach 
that conclusion?  In part, they simply cited and highlighted a phrase in the 
Motor Carrier Act § 30: “[M]inimum levels of financial responsibility . . . must 
be sufficient to ‘satisfy liability . . . for the transportation of property in 
interstate commerce.’”509  But, the learned judges also based their conclusion 
on a stipulation.510  Judge Benavides tells the reader: “[T]he parties stipulate[d] 
that Briggs was not engaged in the ‘transportation of property’” when the 
accident occurred.511  Therefore, in light of the stipulation and the “plain text 
[in] the endorsement,” the Coleman panel embraced the district court’s ruling 
and concluded that the MCS-90 did not apply because Briggs “was not engaged 
                                                                                                                 
 507. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing 49 C.F.R. § 387.15, ILLUSTRATION 1). 
 508. Id. at 249. 
 509. Id. (emphasis added) (second omission in original) (“Thus, the MCS-90 is a way of conforming with 
statutory minimum-financial-responsibility requirements.  And because those requirements exist to ‘satisfy 
liability . . . for the transportation of property,’ it follows that the MCS-90 must cover liabilities ‘for the 
transportation of property.’  Nothing in the MCS-90’s text indicates that it covers other kinds of liabilities, 
i.e., liabilities incurred outside of the transportation of property.” (omission in original)). 
 510. See id. at 247. 
 511. Id. 
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in the transportation of property at the time of the accident.”512  The panel’s 
analysis, however, is less than stellar, because the panel admitted and Judge 
Benavides reported the following: “Given the [Motor Carrier Act’s] broad 
terms, it is at least arguable that Briggs’s conduct at the time of the accident 
could be termed ‘transportation of property.’”513 
The Motor Carrier Act § 30 states that “terms are defined in section 13102 
of this title.”514  Now, consider the definition of “transportation” as it appears in 
§ 13102: 
 
(23) Transportation.—The term “transportation” includes—  
  (A) a motor vehicle, vessel, warehouse, wharf, pier, dock, yard, property, 
facility, instrumentality, or equipment of any kind related to the movement of 
passengers or property, or both, regardless of ownership or an agreement 
concerning use; and  
  (B) services related to that movement, including arranging for, receipt, 
delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, refrigeration, icing, ventilation, storage, 
handling, packing, unpacking, and interchange of passengers and     
property.515 
 
To be sure, the definition of “transportation” is exceedingly broad under the 
Motor Carrier Act from which the MCS-90 evolved.516  The panel did not reach 
the question of whether § 13102(23) applied in this case “because the district 
court accepted Coleman’s stipulation that it [did] not.”517  Judge Benavides 
wrote: “Had Coleman not explicitly conceded that Briggs’s liability was not 
‘for the transportation of property,’ the district court would have needed to ask 
what that phrase means.”518  But, with all due respect to the panel of judges, 
there is a reasonable counterview: Even though the Northern District of 
Mississippi allowed a stipulation rather than a federal statute to control its 
limited analysis and determine the outcome in this case, the Coleman panel 
certainly did not have to follow suit.  And the reason is categorically 
uncomplicated. 
                                                                                                                 
 512. Id. at 249.   
[T]he district court held: Congress empowered the Secretary of Transportation to “prescribe 
regulations to require minimum levels of financial responsibility sufficient to satisfy liability 
amounts . . . covering public liability, property damage, and environmental restoration for the 
transportation of property by motor carrier . . . .”  Similarly, the regulations are applicable to “for-
hire motor carriers operating motor vehicles transporting property in interstate or foreign 
commerce.”  In the present case, there is no dispute that Briggs was not transporting property at 
the time of the accident. 
Id. at 252 (quoting, respectively, 49 U.S.C. § 31139(b)(1) (2006) and 49 C.F.R. § 387.3(a) (2010)). 
 513. Id.  
 514. 49 U.S.C. § 31139(b) (2006). 
 515. Id. § 13102(23) (emphasis added). 
 516. See id. § 31139(b). 
 517. Coleman, 625 F.3d at 252. 
 518. Id. 
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Canal and Coleman’s summary judgment conflict arose in an equitable 
proceeding—a declaratory judgment trial.519  Thus, because the Coleman panel 
conducted a de novo review, there was no impediment in equity or in law to 
prevent the Fifth Circuit panel from conducting a thoughtful and 
comprehensive review of the original question: Whether Canal had a duty to 
indemnify under the MCS-90 endorsement.520  And a proper de novo review 
would have included an intelligible analysis of whether § 13102’s definition of 
“transportation” applied in this case.  After all, the Coleman panel stressed: 
“Neither this Court nor most federal courts have ever directly addressed the 
precise question before us.”521  And as of this writing, the issue still has not 
been addressed satisfactorily, or otherwise, because the panel allowed a 
stipulation to block a serious and independent de novo review of the Coleman 
controversy.522 
But even more importantly, the analysis in Coleman is terribly wanting 
because future Fifth-Circuit litigants still do not know whether the 
“transportation of property” defense is a truly sound defense.523  Unfortunately, 
                                                                                                                 
 519. Id. at 245. 
 520. Id. at 247. 
 521. Id. at 249. 
 522. See Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 349-50 (1991) (“The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
District Court’s judgment that this ‘specifically established’ a violation of [the statute]  primarily because it 
believed that . . . the District Court was not ‘clearly erroneous’ in so concluding.  That is[,] . . . the standard 
applied . . . to findings of fact.  Determination of the meaning and effect of a stipulation, however, is not a 
factual finding: We review that just as we would review a determination of meaning and effect of a contract, 
or consent decree, or proffer for summary judgment. . . .  The question, therefore, is not whether there is any 
reasonable reading of the stipulation that supports the District Court’s determination, but whether the 
District Court was right.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); United States v. Lucas, 157 F.3d 998, 1000 
(5th Cir. 1998) (“We review de novo a determination of the meaning and effect of any factual stipulations on 
a sentence.” (emphasis added)); Wash. Hosp. v. White, 889 F.2d 1294, 1299 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he legal 
resolution of any particular ambiguity in the stipulation’s construction is not possible in the absence of factual 
findings by the district court as to what the parties intended the ambiguous provisions to mean.  Hence, 
ambiguous provisions in the stipulation must be interpreted by the factfinder, here the district court, as an 
initial matter.”); Frost v. Davis, 346 F.2d 82, 83, 86 (5th Cir. 1965) (“[T]he case was submitted to the trial 
court on a stipulation, and involved simply and solely the construction of a written contract in the light of 
other written contracts embodied by reference. . . . There was no effort made to show what other duties, 
liabilities and obligations there were on the part of the percentage participants in the project other than the 
obligation to pay for the drilling costs and the share of the termination payment, if made.  We, therefore, are 
required to look at the language of the contract, and, of course, in doing so we look at the entire contract with 
an effort to understand the true meaning of the parties.” (emphasis added)). 
 523. See Coleman, 625 F.3d at 252.  Briefly put, the panel did not explain why it legally could not give a 
comprehensive analysis of this issue.  See id.  To be sure, judicial efficiency and future litigants deserve more. 
See, e.g., Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 188 (5th Cir. 1981) (Gee, J., dissenting) (“We advance no hard and 
fast formula for ascertaining whether a party may sue anonymously. . . . The Does should have been permitted 
to proceed under fictitious names. . . . Intending no offense, it seems to me that such a startling procedure as 
an anonymous lawsuit deserves better underpinnings than are offered here.  The majority tells our courts 
below little more than that, in future, we will decide the matter when it gets to us.  Nothing objective is 
offered, ‘no hard and fast formula.’  But it is just such formulas, or at least a sketching of their outlines, that 
we sit to provide.” (emphasis added)); Burke v. Ripp, 619 F.2d 354, 360 (5th Cir. 1980) (Goldberg, J., 
concurring) (“I write to clarify the relationship between the court’s holding in this case and those of the prior 
decisions discussed in the majority opinion.  In particular, I write to ensure that future potential indemnitors 
and indemnitees understand which steps will make proof of actual liability necessary, and those which will 
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that question has been left needlessly for the full court or another panel to 
resolve judiciously, despite the Coleman panel’s highly questionable 
conclusion: “In sum, the weight of authority from this Circuit and beyond 
supports our conclusion that the MCS-90 does not cover vehicles when they are 
not presently transporting property in interstate commerce.”524  Put simply, that 
conclusion evolved from thin air rather than from the application of rulings that 
address squarely the § 13102 issue.  Furthermore, that ruling clashes with the 
clear purpose of MCS-90 liability insurance—to cover third-party victims’ 
bodily injuries and property damages.525 
The last case involving an automobile-insurance dispute is Hurst.526  To 
recap, Darral Bell’s and Lecedrick Hurst’s vehicles collided.527  Lecedrick 
died.528  A Mississippi jury convicted Bell of involuntary manslaughter, using 
in part a voluntary statement that Bell gave to the police.529  Bell reported that 
“he was driving in the middle of the road to prevent Hurst from passing” when 
the collision occurred.530  Latasha Hurst and other survivors commenced a 
wrongful-death action against Bell and Pinewood, the employer.531  Capital 
City filed a declaratory judgment suit, asking the Southern District of 
Mississippi to declare that Pinewood’s insurance contract did not cover 
                                                                                                                 
necessitate proof of potential liability.” (emphasis added)). 
 524. But see Coleman, 625 F.3d at 246 n.1 (“[W]e do not hold today that a ‘bobtail’ truck can never be 
engaged in the transportation of property.  Nor do we take any position as to whether Briggs was actually 
engaged in ‘transportation of property’ at the time of the accident in this case.” (emphasis added)); id. at 254 
(“Because Coleman stipulated that Briggs was not engaged in the transportation of property at the time of the 
accident in this case, we have no occasion today to remark on whether the statutory definition reaches this 
case.” (emphasis added)). 
 525. See 49 U.S.C. § 31139 (2006).  MCS-90 liability insurance is designed for the benefit of third-party 
victims.  See, e.g., Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Yeates, 584 F.3d 868, 884 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[I]f no other 
insurance policy is available the purposes behind the MCS-90 are clearly implicated.  As the majority of 
circuits have recognized, the ‘primary purpose of the MCS-90 is to assure that injured members of the public 
are able to obtain judgment from negligent authorized interstate carriers.’  Where, for example, a motor carrier 
fails to obtain insurance on a particular vehicle or driver, no liability policy would extend to cover the carrier’s 
potential negligence on the public highways.  If an injured party obtains judgment, he or she would be left to 
rely solely on the financial stability of the motor carrier to satisfy judgment. This is the exact situation the 
endorsement contemplates and is designed to address.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting John 
Deere, Ins. Co. v. Nueva, 229 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2000))); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Redland Ins. Co., 522 
F. Supp. 2d 891, 895 (W.D. Mich. 2007) (“[T]he Auto-Owners policy includes an endorsement, Form MCS-
90, required by federal regulations for the protection of third-party accident victims.  That endorsement 
requires Auto-Owners to provide coverage for claims like those asserted in the [third-party] litigation, even if 
Auto-Owners . . . has recourse against another insurer.” (emphasis added)); Nueva, 229 F.3d at 857 
(reiterating and stressing a settled federal legal principle: “The purpose of the MCS–90 is to protect the public, 
not to create a windfall to the insured.  It is well-established that the primary purpose of the MCS–90 is to 
assure that injured members of the public are able to obtain judgment from negligent authorized interstate 
carriers.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
 526. Capital City Ins. Co. v. Hurst, 632 F.3d 898, 898 (5th Cir. Feb. 2011). 
 527. Id. at 900. 
 528. Id. 
 529. Id. 
 530. Id. at 902. 
 531. Id. at 900. 
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Lecedrick’s death.532  Later, Capital City filed a summary judgment motion and 
the district court granted the motion without “expressly analyzing the preclusive 
effect of [Bell’s involuntary manslaughter] conviction.”533  Instead, the district 
court simply concluded that Bell’s self-reported conduct was intentional; 
therefore, the automobile-insurance contract did not cover Lecedrick’s death.534 
On appeal, the survivors challenged the district court’s ruling.535  Circuit 
Judge Prado wrote the opinion for the Hurst panel.536  Before crafting the 
opinion, however, he reviewed the pertinent provisions in the automobile 
insurance contract.537  First, the coverage clause stated in relevant part: “We 
will pay all sums an ‘insured’ legally must pay as damages because of ‘bodily 
injury’ or ‘property damage’ to which this insurance applies, caused by an 
‘accident’ and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a covered 
‘auto.’”538  The insurance contract defined an “accident” as a “continuous or 
repeated exposure to the same conditions resulting in ‘bodily injury’ or 
‘property damage.’”539  On the other hand, the contract’s exclusion clause 
excluded coverage for “‘[b]odily injury’ or ‘property damage’ expected or 
intended from the standpoint of the ‘insured.’”540 
Hurst presented two questions for the panel: (1) Whether Bell’s attempt to 
stop Hurst by driving in the middle of the road constituted an “intentional act,” 
which precluded coverage under the insurance contract;541 and (2) whether 
Bell’s involuntary manslaughter conviction precluded a civil court from 
relitigating an insurance-law question: whether Bell’s conduct was an 
intentional act under the auto policy.542  Addressing the first question, Judge 
Prado wrote: “Under the plain reading of the [automobile insurance contract, 
the Bell–Hurst] collision is excluded from coverage.”543  Certainly, the Hurst 
panel based its conclusion on more than a simple reading of the insurance 
contract’s coverage and exclusion clauses.544  In addition, the panel (1) read the 
jury’s charges in the underlying state-court criminal trial;545 (2) reviewed and 
assigned a considerable amount of weight to the state-court jury’s involuntary-
                                                                                                                 
 532. Id. 
 533. Id. at 902. 
 534. Id. 
 535. Id. at 900. 
 536. Id. 
 537. Id. at 902. 
 538. Id. (emphasis added). 
 539. Id. 
 540. Id. (emphasis added). 
 541. Id. at 903. 
 542. Id. (“[The third-party victims] essentially argue in both issues that there is a question of fact 
remaining as to whether Bell intended to kill Hurst, and that Mississippi insurance law requires specific intent 
to injure—or, in this case, kill—in order for the [p]olicy’s coverage exemption for ‘expected or intended’ 
bodily injury to apply.”). 
 543. Id. at 906. 
 544. See infra notes 558-59, 564 and accompanying text. 
 545. See infra note 552 and accompanying discussion. 
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manslaughter verdict against Bell;546 and (3) concluded that the federal district 
court’s conclusion was sound: The Bell–Hurst collision was not an accident 
under the insurance contract.547 
Stated clearly, the Hurst panel concluded that Capital City’s automobile 
insurance contract did not cover Lecedrick Hurst’s death or his survivors’ 
underlying wrongful-death claim.548  To be clear, standing alone, that 
conclusion is not, and should not be, a source of concern.  The manner in which 
the Fifth Circuit panel reached that conclusion, however, is troublesome.  Why? 
The Hurst panel’s less-than-thorough analysis is replete with critical 
omissions—failing to research, cite, state, and apply carefully Mississippi 
Supreme Court’s insurance-law decisions.549  Arguably, the most indefensible 
omission is this one: The Fifth Circuit panel refused or forgot to harmonize 
ambiguous words and phrases in the state-criminal-court jury charge with the 
definitions of similar words and phrases that the Mississippi Supreme Court has 
embraced to declare rights and obligations under liability insurance contracts.550 
To help prove the point, consider a few uncontroverted facts.  Darral Bell 
was indicted on murder charges and tried.551  The Mississippi trial judge gave 
murder and manslaughter charges to the jury.552  The murder charge read: 
Darral Bell has been charged with the offense of murder.  If you find from the 
evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
1) Darral Bell, on or about October 30, 2004, in Amite County, Mississippi; 
2) Wilfully, with a deliberate design to effect the death of Lecedrick Hurst, 
killed the said Lecedrick Hurst by running over him with a truck; and 
3) Darral Bell was not acting in self-defense then you shall find the defendant 
guilty as charged. 
If the prosecution has failed to prove any one or more of the above listed 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you shall find Darral Bell not guilty 
of murder.553 
The Mississippi trial court’s “deliberate design” charge read: 
“[D]eliberate design” . . . means an intent to kill without authority of law, and 
not being legally justifiable, or legally excusable. “Deliberate” always 
indicates full awareness of what one is doing, and generally implies careful 
                                                                                                                 
 546. See Hurst, 632 F.3d at 905 (“Turning to the terms of the [insurance contract], [it] provides coverage 
for bodily injury caused by an ‘accident’ and expressly excludes coverage for bodily injury ‘expected or 
intended from the standpoint of the “insured.’”  Under any reading of the [p]olicy, Bell’s manslaughter 
conviction negates any finding that Hurst’s death was an ‘accident.’”). 
 547. See id. at 905-06. 
 548. See id. at 906. 
 549. See infra notes 559-62 and accompanying text. 
 550. See infra notes 551-58 and accompanying text. 
 551. Hurst, 632 F.3d at 901. 
 552. Id. 
 553. Id. (emphasis added). 
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and unhurried consideration of the consequences.  “Design” means to 
calculate, plan, or contemplate.  “Deliberate design” to kill a person may be 
formed very quickly, and perhaps only moments before the act of killing the 
person.  However, a “deliberate design” cannot be formed at the very moment 
of the fatal act.554 
Furthermore, the judge also instructed the jury to continue deliberating 
and consider whether Bell was guilty of manslaughter, if the jury concluded 
that Bell was not guilty of murder.555  The manslaughter charge stated: 
[M]anslaughter is the killing of a human being, without malice aforethought, 
and in the heat of passion by the use of a deadly weapon, without authority of 
law.  Thus, if you find from the evidence, that the State has proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt all of the following material elements that: 
1. The defendant, Darral Bell, did wilfully, feloniously and without 
authority of law and without malice aforethought, in the heat of 
passion, with the use of an automobile, did run over and kill Lecedrick 
Hurst, a living person, and further, 
2. That the defendant, Darral Bell, had the mental capacity to realize 
and appreciate the nature and quality of his acts and to distinguish right 
from wrong at the time he committed these acts; 
Then you shall find the defendant, Darral Bell, guilty of manslaughter.  
However, if the State has failed to prove any one of the elements of the 
charge of manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt, you may consider 
whether the death of Lecedrick Hurst was an accidental homicide.556 
There is more: Other instructions stated that a “killing, even though intentional, 
committed on impulse in the heat of passion is without deliberation and without 
malice aforethought,’ that malice aforethought required ‘premeditation and 
deliberation,’ and that deliberation [required giving] ‘consideration to the intent 
to kill.’”557 
Now consider Judge Prado’s statement that he penned in the Hurst 
opinion: 
[Lecedrick Hurst’s survivors] seriously misunderstand the crime of which 
Bell was convicted.  Under Mississippi law, heat-of-passion manslaughter is a 
lesser-included offense of murder because it lacks malice, not willfulness.  
While the jury determined that Bell did not act “[w]ilfully, with a deliberate 
design to effect [Hurst’s] death” or with “premeditation and deliberation,” it 
did find Bell guilty of manslaughter on a theory that he killed Hurst “wilfully  
. . . without malice aforethought, in the heat of passion,” and that he had the 
                                                                                                                 
 554. Id. (emphasis added). 
 555. Id. 
 556. Id. (emphasis added). 
 557. Id. at 902. 
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“mental capacity to realize and appreciate the nature and quality of his 
acts.”558 
So, what is problematic?  First, the Hurst panel concluded: “Under 
Mississippi law, heat-of-passion manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of 
murder . . . .”559  But the panel did not cite any Mississippi cases to support that 
assertion.560  In fact, based on the author’s research, that statement is untrue.  
The Mississippi Legislature has enacted eleven manslaughter statutes and each 
has different elements.561  And those “statutes do not refer to any form of 
manslaughter being of a varying degree or ‘lesser’ than another form.”562 
Second, review carefully the following words and phrases that appear in 
the Mississippi trial court’s murder charge: “‘Deliberate design’ . . . means an 
intent to kill”; “‘Design’ means to calculate, plan, or contemplate”; and 
“willfully, with a deliberate design . . . killed . . . Lecedrick Hurst.”563 
                                                                                                                 
 558. Id. at 903 (emphasis added). 
 559. Id. 
 560. See id. 
 561. See MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-27 to -47 (West 2006). 
 562. Nolan v. State, 61 So. 3d 887, 904 (Miss. 2011) (Carlson, J., dissenting).  Judge Carlson also added 
the following highly relevant information: 
Further, the plain language of Section 97-3-47 [involuntary manslaughter] distinguishes itself from 
our other manslaughter sections.  Section 97-3-47 begins with stating “every other killing of a 
human being . . . .”  The word “other” in Section 97-3-47 divides the Section from the remaining 
ten manslaughter statutes. . . . [T]he Fifth Circuit has found that, under the federal manslaughter 
statute, involuntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter.  
Notably, the wording of the federal statute is different from our state statutes.  The federal statute 
provides: 
“(a) Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice.  It is of two 
kinds: Voluntary—Upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.  Involuntary—In the 
commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or in the commission in an 
unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection, of a lawful act which 
might produce death.” 
In holding that involuntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense, the Fifth Circuit stated: 
“[I]nvoluntary manslaughter is also necessarily a lesser included offense of voluntary 
manslaughter.  Voluntary manslaughter encompasses all of the elements of murder: it 
requires proof of the physical act of unlawfully causing the death of another, and of a 
mental state that would constitute malice, but for the fact that the killing was 
committed in adequately provoked heat of passion or provocation.  Involuntary 
manslaughter requires proof only of a subset of those elements: the same physical act, 
but only a reduced mental state and no requirement at all for heat of passion or 
provocation.  Thus, under the elements test, involuntary manslaughter under the 
federal statute is necessarily a lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter.” 
However, of significant import is that, under the federal statute, the punishment for voluntary 
manslaughter is more severe than the punishment for involuntary manslaughter. . . .  On the other 
hand, in Mississippi, we have eleven manslaughter statutes, all of which provide for . . . 
imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not less than two years nor more than twenty years.  In 
sum, prior to today, this Court has not yet addressed the issue of whether general manslaughter is 
a lesser-included offense of heat-of-passion manslaughter.   
Id. at 904-05 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (citing United States v. Browner, 
889 F.2d 549, 553 (5th Cir. 1989)); 18 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (Supp. 2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-25 
(West 2006). 
 563. Hurst, 632 F.3d at 901. 
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Conversely, the manslaughter charge contained these pertinent words and 
phrases: “without malice aforethought,” “[a] killing, even though intentional     
. . . is without deliberation and without malice aforethought” and “wilfully.”564  
Yes.  “Wilfully” appears in both the murder and manslaughter charges.565  But, 
on at least one occasion, the Mississippi Supreme Court embraced Black’s 
definitions and concluded that “intent” and “willful” are synonymous.566  
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Mississippi also declared that “malice 
aforethought,” “deliberate design,” and “intent” are synonymous.567 
In the Hurst opinion, Judge Prado wrote: “While the jury determined that 
Bell did not act ‘[w]ilfully, with a deliberate design to effect [Hurst’s] death’ or 
with ‘premeditation and deliberation,’ it did find Bell guilty of manslaughter 
on a theory that he killed Hurst ‘wilfully . . . without malice aforethought, in the 
heat of passion.’”568  And stressing that the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld 
Bell’s involuntary-manslaughter conviction, the Hurst panel concluded:         
(1) Bell “intentionally killed Hurst”; (2) The intentional killing—bodily 
injury—was excluded from coverage under the automobile policy; and           
(3) Capital City had no duty to compensate Hurst’s survivors.569 
It is important, however, to restate an earlier observation: Mississippi has 
several manslaughter statutes.570  And Judge Prado cites and discusses two of 
those statutes in the opinion.571  Section 97-3-35 of the Mississippi Code reads: 
                                                                                                                 
 564. Id. 
 565. See supra notes 563-64 and accompanying text. 
 566. See Lester v. State, 692 So. 2d 755, 790 (Miss. 1997), overruled by Weatherspoon v. State, 692 So. 
2d 755 (Miss. 1999) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1599 (6th ed. 1990) (holding the word “willfully” 
means “intentionally”)).  But see Johnson v. State, 44 So. 3d 400, 405 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (“Johnson argues 
[that Lester] (overruled on other grounds) ‘conclusively’ establishes that ‘willfully’ means the same as 
‘intentionally’ in both ordinary and legal use.  In Lester, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed a capital-
murder conviction and granted a new trial.  However, the defendant unsuccessfully argued that the trial judge 
erred in overruling an objection to a jury instruction which he argued omitted the intent from the elements of 
the charge of child abuse.  The jury instruction at issue only stated ‘willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously’; and 
it did not contain the word ‘intentionally,’ so the defendant argued it did not contain the element of intent, 
allowing the jury to convict him of child abuse for negligently, not criminally, caused injuries.  The supreme 
court held the word ‘willfully,’ in that context, meant ‘intentionally.’  Lester, however, is readily 
distinguishable from the case at bar, as it does not establish the meaning of ‘willfully’ in all contexts, least of 
all the required intent of the different crime: shooting into a dwelling.  In Lester, there is no statutory 
interpretation at issue, but a jury instruction on a different crime—felonious child abuse.  The jury instruction 
did not contain the word ‘intent,’ but ‘willfully’; however, the court found these two terms synonymous in that 
context.  Accordingly, Lester is not dispositive as argued by Johnson.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted) 
(citing Lester, 692 So. 2d at 789-90)). 
 567. See Wilson v. State, 936 So. 2d 357, 363-64 (Miss. 2006) (“By definition, malice aforethought and 
deliberate design are synonymous.  This [c]ourt has also acknowledged that deliberate design connotes an 
intent to kill.” (citation omitted)) (citing Hawthorne v. State, 835 So. 2d 14, 19 (Miss. 2003)); Tran v. State, 
681 So. 2d 514, 517 (Miss. 1996) (concluding that the definition of “malice aforethought” is synonymous 
with the definition of “deliberate design”). 
 568. Hurst, 632 F.3d at 903. 
 569. See id. at 902, 905-06 (emphasis added) (alterations in original) (citing Bell v. State, 963 So. 2d 
1124 (Miss. 2007)). 
 570. See MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-27 to -47 (West 2006). 
 571. See Hurst, 632 F.3d at 903-04. 
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“The killing of a human being, without malice, in the heat of passion, but in a 
cruel or unusual manner, or by the use of a dangerous weapon, without 
authority of law, and not in necessary self-defense, shall be manslaughter.”572 
And § 97-3-47 of the Mississippi Code states: “Every other killing of a human 
being, by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, and without 
authority of law, not provided for in this title, shall be manslaughter.”573 
But note: The following words and phrases do not appear in the two 
manslaughter statutes, §§ 97-3-35 and 97-3-47: “Wilfully,” “willfully,” 
“wilful,” “willful,” “intent,” “intentional,” “deliberate design,” and 
“premeditation.”574  Thus, did the state criminal court give the wrong charge 
that the Mississippi jury used to convict Bell of involuntary manslaughter?  Or, 
does the Mississippi Supreme Court allow trial judges to fashion jury charges 
that deviate from or clash with the words and phrases that appear in criminal 
statutes?  Put simply, a comprehensive and intelligibly de novo review and 
analysis of this question is sadly absent in the Hurst opinion. 
There is more.  In the underlying criminal case, Darral Bell admitted that 
he acted intentionally—“driving [his truck] in the middle of the road to prevent 
Hurst from passing him.”575  But, did Bell intentionally cause the results—a 
collision and Lecedrick Hurst’s death?  The Hurst panel simply embraced the 
district court’s conclusion: Capital City insurance policy did not cover the 
collision or death because Bell “intentionally killed Hurst.”576  But, to repeat, 
the jury’s manslaughter conviction is highly questionable because the 
Mississippi Supreme Court has been extremely clear: Mississippi’s involuntary 
manslaughter statute—§ 97-3-47—does not require a jury to find that a 
defendant “willfully killed” or had an intent to kill.577 
Stated differently, on numerous occasions, the Mississippi Supreme Court 
has ruled: To secure a manslaughter conviction, a prosecutor must prove 
“culpable negligence,” which is the “conscious and wanton or reckless 
disregard of the probabilities of fatal consequences to others as the result of the 
willful creation of an unreasonable risk.”578  Without a doubt, negligence and 
                                                                                                                 
 572. § 97-3-35 (emphasis added). 
 573. § 97-3-47 (emphasis added). 
 574. §§ 97-3-35, 97-3-47. 
 575. Hurst, 632 F.3d at 902. 
 576. See id. at 906. 
 577. See Lester v. State, 692 So. 2d 755, 789 (Miss. 1997) (comparing elements of § 97-3-27 
manslaughter and § 97-3-19(2)(f) capital murder); Craig v. State, 520 So. 2d 487, 491 (Miss. 1988) 
(characterizing § 97-3-47 as an involuntary manslaughter statute). 
 578. See Towner v. State, 726 So. 2d 251, 257 (Miss. App. 1998) (emphasis added) (citing Campbell v. 
State, 285 So. 2d 891, 893 (Miss. 1973)) (“It has been pointed out by this Court on several occasions that 
involuntary manslaughter by culpable negligence within the meaning of the foregoing Code section may be 
defined as the conscious and wanton or reckless disregard of the probabilities of fatal consequences to others 
as the result of the willful creation of an unreasonable risk.” (emphasis added)); see also Smith v. State, 20 
So. 2d 701, 706 (Miss. 1945) (“[C]ulpable negligence should be defined as the conscious and wanton or 
reckless disregard of the probabilities of fatal consequences to others as a result of the wilful creation of an 
unreasonable risk thereof.” (emphasis added)). 
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an intentional act are not synonymous.579  And arguably one’s willfully acting 
to create an unreasonable risk is not the same as one’s intentionally designing a 
specific result.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Mississippi—like most 
state supreme courts that interpret the meaning of “expected or intended from 
the standpoint of the insured ” clauses—accepts the critical distinction between 
an insured’s intent to act versus an insured’s intent to harm.580  Of course, as 
the appellants requested, the Hurst panel did not discuss thoroughly (1) whether 
the Capital City insurance contract excluded intentional act or results, or       
(2) whether Bell only created a risk or collided with Hurst with intent to kill 
Hurst.581  Again, under Mississippi’s law, “a wilful risk” and a “wilful 
consequence” are not synonymous.582  Thus, the Hurst opinion is also 
blemished because it fails to provide intelligible discussions of these latter 
issues. 
                                                                                                                 
 579. Cf. Buchanan v. State, 427 So. 2d 697, 700 (Miss. 1983) (“The [c]ourt instruct[ed] the jury that if 
you find from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant . . . unlawfully, wilfully, 
and feloniously cause[d] bodily injury to Joe Parker, a human being, recklessly under circumstances 
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life by driving into Joe Parker and striking him with 
an automobile, then you shall find the defendant guilty as charged.  This instruction offers no guidelines or 
distinctions for the jury to follow so that it could understand the difference between recklessness under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life that amounted to willfulness and 
ordinary negligence, gross negligence or culpable negligence, all of which are a lesser degree than willful.  
To avoid the possibility that state instruction No. 2 be interpreted by the jury as a peremptory instruction, 
thereby depriving appellant of his only defense, it became necessary for the court to grant an instruction 
similar to the one offered by defense instruction No. 3.  Although inartfully drawn and the verbiage redundant, 
this instruction attempted to instruct the jury as to the difference between recklessness or negligence without 
intent as opposed to such negligence that would be tantamount to willfulness and therefore subject the 
appellant to criminal responsibility.”) (Lee, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted); Ramon v. State, 387 So. 2d 745, 751 (Miss. 1980) (“Furthermore, in a prosecution for 
manslaughter, the charge is the action of ‘culpable negligence’ which is a lesser term than ‘wilful.’  All the 
instructions adequately informed the jury as to its duties under the law as applied to the evidence in the 
case.”). 
 580. See United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Omnibank, 812 So. 2d 196, 200-01 (Miss. 2002) (adopting 
the analysis and reasoning in Moulton); S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Allard, 611 So. 2d 966, 968 (Miss. 
1992) (concluding that the insurer had a duty to pay because although the insured’s act was intentional, the 
act’s result was not intentional); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Moulton, 464 So. 2d 507, 509-10 (Miss. 1985) 
(concluding that the insurer had no duty to pay because the insured intended to act, even though the result was 
unintended); see also Willy E. Rice,  Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord Over Whether Liability 
Insurers Must Defend Insureds’ Allegedly Intentional and Immoral Conduct: A Historical and Empirical 
Review of Federal and State Courts’ Declaratory Judgments—1900-1997, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1183-86 
(1998) (presenting an exhaustive analysis of nationwide judicial conflicts over whether an insured’s  “intent to 
act” or “intent to injure” determines an insurer’s duty to pay a third-party claim or defend an insured against a 
wrongful-death suit). 
 581. See Hurst, 632 F.3d at 903. 
 582. See supra note 579 and accompanying text. 
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IV.  THIRD-PARTY FEDERAL- AND STATE-LAW POLLUTION CLAIMS AND 
LIABILITY INSURER’S DUTY TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY INSUREDS 
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).583  Put simply, Congress found 
that industrial pollution was widespread, producing numerous hazardous-waste 
sites, causing serious environmental hazards and increasing health risks to 
dangerous levels.584  Therefore, CERCLA was designed to promote the “timely 
cleanup of hazardous waste sites” and to ensure that commercial polluters paid 
the cleanup costs.585  To accomplish this end, CERCLA imposes strict liability 
for environmental contamination upon four broad classes of potentially 
“responsible parties.”586 
The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 
(Superfund) grants broad authority to the Federal Executive Branch to 
decontaminate hazardous-substances sites.587  Specifically, if hazardous 
substances are released or present a threat to the environment, the President 
may (1) remove or arrange for the removal of hazardous substances,               
                                                                                                                 
 583. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), 
amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006). 
 584. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 257-58 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1992) (“In 
response to widespread concern over the improper disposal of hazardous wastes, Congress enacted CERCLA, 
a complex piece of legislation designed to force polluters to pay for costs associated with remedying their 
pollution. . . .  As numerous courts have observed, CERCLA is a remedial statute which should be construed 
liberally to effectuate its goals. . . . Unfortunately, CERCLA was passed in great haste during the waning days 
of the 96th Congress.  As a result, the statute is riddled with inconsistencies and redundancies.”) (citing A 
Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 
S. Comm. of Env’t and Pub. Works, S. Doc. No. 97-14, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.1983, Vol. I, 320 [hereinafter A 
Legislative History] (one of the statute’s principal goals is “assuring that those who caused chemical harm 
bear the costs of that harm . . . .”)); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1197 (2d Cir. 1992) (“In 
CERCLA Congress enacted a broad remedial statute designed to enhance the authority of the EPA to respond 
effectively and promptly to toxic pollutant spills that threaten[] the environment and human health.”); Dedham 
Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1150 (1st Cir. 1989) (CERCLA is a “broad 
response and reimbursement statute”); A Legislative History, supra, Vol. I, at 785-87. 
 585. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Util., 
Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2005); Dedham Water Co., 805 F.2d at 1081. 
 586. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006); Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d at 257.  The four broad classes of 
potentially “responsible parties” are: 
 (1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, 
 (2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at 
which such hazardous substances were disposed of, 
 (3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged 
with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by 
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by 
another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and 
 (4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment 
facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a 
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance.   
§ 9607(a). 
 587. Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601). 
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(2) institute remedial actions to decontaminate polluted areas, and (3) institute 
any other necessary measures to protect the public’s health and welfare, and 
clean up the polluted environment.588  In the course of events, the President 
delegated most of his CERCLA authority to the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA).589  Consequently, the EPA must identify toxic-waste sites, 
fashion cleanup plans, and collect reimbursements from responsible parties.590  
Additionally, some states have established procedures to decontaminate 
polluted areas and to secure reimbursements from “responsible entities” or 
those who polluted land and water over multiple decades.591 
                                                                                                                 
 588. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (2006). 
 589. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,580, 61 Fed. Reg. 45,871 (Jan. 23, 1987). 
 590. See John Seward, Insurers and Environmental Icebergs, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2004, at B9D (“A 
special tax on oil and chemical companies created a fund to pay for cleanups when responsible parties weren’t 
available.  The tax was eliminated in 1995 and the trust fund’s unallocated balance went from a high of $3.6 
billion in 1995 to zero by the end of 2003.  Rather than suggesting the environment has been cleaned, the 
slowdown at the EPA merely portends a developing backlog of sites to be listed eventually as eligible 
Superfund sites that may generate insurance claims . . . . [F]iscal 2003 saw work under way at 436 Superfund 
sites, which . . . the second-highest level of activity in the Superfund’s 24-year history. . . .  The EPA has 
cleaned up about 900 sites under the Superfund since 1980, with about 1,200 still on the list.”).  Put simply, 
the EPA may secure reimbursement for response costs in multiple ways.  For example, the EPA can clean the 
sites itself using monies in the “Superfund.”  26 U.S.C. § 9507(b) (2006).  In addition, under § 9606(a), the 
EPA may ask the Attorney General to “secure such relief as may be necessary to abate such danger or threat” 
by filing a civil action in federal district court.  § 9606(a) (1980) (amended 1987).  That section also permits 
the EPA to issue administrative orders “as may be necessary to protect public health and welfare and the 
environment.”  Id. 
 591. See Russell Gold, Uranium Firm, State Strike Financing Deal for Cleanup, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 
2000, at T1 (emphasis added): 
  In an effort to avoid creating a Superfund site that could cost $12 million to $18 million to 
clean, state environmental regulators signed an agreement last week to keep a financially troubled 
uranium-mining company afloat.  The deal allows Dallas-based Uranium Resources Inc. to use its 
financial-security bonds to restore the groundwater and surface at two mines in South Texas . . . 
Uranium companies are required by the state to fund financial-security bonds to cover the closing 
and cleanup of mines if a company goes bankrupt.  URI has $6.2 million in such bonds.  
. . . . 
  URI will get $2.3 million over 18 months for the cleanup.  After that, URI can negotiate 
another deal to get the rest of the $6.2 million. . . .  The flap over the URI mines comes at a time 
when a quarter-century of uranium mining across South Texas has all but ceased—the victim of a 
recent collapse in the price of uranium, which fuels nuclear plants. As a result, the state has found 
itself negotiating with companies to avoid an expensive environmental headache, with the URI 
pact being the first such deal.  
. . . . 
  When the uranium industry took off in the late 1970s, state officials started requiring 
companies to post financial-security bonds.  The size of the bonds was reviewed annually, and 
they had to be enough for an independent contractor to perform the required decommissioning 
work.  But the amount was largely guesswork until recently, since most companies completed the 
work themselves without dipping into the bonds.  When companies’ financial stability became an 
issue in the past couple years, state officials quickly realized the cleanup costs were much higher 
than expected and that the bonds were too small. 
  URI entered the South Texas uranium-mining industry in the 1980s. . . . By 1988, URI 
began production in the region using a method called in situ mining.  URI used a well field to 
extract uranium from shallow aquifers, which supply drinking water to nearby ranchers and 
communities.  Gaseous oxygen is pumped into the aquifer, where it reacts with ore and causes 
uranium and other metals to become soluble.  The mineral-rich water is then pumped back to the 
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But, who should pay federal and state governments after they 
decontaminate toxic-waste sites?  Should the polluters or responsible persons 
pay, or should their commercial and environmental liability insurers pay?  To 
illustrate the scale and gravity of the problem, consider the following 
information, which appears in a 1989 Wall Street Journal article: 
 
The [cost of remediating] years of pollution is expected to approach $100 
billion.  And there’s a growing sense among . . . some judges, lawyers and 
industry executives []that the courtroom is not the best place to decide who 
should bear most of the cost.   
  The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act of 1980, [or] Superfund, was designed to set the rules. . . . 
[T]hose who generated, transported or stored hazardous waste are liable for 
its cleanup, regardless of whether their actions were legal at the time they 
took place.   
  However, it soon became evident that corporations alone were unable to 
handle the cost of cleaning the nation’s waste sites.  So they undertook a 
hugely expensive legal effort to compel their insurance carriers to help foot 
the bill instead. 
Corporate policyholders argue . . . that [they] paid millions of dollars in 
comprehensive general-liability insurance premiums to protect themselves 
against business risks. . . .  [Thus, they stress that] the carriers . . . accepted 
the premiums [as well as] . . . the risks . . . and [the insurers] must now pay 
the price. 
  The insurance industry counters that general-liability policies were 
never intended to cover the cleanup of pollution released gradually into the 
                                                                                                                 
surface where the uranium is extracted.  
. . . . 
  The state requires that the aquifers be thoroughly cleansed to remove residual uranium as 
well as other hazardous materials dislodged during mining.  This accounts for about 90% of the 
overall cleanup cost.  Water from the aquifer is cleansed using reverse osmosis and a collection of 
resins and filters.  The process takes tremendous amounts of electricity to run the pumps, but 
operations are fairly automated.  
. . . . 
  Kingsville, a city of 25,000, draws its water from the aquifer. While groundwater 
movement in the area is very slow—10 feet a year by some estimates—any movement would 
quickly escalate the cost of cleanup. 
See also Energy Brief—Exxon Mobil Corp.: Appeal Is Planned of Decision in Louisiana Environment 
Case, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2005, at B3 (emphasis added): 
  Exxon Mobil Corporation said it plans to appeal a Louisiana appeals-court decision that 
held the oil giant liable for more than $100 million in damages in an environmental case.  The 
court reduced an earlier award Thursday, trimming punitive damages awarded by a jury to $112 
million from $1 billion and leaving $56 million in compensatory damages unchanged. 
  But Exxon Mobil of Irving, Texas, insisted punitive damages weren’t warranted and said 
the compensatory award exceeded cleanup costs.  The case involves land leased by former 
Jefferson Parish District Judge Joseph Grefer to Intracoastal Tubular Services Inc. a company 
contracted to clean and refurbish Exxon’s pipes between the 1950s and 1992.  Judge Grefer 
argued the oil industry knew since the 1930s that its pipes were filled with residue containing 
significant amounts of radium, a carcinogen, and Exxon said nothing in hopes of avoiding 
liability for cleanup costs. 
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environment.  In addition, [insurance-defense lawyers argued that] intentional 
polluters are barred from insurance protection, which is designed to cover 
accidental calamities only.592 
 
Perhaps the courtroom is not the best forum to determine whether insurers 
or polluters must bear the greater burden of decontaminating hazardous-waste 
sites.  But this question has generated a considerable amount of litigation since 
CERCLA, the Superfund, and various states’ pollution remediation statutes 
were enacted.593  Significantly, state courts have decided most of the 
controversies.594  Since the Wall Street Journal article appeared in 1989, the 
Fifth Circuit has decided only a few environmental impairment liability 
disputes between insurers and their corporate insureds.595  However, during the 
2010–2011 session, Fifth Circuit panels decided two quarrels over whether 
environmental liability insurers have a duty to pay pollution-remediation costs 
as well as damages for pollution-caused personal injuries.596  Those opinions 
are discussed below. 
A.  Federal Environmental Remediation Claim and Insurers’ Duty to 
Indemnify 
 Substantive Question: Whether under Texas’s laws, an environmental 
impairment liability insurer has a duty to indemnify the insured for paying 
the remediation costs that the EPA incurred after removing pollution from 
an industrial site. 
Although the legal issues and procedural history in RSR Corp. v. 
International Insurance Co. are somewhat intricate, the facts are not.597 
                                                                                                                 
 592. Amy Dockser, Corporate Polluters Paying the Price—More Rulings Favor Insurers In Toxic Suits, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 1989. 
 593. See generally ALA. CODE 1975 § 22-30E-1 (2009) (“Alabama Land Recycling and Economic 
Redevelopment Act”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-202 (West 2011) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter . . . to    
. . . enforce a hazardous waste program”); CAL. GOV. CODE § 53314.6 (West 2008) (setting up a fund for the 
cleanup of hazardous waste); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-104.6 (2011) (establishing in the state treasury 
a hazardous substance response fund); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-133k (West 2006) (“setting forth 
standards for the remediation of environmental pollution at hazardous waste sites”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.      
§ 30:2273 (2000) (“The purpose of this chapter is to encourage prompt notification to the department of any 
hazardous substance discharge”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-17-405 (2003) (providing funding for rehabilitation 
of contamination sites); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 7.031 (West 2008) (allowing commission to order 
corrective action for hazardous waste spills). 
 594. On September 18, 2011, the author accessed Westlaw’s MIN-CS database and submitted the 
following query: SY(POLLUT! CONTAMINA! /P (DEFEND INDEMN!)).  Covering the period between 
March 1969 and August 2011, four hundred (404) cases were generated. 
 595. On September 18, 2011, the author accessed Westlaw’s CTA5 database and submitted the following 
query: SY(POLLUT! CONTAMINA! /P (DEFEND INDEMN!)).  Covering the period between September 
1983 and August 2011, twenty-four opinions were generated. 
 596. See infra Part IV.A. 
 597. See RSR Corp. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 854-57 (5th Cir. July 2010) (Panel comprised of 
Circuit Judges Edith Brown Clement, the late William Lockhart Garwood, and Jerry Smith). 
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Essentially, RSR Corporation (RSR) is a recycling company.598  Quemetco, Inc. 
(Quemetco) is RSR’s subsidiary.599  From 1972 until 1983, Quemetco operated 
a lead smelter on Harbor Island near Seattle, Washington.600  During that 
period, Quemetco’s operations generated a substantial amount of pollution on 
the island, which severely damaged the environment.601  In December 1982, the 
EPA announced that it would put Harbor Island on its National Priorities List 
(NPL).602 In 1986, the EPA determined that Quemetco was a potentially 
responsible party who caused the pollution.603  And in May 2000, the EPA filed 
a CERCLA action against RSR.604  The action sought reimbursements for 
expenditures that the EPA used to clean up Harbor Island.605 
When the EPA commenced it remediation action, International Insurance 
Company (International) insured RSR and its subsidiaries—Quemetco, 
Quemetco Metals Limited, Inc., and Quemetco Realty, Inc.—under four 
environmental impairment liability insurance contracts.606  International’s 
predecessor-in-interest, North River Insurance Company, sold the insurance 
contracts to RSR in 1981.607  Therefore, after learning about the EPA’s lawsuit, 
International filed a declaratory judgment lawsuit against RSR (Northern 
District’s First RSR Decision).608  In the complaint, the insurer asked the 
District Court for the Northern District of Texas to declare that International 
had no duty to defend or indemnify RSR under the four environmental liability 
insurance policies.609 
An initial jury trial was held to resolve certain coverage issues.610  Other 
coverage and damages issues, however, were reserved for future resolution.611  
                                                                                                                 
 598. See RSR Corp.: Company Description, HOOVERS, http://www.hoovers.com/company/RSR_ 
Corporation/crccsi-1.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2012) (“Medieval alchemists tried to turn lead into gold.  
RSR’s operations are even more complex—the company turns batteries into lead and then into money.  RSR 
represents the stateside operations of privately owned holding company Quexco, which also owns UK battery 
recycler Eco-Bat Technologies.  RSR recycles scrapped lead-acid batteries and other lead-bearing materials 
into refined lead and calcium and antimonial lead alloys. The company also offers technology and product 
development services to the metals industry.  It operates three plants in the US.”). 
 599. RSR Corp., 612 F.3d at 854. 
 600. Id. 
 601. See id. 
 602. Id.  “Placement of a site on the NPL indicates that the EPA plans to clean up a site and serves as 
notice to potentially responsible parties that the EPA may seek to recoup its remediation costs from them.”  Id. 
at 854 n.1. 
 603. Id. at 854. 
 604. Id. 
 605. Id. 
 606. Id. 
 607. See id. at 854-55; see also Int’l Ins. Co. v. RSR Corp., 426 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(“International Insurance Company is the successor-in-interest of North River Insurance Company . . . , which 
issued the [environment impairment liability] policy to RSR and other related entities in 1981.  The 
[contracts] had a policy period of September 4, 1981 to November 4, 1982, with an extended reporting period 
until November 4, 1983.”). 
 608. Int’l Ins. Co., 426 F.3d at 285. 
 609. RSR Corp., 612 F.3d at 854. 
 610. Id. 
 611. See id. 
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At the conclusion of the initial trial, the Northern District of Texas entered a 
judgment for RSR.612  The district court concluded that International had a duty 
to indemnify RSR for the Harbor Island remediation costs, barring costs that 
were excluded under the insurance contracts.613  The Fifth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s judgment in the first RSR decision.614  About two years later, 
International raised additional defenses, which had been reserved or were 
unavailable prior to the judgment in the Northern District’s First RSR 
Decision.615  Both parties filed motions for summary judgment.616  The 
Northern District of Texas granted International’s motion and dismissed RSR’s 
claims.617 
More specifically, the district court concluded that RSR could not recover 
from International, giving two reasons: (1) The “other insurance” clauses in 
International’s environmental liability policies limited RSR’s recovery to the 
amount of proceeds that the company had received under other liability 
insurers’ settlement agreements; and (2) Texas’s “one recovery” rule barred 
RSR’s collecting money from International because RSR had been fully 
compensated for its Harbor Island liability under the other settlement 
                                                                                                                 
 612. Id. at 856.  The following facts are relevant: 
In August 2001, RSR and International tried certain coverage issues relating to the Harbor Island 
claim before a jury, while reserving unripe coverage and damages issues for future resolution.  
Issues relating to the West Dallas site were severed into a separate trial and were later settled.  
After the jury returned its verdict on the Harbor Island issues, the district court entered judgment 
for RSR, declaring that International was: 
“contractually obligated to indemnify RSR for any remediation costs and expenses that 
RSR is or becomes obligated to pay to the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (‘EPA’) with respect to the EPA’s remediation activity at the Harbor Island 
site . . . to the extent such remediation costs and expenses are covered by [the] EIL 
Policies   . . . and are not otherwise excluded by the terms of the policies . . . .” 
The district court also determined that the EPA had made a claim against RSR, that RSR had not 
waived its right to coverage with respect to the Harbor Island site, that RSR’s Harbor Island 
lawsuit against International was not barred by the statute of limitations, and that RSR should take 
nothing on its common law bad faith and Texas Insurance Code claims against International. 
Id.  
 613. Int’l Ins. Co., 426 F.3d at 285-86. 
 614. Id. at 290. 
 615. See RSR Corp., 612 F.3d at 854. 
In March 2006, RSR moved to reopen the same federal district court case under 28 U.S.C.           
§ 2202.  Subsequently, International requested leave to amend its complaint to assert new 
coverage and damages defenses which had not been ripe at the time of the 2001 trial.  In February 
2007, the district court granted both motions.  International then amended its complaint to assert 
new defenses, among them that Condition 8 of its policies, an “other insurance” clause, precluded 
coverage of RSR’s Harbor Island claims because RSR had already been fully compensated for this 
liability through its settlements with the CGL insurers in the Harrison County state court case. . . . 
On July 12, 2007, the parties were realigned. RSR filed its original complaint on March 7, 2008, 
seeking approximately $13.1 million as its allegedly remaining liabilities on the Harbor Island 
claims, and International filed its answer on April 3, 2008. 
 Id. at 856-57. 
 616. Id. at 854. 
 617. Id. 
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agreements (Northern District’s Second RSR Decision).618  RSR appealed the 
district court’s adverse summary judgment ruling to the Fifth Circuit.619 
On appeal, the late Circuit Judge Garwood wrote the opinion for the 
panel.620  He began his analysis by carefully inspecting the various insurance 
contracts that International, its predecessor-in-interest, and other commercial-
liability insurers sold to RSR.621  Again, in 1981, the North River Insurance 
Company (North River) issued four environmental-liability policies to RSR.622  
Under each of those insurance contracts, North River promised to pay 
successive layers of coverage up to $60 million.623  There were multiple 
conditions, including this one: The per-claim limit was $30 million.624  
Additionally, the environmental-liability policies covered RSR’s operations at 
several locations, including the insured’s facilities on Harbor Island.625  In 
1993, International became North River’s successor-in-interest.626 
Under the environment-liability policies, International promised to: 
[I]ndemnify the Insured against all sums which the Insured shall be obligated 
to pay for compensatory but not punitive or exemplary damages by reason of 
the liability imposed upon the Insured by law on account of:— 
(a) Personal Injury, including death at any time resulting therefrom; 
(b) Property Damage; 
(c) Impairment or diminution of or other interference with any other  
  environmental right or amenity protected by law; 
. . . caused by Environmental Impairment in connection with the Business of 
the Insured . . . and in respect of which a claim has been made against or 
other due notice has been received by the Insured during the Policy Period.627 
International liability insurance contracts defined “Environmental Impairment” 
in different ways: 
(a)  the emission, discharge, dispersal, disposal, seepage, release or escape of 
any liquid, solid, gaseous or thermal irritant, contaminant or pollutant into or 
upon land, the atmosphere or any watercourse or body of water; 
(b)  the generation of smell, noises, vibrations, light, electricity, radiation, 
changes in temperature or any other sensory phenomena but not fire or 
explosion  
arising out of or in the course of the Insured’s operations, installations or 
premises. . . .628 
                                                                                                                 
 618. Id. 
 619. Id. 
 620. See id. 
 621. See id. 
 622. Id.  
 623. Id. 
 624. Id. 
 625. Id. 
 626. Id. at 854-55. 
 627. Id. at 855 (alteration and omissions in original). 
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And the environmental policies’ exclusion clauses excluded from coverage any 
liability for injuries or property damages resulting “from a ‘sudden and 
accidental happening’ or a ‘fire or explosion.’”629 
RSR also purchased several comprehensive general liability (CGL) 
insurance contracts, which covered RSR’s operations on multiple sites, 
including those on Harbor Island.630  Some of those CGL policies excluded 
coverage for an environmental claim unless the event was “sudden and 
accidental.”631  Other CGL policies excluded an environmental claim unless the 
event was a “hostile fire.”632  Still, other CGL insurance contracts covered 
environmental claims if those claims were “accidents and occurrences.”633  
Thus, in 1993, RSR sued fifty-three of its CGL insurers “in the 71st District 
Court for the Judicial District of Harrison County, Texas” (Harrison County 
action).634 
In the state action, RSR asserted that the CGL insurers had a contractual 
duty to cover the environmental cleanup costs as well as an obligation to pay 
third-party personal-injury claims that evolved from RSR’s operations on 
Harbor Island and at twenty-five additional sites.635  Furthermore, RSR argued 
that “accidental pollution” caused the third-party claims; therefore, the “sudden 
and accidental” requirement was satisfied under the CGL insurers’ 
environmental-liability insurance contracts.636  In the end, the Harrison County 
court adopted RSR’s reading of the policies.637  And, in the course of events, 
RSR and its CGL insurers entered into thirty-six settlement agreements.638  
RSR received an aggregate payment of $76,006,501 from the CGL insurers.639 
RSR dismissed the rest of its CGL insurers from the Harrison County action.640 
The commercial polluter also dismissed International as a defendant in the 
state-court action.641 
Returning to the federal-court action, International wanted the Northern 
District of Texas to declare: International has no duty to pay third-party 
pollution claims that originated from RSR’s operations on Harbor Island or at 
                                                                                                                 
 628. Id. (omission in original). 
 629. Id. 
 630. Id. 
 631. Id. 
 632. Id. 
 633. Id. 
 634. Id. 
 635. Id. 
 636. Id. at 856. 
 637. Id. 
 638. Id. 
 639. Id. 
 640. Id. 
 641. Id. at 855. (“RSR also asserted claims against International in the Harrison County action for breach 
of the Environmental policies, violations of the Texas Insurance Code, and recovery of attorney’s fees.”).  In 
the Harrison County action, RSR also asserted claims against International.  Id.  And, several CGL insurers 
sought contribution from International.  Id.  “Following the execution of the last of the settlements, RSR non-
suited the Harrison County action.”  Id. at 856. 
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another site. 642  The district court granted International’s request for summary 
relief for two reasons: (1) As a matter of law, the “other insurance” clause in 
International’s policy barred RSR’s recovery because the commercial polluter 
and its CGL insurers settled similar claims in the Harrison County action, and 
(2) Texas’s “one satisfaction” rule bars double recovery for the same claims.643 
To determine whether International’s environmental-impairment-liability 
insurance contracts also covered similar claims in RSR and CGL insurers’ 
settlement agreements, Judge Garwood carefully examined the condition 
clauses in International’s multiple policies.644  Each insurance contract 
contained the same “other insurance” provision.645  It read: 
This Policy shall not be called upon in contribution and no liability shall 
attach hereunder for any injury, loss, damage, costs or expenses recoverable 
under any other insurance insuring to the benefit of the Insured except as 
regards any excess over and above the amounts collectible under such other 
insurance; provided always that this clause shall not apply to any policy that 
is specifically arranged by the Insured to cover limits in excess of those stated 
in this Policy.  Nothing herein shall be construed to make this Policy subject 
to the terms, conditions and limitations of any other insurance.646 
Earlier, the district court concluded: (1) RSR’s CGL policies were “other 
insurance”; (2) The CGL insurers paid the full amount of proceeds to cover 
RSR’s Harbor-Island liabilities; (3) The “other insurance” clause precluded 
RSR’s receiving any additional compensation under International’s 
environmental-liability policies; and (4) RSR was judicially estopped from 
asserting the environmental and CGL policies were different because RSR had 
argued successfully in the Harrison County action that the CGL and 
environmental-liability insurance contracts covered the matching liabilities.647 
On appeal, RSR argued that the district court erred by failing to embrace 
the following points: (1) a payment under a settlement agreement is not 
                                                                                                                 
 642. Id.  
 643. Id. at 856-57. 
 644. See id. at 858. 
 645. See id. at 855. 
 646. Id. at 858 n.4 (emphasis added).   
Condition 8 is triggered where “any injury, loss, damage, costs or expenses [are] 
recoverable under any other insurance insuring to the benefit of the Insured.”  Thus, 
for Condition 8 to have been applicable in this case, (1) RSR must have had “other 
insurance” insuring to its benefit, and (2) RSR must have been able to recover under 
this other insurance for the same “injury, loss, damage, costs or expenses” it sought to 
recover from International.   
Id. at 858. 
 647. Id.; see also Ergo Sci., Inc. v. Martin, 73 F.3d 595, 598 (5th Cir. 1996) (reaffirming that the judicial 
estoppel doctrine “prevents a party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding that is contrary to a position 
previously taken in the same or some earlier proceeding”) (citing United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 378 
(5th Cir. 1993)). 
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“insurance” and does not qualify as “other insurance”;648 (2) assuming that the 
settlement payment was insurance, the condition clause only applies if 
International’s environmental-liability policies and the CGL insurers’ insurance 
contracts cover the same liabilities;649 and (3) the environmental-impairment 
and CGL policies covered very different third-party liabilities.650 
The central question for the RSR panel was whether recovery under the 
CGL polices precluded RSR’s recovery under the environmental policies.651  
And, writing for the panel, Judge Garwood concluded that the Northern District 
of Texas did not abuse its discretion.652  The panel also concluded that 
International did not have to pay any additional reimbursements.653  To reach 
that central conclusion, the Fifth Circuit panel found: (1) “RSR [never argued] 
that any of its pollution at Harbor Island was intentional;”654 and (2) the 
conditions clause precluded RSR’s collecting additional payments.655 
Regarding the applicability of the conditions clause, RSR argued that the 
district court erred by holding that a settlement payment could be “other 
insurance” within the meaning of the conditions clause.656  But, the Fifth 
Circuit panel concluded that RSR’s argument was flaccid.657  Therefore, the 
panel decided not to address whether the district court should have applied 
Texas’s “one satisfaction” rule to resolve this prong of the overriding dispute.658 
                                                                                                                 
 648. RSR Corp., 612 F.3d at 858-60. 
 649. Id.  See generally E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 82 Civ. 7327 (JSM), 
1997 WL 251548, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1997), aff’d, 241 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that 
“settlement agreements are not contracts of insurance”). 
 650. RSR Corp., 612 F.3d at 858. 
 651. See id. at 859. 
 652. See id. at 860-61 (“We decline to find an abuse of discretion in the district court’s holding . . . .  
Because RSR’s original interpretation of the CGL and Environmental policies allowed accidental pollution to 
be covered under both policies, and because the only pollution alleged to have occurred at Harbor Island was 
accidental, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by holding that RSR was estopped from 
arguing that the CGL and Environmental policies covered different liabilities.”). 
 653. See id. at 861-63. 
 654. Id. at 860.   
This is not surprising, since intentional pollution at Harbor Island would likely be 
excluded from the Environmental policies under Exclusion 4 (“Liability for 
Environmental Impairment, arising out of the Insured’s noncompliance with any valid 
and applicable statute, regulation or written instruction relating to Environmental 
Impairment issued by competent authority . . . .”) or Exclusion 13 (“Liability arising 
from the deliberate and intentional dumping or disposal of toxic or radioactive 
substances in the open sea.”).  An admission by RSR that its pollution at Harbor Island 
was intentional also might have led to new difficulties with the EPA.   
Id. at 860 n.5 (omission in original). 
 655. See id. at 858-59. 
 656. Id. at 858. 
 657. See id. at 859 (“By its plain language, the triggering of Condition 8 requires only (1) the existence of 
‘other insurance’ insuring to RSR’s benefit and (2) overlapping coverage between that other insurance and 
International’s Environmental policies.  The means by which actual recovery might be achieved under the 
other insurance in question, whether by settlement agreement or by judgment, is irrelevant to Condition 8’s 
applicability.  The existence of other insurance that covers the same liability as the Environmental policies is 
what triggers the condition, whether or not recovery under this other insurance is actually sought.”). 
 658. Id. at 857. 
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Why?  Put simply, the RSR panel embraced the district court’s conclusion: 
“International’s ‘other insurance’ clause deprived RSR of any right to recover 
more than it had already obtained from its settlements with the CGL 
insurers.”659 
Finally, “RSR clearly alleged in state court that its CGL policies covered 
all accidental pollution, whether . . . it was sudden [or otherwise].”660  To be 
sure, that position in the Harrison County action contradicted RSR’s position 
before the Northern District of Texas.661  Thus, in light of RSR’s inconsistent 
positions, the Northern District of Texas applied the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel.662  In the end, the district court declared that RSR was judicially 
estopped from asserting this point: RSR’s CGL and environmental-impairment-
liability insurance contracts cover different liabilities.663  On appeal, RSR 
argued that the district court’s application of judicial estoppel was an abuse of 
discretion.664  Judge Garwood and other members on the panel disagreed.665 
 
                                                                                                                 
 659. Id.  “Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err in finding that Condition 8 barred all 
recovery on the Environmental policies.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the take-nothing judgment of 
the district court.”  Id. at 863. 
 660. Id. at 860 (“The Environmental policies have nothing to do with whether or not the pollution in 
question can be characterized as ‘routine.’  Their exclusions are triggered only where pollution occurred in a 
manner that was both sudden and accidental.  Thus, the Environmental policies covered pollution that was 
accidental, but not sudden.” (citation omitted)). “[U]nder Texas law, the [sudden and accidental] clause 
contains a temporal element in addition to the requirement of being unforeseen or unexpected.  The sudden 
and accidental requirement unambiguously exclude[s] coverage for all pollution that is not released quickly as 
well as unexpectedly and unintentionally.”  Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat’l Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 554 
(5th Cir. 2004) (alterations in original) (quoting Guar. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Vic Mfg. Co., 143 F.3d 192, 193-94 
(5th Cir. 1998)). 
 661. See RSR Corp., 612 F.3d at 860 (“[I]n the Harrison County action, RSR took a very different 
position.  There, RSR argued that the CGL policies’ exception for ‘sudden and accidental’ occurrences could 
be satisfied by an occurrence that was not sudden, so long as it was accidental.  RSR argued that the CGL 
policies covered ‘all forms of emissions causing pollution liabilities, except for those resulting from intentional 
pollution.’   It urged the Harrison County district court to hold that the CGL policies covered ‘all damages 
from unexpected and unintended releases, discharges, dispersals, and/or escapes of pollution.’  In a letter 
ruling dated March 19, 2003, the Harrison County district court granted RSR’s request and held that ‘the 
sudden and accidental exception provides coverage for all unexpected and unintended pollution.’”). 
 662. See id. at 859 (“The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a position in a legal 
proceeding that is contrary to a position previously taken in the same or some earlier proceeding.” (quoting 
Ergo Sci., Inc. v. Martin, 73 F.3d 595, 598 (5th Cir. 1996))); see also Hall v. GE Plastic Pac. PTE Ltd., 327 
F.3d 391, 395-96 (5th Cir. 2003) (declaring that two elements must be satisfied before a party can be 
judicially estopped from asserting a position:  “First, it must be shown that ‘the position of the party to be 
estopped is clearly inconsistent with its previous one; and [second,] that party must have convinced the court 
to accept that previous position.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Ahrens v. Perot Sys. Corp., 205 F.3d 831, 
833 (5th Cir. 2000))). 
 663. RSR Corp., 612 F.3d at 859. 
 664. Id. 
 665. See id. at 859-60. 
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B.   Third-Party Victims’ Property-Pollution Claims Against Insureds and 
Liability Insurers’ Duty to Indemnify 
Substantive Question: Whether under Texas’s laws, a comprehensive 
general liability insurer has a duty to indemnify the insured after the insured 
polluted third-party victims’ property and persons and settled the victims’ 
class action. 
In DPC Industries, Inc. v. American International Specialty Lines 
Insurance Co., the general conflict between a different CGL insurer and a 
commercial polluter evolved over whether the insurer had a duty to cover third-
party victims’ injuries.666  But more narrowly, the disagreement was over 
whether several liability insurance contracts covered both the parent company’s 
and its subsidiaries’ activities.667  Before reviewing the third-party victims’ 
underlying claims, however, consider the complex organizational structure 
among all of the allegedly insured business entities.668 
DX Holding Company, Inc. (DX Holding) “manufactures and distributes 
water treatment chemicals and chemical products.  [It offers] chlorine, caustic 
soda, sulfur dioxide, anhydrous ammonia, sodium hypochlorite (bleach), and 
water treatment chemicals.  The company was founded in 1946 and is based in 
Houston, Texas.”669  DPC Industries, Inc. (Industries) is a subsidiary of DX 
Holding.670  DPC Enterprises and DPC Enterprises, L.P. (collectively 
Enterprises) are general partners.671  But, DPC Enterprises, Inc. is also a 
subsidiary of Industries.672  In the opinion, DX Holding and its subsidiaries are 
jointly referred to as the DX entities or DX subsidiaries.673 
Enterprises owns and operates a chlorine repackaging facility in Festus, 
Missouri.674  And, “Industries provides technical support and training for the 
Festus facility.”675  On August 14, 2002, chlorine gas was released from the 
Festus facility.676  Consequently, numerous third parties filed pollution-related 
claims for bodily injury and property damage.677  The complainants filed 
lawsuits against Enterprises and DX Holding’s other subsidiaries.678  In 
                                                                                                                 
 666. See DPC Indus., Inc. v. Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 609, 612 (5th Cir. Aug. 2010) 
(Panel comprised of Circuit Judges W. Eugene Davis, Catharina Haynes, and Jerry Smith). 
 667. See id. at 611, 614-15. 
 668. See id. at 611; infra notes 669-72 and accompanying notes. 
 669. Company Overview of DX Holding Company, Inc., BLOOMBERG, http://investing.businessweek. 
com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=4253469 (last visited Mar. 3, 2012). 
 670. DPC Indus., 615 F.3d at 611. 
 671. Id. 
 672. Id. 
 673. Id. 
 674. Id. at 612. 
 675. Id. 
 676. Id. 
 677. Id. 
 678. Id. 
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addition, a Missouri state court certified a class-action lawsuit after unsettled 
third-party claims were consolidated as Adams v. DPC Enterprises.679 
Furthermore, “Goodwin Brothers Construction Company filed a separate 
lawsuit against Enterprises, Industries and Jason Wisdom, manager of the 
Festus facility.”680  “The Goodwin suit specifically named Industries as a 
defendant.”681 
American International Specialty Lines Insurance Co. (AISLIC) insured 
DX Holding under two CGL insurance contracts—primary and umbrella 
policies.682  Under the CGL primary policy, AISLIC’s limit of liability was $1 
million per occurrence.683  More specifically, under the primary policy’s 
Coverage A provision, AISLIC agreed to pay general damages “for bodily 
injury and property damage, ” and, under Coverage D, the insurer promised to 
reimburse DX Holding for pollution-related expenditures.684 AISLIC’s 
aggregate liability under the CGL primary policy, however, was just $2 
million.685  On the other hand, the CGL umbrella policy provided a second 
layer of coverage.686  Under the umbrella, the policy limits for Coverages A and 
D were $10 million and $4 million, respectively.687 
Although DX Holding is the named insured under the two insurance 
contracts, DX Service Company’s agent, Jack Holcomb, reported the accident 
to AISLIC.688  And, Holcomb informed AISLIC that DX Holding wanted the 
insurer to make reimbursements under the terms of Coverage A, rather than 
Coverage D.689  In an August 26, 2002 letter and subject to a reservation of 
rights, AISLIC accepted coverage for the claims under Coverage D, the smaller 
policy limit.690  And “[t]he only insured referenced in the August 26 letter [was] 
DX Holding—the parent of Industries and Enterprises.”691  To complicate the 
matter, on August 27, 2002, DX Holding responded.692  In the August 27th 
                                                                                                                 
 679. Id. 
 680. Id. 
 681. Id. 
 682. Id. at 611. 
 683. See id. 
 684. Id. 
 685. Id. 
 686. Id. 
 687. Id. 
 688. See id. at 612. 
 689. Id. (“Starting in October 2005, Holcomb of DX Service Company began efforts to obtain coverage 
under Coverage A and thereby obtain the benefit of the higher liability policy limit for subsidiaries of DX 
Holding who were not owners of the Festus facility.  Numerous letters were sent to and responses received 
from AISLIC.  Holcomb notified AISLIC that the claims asserted against DX entities which did not own and 
operate the Festus plant, including Industries, were entitled to the benefit of coverage A in the policy.  Mr. 
Holcomb noted that those entities do not own and operate the Festus facility and that the allegations involved 
claims of negligent training, supervision and maintenance of the facility.”). 
 690. Id. 
 691. Id. 
 692. Id. 
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letter, however, DX Holding only mentioned DPC Enterprises, L.P. and that 
subsidiary’s activities.693 
Ultimately, on behalf of the DX entities, AISLIC settled multiple third-
party claims and actions.694  Every settlement agreement contained a release for 
all DX entities, including Industries.695  AISLIC also settled the Goodwin 
lawsuit, paying $450,000.696  In fact, AISLIC obtained releases for all 
defendants, including Industries.697  In addition, AISLIC covered the defense 
costs for all the DX entities, including Industries.698  AISLIC, however, did not 
settle the Adams suit against DX entities, including Industries.699  And after 
exhausting the policy limit under Coverage D-2, AISLIC withdrew its 
defense.700  Using their funds, Industries and its affiliates settled the Adams suit 
for $9,400,000.701 
Citing the pollution exclusion clause in the insurance contract, AISLIC 
refused to pay any proceeds under Coverage A of the general liability policy.702 
In response, Industries, rather than DX Holding, filed a breach of contract 
action against AISLIC in a Texas state court.703  Industries sought 
reimbursement to cover its settlement costs, a “$6 million differential between 
the policy limits of Coverage A and the policy limits of Coverage D [under] the 
umbrella policy.”704  Again, under Coverage A, AISLIC’s limit of liability was 
$10,000,000, and the CGL insurer’s limit of exposure for pollution damage was 
only $4,000,000 under Coverage D.705  Quite simply, Industries wanted to 
secure as much insurance compensation as possible under Coverage A.706 
AISLIC timely removed the case to the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas.707  And shortly thereafter, the CGL insurer filed a 
motion for summary judgment, claiming that several exclusion provisions 
precluded Industries’s receiving any insurance remuneration under Coverage 
A.708  Industries filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.709  The district 
court granted AISLIC’s motion for summary relief, finding primarily that       
(1) AISLIC satisfied its contractual obligation under Coverage D-2, and (2) an 
                                                                                                                 
 693. Id. 
 694. Id. 
 695. Id. 
 696. Id. 
 697. Id. 
 698. Id. 
 699. Id. 
 700. Id. 
 701. Id. 
 702. See id. 
 703. See id. at 612-13. 
 704. Id. at 613. 
 705. Id. at 611. 
 706. Id. 
 707. See id. at 610, 613. 
 708. Id. at 613. 
 709. Id. 
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exclusion clause precluded the subsidiary’s collecting any additional insurance 
proceeds under Coverage A.710  Industries appealed.711 
Circuit Judge Davis wrote the DPC Industries opinion.712  And, on appeal, 
the general question was whether AISLIC’s favorable summary judgment 
award was warranted.713  More narrowly, the question was whether AISLIC had 
a contractual duty to pay additional funds under the CGL policy’s Coverage A 
provision.714  But, at the outset, Judge Davis and the panel observed that the 
litigants did not specifically address an important point: The Coverage D-2—a 
pollution coverage clause—applied only when chlorine was released and 
produced injuries and damages.715  “Coverage D-2 states: ‘We will pay those 
sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as loss because of claims 
in the coverage territory for bodily injury, property damage or clean-up costs 
beyond the boundaries of the insured property [within the specified time frame 
of the policy.]’” 716 
Of course, the language in Coverage D-2 is significant for an important 
reason.  According to Industries, the complaints in the underlying Adams and 
Goodwin lawsuits alleged that Industries and other DX entities negligently 
maintained the Festus facility and negligently trained and supervised employees 
in the facility.717  Furthermore, Industries was responsible for providing 
technical support and training various personnel in the Festus facility.718  
Therefore, the DPC Industries panel concluded as follows: Coverage D-2 rather 
than Coverage A governed whether AISLIC had a contractual duty to pay 
additional funds to cover the third-party complainants’ negligence-based 
pollution claims and the pollution-remediation costs.719 
But, Industries insisted that it did not own or operate the Festus plant; 
therefore, the polluter argued that the court should not employ the language in 
the Coverage D-2 clause to resolve the dispute.720  In addition, Industries cited 
the language in an endorsement to the CGL policy to buttress its argument.721  
The endorsement read: “It is agreed that the following location(s) are insured 
property(ies) under Coverage D—Pollution Legal Liability, subject to all Policy 
terms, conditions and exclusions and shall be deemed listed in Item 6 of the 
Declarations.”722  On the endorsement, the Festus facility was listed as an 
                                                                                                                 
 710. Id. 
 711. Id. 
 712. See id. at 610. 
 713. See id. at 613. 
 714. See id. 
 715. Id. 
 716. Id. (alteration in original). 
 717. Id. 
 718. See id. 
 719. Id. 
 720. Id. 
 721. See id. 
 722. Id. (alterations in original) (“Item 6 is on the first page of the policy and titled ‘Insured Property: 
Coverage D Pollution Legal Liability.’”). 
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“owned or operated” location.723  But the Fifth Circuit panel embraced the 
district court’s analysis of this issue and concluded: The policy and its 
endorsement did not contain any language that required a specific entity to own 
or operate an insured property before the entity could obtain insurance 
compensation for personal injuries or damages emanating from the insured 
facility.724 
The DPC Industries panel also reviewed two other relevant insurance 
provisions.725  One was entitled “Separation of Insureds.”  It read: “Except with 
respect to the Limits of Insurance, and any rights or duties specifically assigned 
to the first Named Insured, this insurance applies: (a) As if each named Insured 
were the only Named Insured; and (b) Separately to each insured against whom 
claim is made or suit is brought.”726 
The policy also contained a “covered by other coverages exclusion” or an 
“exclusion u” clause.727  That clause outlined the exclusions under Coverage 
A.728  It stated that Coverage A did not apply to: 
Any claim or part thereof which may be alleged as covered under this 
Coverage of this Policy, if we have accepted coverage or coverage has been 
held to apply for such claims or part thereof under any other Coverage in this 
Policy.  This exclusion does not apply to any claim for medical expenses 
under Coverage C caused by bodily injury which is covered under Coverage 
A.729 
But a similar exclusion clause limited AISLIC’s exposure under coverage 
provisions D-1 and D-2.730  It stated that Coverage D did “not apply to claims 
or loss:  a. Which may be alleged as covered in whole or in part under this 
Coverage of this Policy, if we have accepted coverage or if coverage has been 
held to apply for such claim under any other Coverage of this Policy.”731 
Like the district court, the Fifth Circuit panel concluded: (1) The exclusion 
clauses were designed to prevent insurance coverage stacking, and (2) They 
were inserted to communicate clearly that Coverage A general liability clause 
and Coverage D-2 pollution-related clause “are mutually exclusive for each 
insured.”732  But, on appeal, Industries argued that exclusion u did not apply to 
the facts in the case because (1) Industries never sought “any other coverage 
[under] the policy”; and (2) AISLIC, presumably, never accepted another 
                                                                                                                 
 723. Id. 
 724. Id. at 611, 613.  “Endorsement No. 2 to the policy adds a Broad Form Named Insured definition 
which includes as a named insured any subsidiary or subsidiary thereof of the named insured.”  Id. at 611. 
 725. See id. at 611. 
 726. Id. 
 727. Id. 
 728. Id. 
 729. Id. (emphasis added). 
 730. Id. 
 731. Id. at 611 n.1 (emphasis added). 
 732. Id. at 611-12. 
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pollution-related claim under any other coverage provision in the policy.733 
Certainly, AISLIC defended Industries subject to a reservation of rights.734  
Still, Industries insisted that the legal defense was not an “acceptance of 
coverage.”735  Furthermore, as discussed above, AISLIC settled multiple third-
party claims and actions on behalf of Enterprises.736  Yet, Industries argued 
relentlessly that the settlements did not constitute an “acceptance of 
coverage.”737 
To resolve one prong of the controversy, the panel focused carefully on 
certain words and phrases that appeared in the exclusion u clause.738  The 
pertinent language stated that the insured would not receive any additional 
insurance compensation under Coverage A after AISLIC accepts a claim and 
pays insurance proceeds under “any other coverage [provision in] the 
policy.”739  Writing for the DPC Industries panel, Judge Davis declared that the 
clause plainly gave AISLIC a contractual right to cover Industries’ liabilities 
under Coverage D rather than under Coverage A.740 
On appeal, however, Industries stressed that AISLIC settled the third-party 
claims and actions on behalf of Enterprises rather than on behalf of 
Industries.741  And Judge Davis  forthrightly acknowledged that the facts were 
blurred respecting whether some or all of the DX entities were covered under 
AISLIC’s CGL insurance contract.742  Still, Judge Davis embraced AISLIC’s 
argument and the district court’s ruling: AISLIC satisfied its obligations 
because the liability insurer defended Industries against the third parties’ 
chlorine pollution, personal injury, and property damage claims.743  To reach 
that conclusion, Judge Davis applied a rule of the panel and observed: Under a 
“typical comprehensive general liability policy[,] . . . defense costs are excluded 
                                                                                                                 
 733. Id. at 613-14 (“Industries [insisted] that it only sought coverage under Coverage A and [that] well-
settled Texas law gives the insured the right to choose the applicable coverage.”). 
 734. Id. at 614. 
 735. Id. 
 736. Id. 
 737. Id. 
 738. See id. 
 739. Id. 
 740. Id. 
 741. Id. 
 742. Id. at 614-15 (“[N]either side did a good job early on to clarify what entities were requesting 
coverage or what entities were being defended or indemnified by AISLIC.  After the accident was reported by 
Holcomb, who is listed as representing DX Service Company, AISLIC responded and referred to the insured 
as DX Holding Company.  Neither Industries nor Enterprises, the actual owner of the facility, was mentioned. 
This pattern continued even when events in the Adams litigation and claims in the Goodwin case led Holcomb 
to request coverage under Coverage A in October 2005.  In that letter Holcomb did not mention the individual 
entities requesting coverage under Coverage A by name, referring only to ‘numerous other entities’ who were 
‘additional named insureds.’  Industries was not mentioned by name until January 2006.”). 
 743. Id. at 615 (“AISLIC argues that payment of defense costs means that it ‘accepted coverage . . . for 
such claims’ because the policy defines the term ‘claim’ as a demand alleging liability for a ‘loss under 
Coverage D–1 or D–2.’  Further[more] under the policy, ‘Loss, as used in Coverages D–2 and D–2, means     
. . . [c]osts, charges and expenses incurred in the defense, investigation or adjustment of claims’. . . .  Thus 
payment of defense costs is payment of a claim under the terms of the policy.”). 
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from the calculation of the policy limits”; however, “Coverage D was an 
eroding policy under which defense costs ‘count’ against and ‘erode’ the policy 
limits.”744 
In the end, the panel concluded that the Southern District of Texas did not 
err.745  The lower court correctly found that (1) “AISLIC accepted coverage of 
Industries under Coverage D-2 of the policy”;746 and (2) “Industries was 
precluded from coverage under any other provision of the policy because of the 
anti-stacking provision in exclusion u.”747  Therefore, the Fifth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s judgment and added the following:  
Having contracted for and paid a premium based upon both a lower total limit 
for Coverage D and an eroding policy, the insured cannot now rewrite the 
policy.  “[I]f the insured wanted a policy that had an unlimited defense 
obligation, rather than an eroding one, it should have contracted for such a 
policy.”748 
V.  SUMMARY—CONCLUSION  
To repeat an earlier observation, Fifth Circuit panels decided a wide 
variety of substantive questions involving insurance law from July 1, 2010, to 
June 30, 2011.  Generally, the panels’ opinions satisfactorily addressed 
litigants’ concerns.  And for the most part, the panels carefully researched the 
laws of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas to reach thoughtful and reasonable 
conclusions. 
                                                                                                                 
 744. Id. at 615 n.3 (citing N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 541 F.3d 552, 559 
(5th Cir. 2008)) (“In many liability policies, the policy limits refer only to the indemnity obligation . . . ,  and 
the obligation to defend a liability suit is not capped by the policy limits.  In an eroding policy . . . the insurer’s 
payments to defense counsel to defend the liability suit count against policy limits.” (omissions in original) 
(quoting N. Am. Specialty Ins., 541 F.3d at 559)). 
 745. Id. at 615. 
 746. Id. (“[W]e need not decide whether providing a defense under a reservation of rights under an 
eroding policy is equivalent to ‘accepting coverage’ to trigger exclusion u., because the record contains 
uncontradicted evidence that AISLIC provided indemnity coverage to Industries.  Industries was named as a 
defendant in the Goodwin case as early as April 2004.  The record contains a Settlement Agreement and 
Release of Claims, dated September 2006, to which Industries is a released party.  AISLIC paid $450,000 for 
this settlement.  Industries argues that because the payments to claimants under this agreement were made by 
Enterprises and reimbursement from AISLIC went to Enterprises, this does not constitute acceptance of 
coverage of Industries as a separate entity.  Industries cites no case law for this proposition.  Qualification for 
‘acceptance of coverage’ does not depend on whether or how the settlement was apportioned between 
Enterprises and Industries and the other named defendants covered by the Settlement Agreement.  Industries 
was a named defendant in the case and a released party to the Settlement Agreement obtained as a result of 
the insurer’s payment.  Industries clearly benefitted from the releases obtained in that agreement.”).  
 747. Id. 
 748. Id. at 615-16 n.4 (citation omitted) (citing N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 
541 F.3d 552, 559 (5th Cir. 2008)) (“In many liability policies, the policy limits refer only to the indemnity 
obligation . . . , and the obligation to defend a liability suit is not capped by the policy limits.  In an eroding 
policy . . . the insurer’s payments to defense counsel to defend the liability suit count against policy limits.” 
(omissions in original) (quoting N. Am. Specialty Ins., 541 F.3d at 559)). 
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Still, a few opinions were not well-reasoned.  And the following 
observation might be a plausible explanation.  Barring just a few controversies, 
the overwhelming majority of insurers and insureds filed declaratory judgment 
actions in federal district courts.  Presumably, the litigants wanted full-blown 
declaratory judgment trials to avoid full-blown breach-of-contract or bad-faith 
trials.749  On the other hand, it is arguable that insureds and insurers truly do 
not want district judges to conduct full-blown, declaratory judgment hearings. 
What is the evidence?  In the Fifth Circuit and elsewhere, insurance-law 
litigants have a feverish habit of filing unremittingly large numbers of summary 
judgment motions in declaratory judgment trials.750  Certainly, that practice 
requires district courts to spend an inordinate amount of time combing through 
and writing about large numbers of arguably unnecessary facts.  Given courts’ 
limited judicial resources and time, many judges award summary relief without 
interpreting the meaning of controversial words and phrases in insurance 
contracts.751  To be sure, fairly often the practice continues on appeal.752  Fifth 
Circuit panels conduct de novo reviews of summary judgment evidence.753  
And in the end, the panels either affirm or reverse the district courts’ summary 
judgment rulings.  But, all-too-many panels forget or refuse to interpret the 
meaning of the convoluted words and phrases in the insurance contracts.754  
And that failure leads to highly questionable and poorly reasoned opinions, like 
a few of the 2010–2011 insurance-law decisions.755 
Again, a declaratory judgment trial is an action in equity.756  As a 
consequence, federal judges have a considerable amount of discretion to 
                                                                                                                 
 749. Cf. Harborside Refrigerated Servs., Inc. v. Vogel, 959 F.2d 368, 373 (2d Cir. 1992) (“A common 
purpose behind both declaratory judgment availability and the doctrine of res judicata is litigation reduction 
and the conservation of judicial resources.  Declaratory relief enables federal courts to clarify the legal 
relationships of parties before they have been disturbed thereby tending towards avoidance of full-blown 
litigation.”). 
 750. Cf. Gregory v. Chrysler Corp., 181 F.3d 101, No. 97-4442, 1999 WL 282685, at *6  (6th Cir. Apr. 
28, 1999) (unpublished op.) (“The harder case, such as here, requires the district court to undertake a careful 
reading of the circumstantial evidence of record, construing that evidence, when the employer moves for 
summary judgment, in the light most favorable to the non-moving plaintiff employee.  Admittedly, this review 
is not an easy undertaking, given the great many summary judgment motions on which the district courts are 
asked to rule, with their ever-increasing and overburdened civil dockets.” (citation omitted)). 
 751. See Hon. Randall H. Warner, All Mixed Up About Contract: When Is Contract Interpretation a 
Legal Question and When Is It a Fact Question?, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 81, 117-18 (2010). 
 752. See id. at 116-18. 
 753. See, e.g., Shotek v. Tenneco Resins, Inc. 953 F.2d 909, 912 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 754. See, e.g., Canal v. Coleman, 625 F.3d 244, 247-50 (5th Cir. Nov. 2010) (considering only the 
contact’s meaning). 
 755. See supra Part III.A. 
 756. See Septum, Inc. v. Keller, 614 F.2d 456, 463 (5th Cir. 1980) (“Although the procedural distinction 
between actions at law and actions at equity has disappeared in Federal District Courts, . . . suits for 
injunctions and for declaratory relief, both traditionally brought as equitable actions are still governed by 
established substantive principles of equity.  The most basic principle of equity is the discretion of the Court.  
Historically, equitable remedies were granted only in cases where an action at law would not provide adequate 
relief.  The remedy granted by a Court sitting in equity was based on its ‘sense of need and justice’. . . .  
Plaintiffs in equity often sought declaratory judgments along with injunctions in order to obtain a formal 
declaration of their rights with respect to an existing conflict or one that was fairly certain to arise in the 
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fashion sound declarations of rights and obligations.757  Surely, a de novo 
review of summary judgment evidence originating in a declaratory judgment 
trial does not or should not preclude a Fifth Circuit panel “sitting in equity” 
from also consistently and thoughtfully applying settled principles of insurance 
law.758 
The supreme courts of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas have adopted 
five doctrines to interpret insurance contracts: the adhesion doctrine,759 the 
doctrine of plain meaning,760 traditional rules of contract construction and 
interpretation,761 the doctrine of ambiguity,762 and the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations.763  For sure, in the aggregate, the quality and predictability of all 
                                                                                                                 
future.” (citations omitted)). 
 757. Id. 
 758. See id. 
 759. See, e.g., Duncan v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 747 So. 2d 656, 674 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1999) 
(observing that “[i]t is well settled that . . . insurance policies  are generally contracts of adhesion”); Lewis v. 
Allstate Ins. Co, 730 So. 2d 65, 72 (Miss. 1998) (concluding that “[i]nsurance policies are contracts of 
adhesion  and as such ambiguities are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and against the 
insurer”); Arnold v. Nat’l Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987) (concluding without 
deciding definitively that insurance contracts are adhesion contracts because they “arise[] out of the parties’ 
unequal bargaining power” and they “allow unscrupulous insurers to take advantage of their insureds’ 
misfortunes” during the bargaining process). 
 760. See, e.g., La. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 630 So. 2d 759, 763 (La. 1994) (holding 
that the parties’ intent must “be determined in accordance with the general, ordinary, plain and popular 
meaning of the words used in the policy”); Blackledge v. Omega Ins. Co., 740 So. 2d 295, 298 (Miss. 1999) 
(holding that courts must give terms used in insurance policies their ordinary and popular definition); 
Transport Ins. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 337 S.W.2d 284, 288 (Tex. 1960) (reiterating that courts must give 
words appearing in insurance contracts their plain meaning when there is no ambiguity). 
 761. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Concord Gen. Corp., 665 So. 2d 1166, 1169 (La. 1996) (holding that “[a]n 
insurance policy is an agreement between the parties and should be interpreted by using ordinary contract 
principles”); Sessoms v. Allstate Ins. Co., 634 So. 2d 516, 519 (Miss. 1993) (embracing the position that 
“insurance policies which are clear and unambiguous are to be enforced according to their terms as written 
[like all other contracts]”); Balandran v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 972 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tex. 1998) (reiterating 
that insurance contracts are subject to the same rules of construction as other contracts). 
 762. See, e.g., Succession of Fannaly v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 805 So. 2d 1134, 1138 (La. 2002) (repeating 
that “ambiguous contractual provision[s] are construed against the insurer who furnished the contract’s text 
and in favor of the insured”); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garriga, 636 So. 2d 658, 662 (Miss. 1994) 
(embracing “the general rule that [ambiguous] provisions of an insurance contract are construed strongly 
against the [insurance company]”); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d 552, 555 
(Tex. 1991) (reaffirming that ambiguous language in an insurance contract must be construed in favor of the 
insured). 
 763. See, e.g., La. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 630 So. 2d at 764 (holding that a court should construe an insurance 
contract “to fulfill the reasonable expectations  of the parties in the light of the customs and usages of the 
industry”); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Miss., Inc., 427 So. 2d 139, 141 n.2 (Miss. 1983) (adopting 
the principle that “[t]he objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding 
the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would 
have negated those expectations”); Kulubis v. Tex. Farm Bureau Underwriters Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 953, 955 
(Tex. 1986) (permitting an innocent victim whose property had been destroyed to collect under an insurance 
contract for “loss reasonably expected to be covered”).  But see Forbau v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 876 S.W.2d 
132, 145 n.8 (Tex. 1994) (observing that Texas law does not recognize the doctrine of reasonable expectation 
as a basis to disregard unambiguous policy provisions). 
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Fifth Circuit insurance-law opinions can improve enormously.  And very likely, 
that will occur, if the panels’ de novo reviews of summary judgment evidence, 
which evolve in declaratory judgment trials, contain the following ingredients: 
(1) a careful examination of probative facts; (2) the consistent application of 
insurance-law doctrines to interpret the meaning of highly unintelligible words 
and phrases in insurance contracts; and (3) formal declarations of insurers’ and 
insureds’ respective contractual rights and obligations. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
